Rise and development of labour movements in the British Caribbean with particular reference to British Guana, Jamaica and Trinidad by Mark, F.X.
THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT
0 F
LABOUR MOVEMENTS IN THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE
T C
BRITISH GUIANA, JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD
A Thesis presented to the Faculty of Arts
of the University of Edinburgh
in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degfee of Doctor of Philosophy
b y




List of Tables ... v
I The British Caribbean in the 20th Century .• 1
II Workers and Occupations 61
III Labour Unrest, I896 - 1915 108
IV Pioneer Associations, 1916 - 1955 1^7
V The Working Class Revolution 230
VI Labour Movements since 1939 ..*.••...••.•• 283
Postface .. • • 3^3
Abbreviations used in the Text 327
Bibliography 329
PREFACE
This thesis traces the history of attempts to
establish laoour organisations in British Guiana, Jamaica
and Trinidad, and describes the blossoming out of those
attempts into mass movements. Special attention has been
paxd to describing the setting in which these movements
emerged. The importance of the peculiar characteristics
of West Indian society for the developing Labour Movements
has been emphasized. No effort has been made to examine
the relationship between organised labour in the three
territories, or to discuss Labour Movements in the British
Caribbean as a whole*
Writers on British Caribbean history either
avoid the 2Gth Century or treat it in summary fashion*
No systematic study of the history of labour organisations
in the area already exists, to ray knowledge. This thesis
is intended as a contribution both to the general history
of the British Caribbean in the 20th Century, and to the
more specialised topic of organised labour in the area*
It may also be of value for the comparative study of Labour
Movements, though no attempt at comparisons has been made
here*
ii
A study of this nature involves the use of some
sources not ordinarily employed by historians of the British
Caribbean. The proxiiaity of the period prevents the use of
Material ia the Public Hecords Office or the Archives of the
territorial Governments. Dispatches, especially confidential
dispatches, the minutes of evidence of various commissions
of enquiry, and police reports, all of which would possibly
reveal a wealth of information, cannot be consulted.
This would not be a severe handicap, were it not
that, the prevailing attitude to keeping records in the
British Caribbean is one of utter disinterest. The people
with whom this study is concerned, too, especially before
1939* are the ones least iikely tc have kept any written
accounts which would throw light on their activities. The
effects of a tropical eliaiate and frequent fires have con¬
tributed to the destruction of what documentary evidence of
this nature there was. Thus, all Cipriani's papers were
removed and destroyed upon his death in order to tidy up
his office for its next occupant who, as Secretary of the
TLP, should have realised their value. The records of both
the BGLU and the Trinidad Labour- Department were destroyed
by fire in 1945 and 1948,
As a result, newspapers have been the main source
of information for the early period, and reconstruction of
events has presented occasionally the familiar problem of
making bricks out of straw. For the period after 1939,
much more evidence is available, a great deal of it con-
iii
forming to the usual type. The detailed treatment given
to the early period, therefore, may seem paradoxical when
compared with the mere outlining of trends after 1939* I
feel however, that apart from the necessity to deal more
fully with the pre-1955 organisations about which there is
bo little known, developments in the British Caribbean since
1939 are too contemporary to allow of fully objective use
of historical techniques in their evaluation.
In addition to written sources, information was
acquired through the medium of interviews and checked when¬
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CHAPTER 1
THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN
IN THE 20TH CENTURY
The history of the British Caribbean colonies in
the 20th Century has been influenced in large measure by
events and ideas of the preceding 75 years. Most signi¬
ficant of these was the Abolition of Negro Slavery, which
gave citizenship to the large and growing Negro population
and which, viewed in retrospect, set the pattern for the
passing of political control out of the hands of the Europ¬
ean and within the grasp of the coloured, Negro and East
Indian population in the last 15 years. Although Europ¬
eans preceded both Negroes and Indians as settlers in the
area, they have remained such a small element in the pop¬
ulation that the tendency is to regard them as 1 foreigners*,
and the Negro and Indian as true 'natives'. Important too
has been the decline of the sugar industry, the result of
a complex of high costs, foreign competition, labour supply
difficulties, the loss of its protected taarkets, and the
traditional inability of the landed plantocracy to adapt
itself easily to environmental changes in society} with
the decline of sugar vanished the prosperity of these 'sugar
colonies', for whose possession nations had warred and bar¬
gained as jewels of great worth. And to weed the cane-
fields of the surviving plantations came a new clement in
the population, the East Indian ira migrants who remained in
numbers large enough to form an important racial minority
group in the South-eastern end of the area, where they are
now the largest racial segment of the British Guianese pop¬
ulation, and are expected to achieve the sane position in
the Trinidad population in the next generation.
From the relationship with the United Kingdom in
the same period stemmed formative influences, particularly
in the field of government. From the beginning, political
institutions have followed the British pattern, the old
representative assemblies being imitations of the English
Parliament. Crown Colony Government in the 19th Century
has been fol owed by a return of semi-ropresentativo insti¬
tutions, a ain on the pattern of the United Kingdom, One
can hardly expect otherwise. As Lord Halifax wrote sooe
36 years ago, "The whole history of the African population
of the West Indies inevitably drives them towards represent¬
ative institutions fashioned after the British model «••
they look for political growth to the only source and pattern
that they know We might add that demands for
representative institutions are more likely to succeed, in
1. Cud, 1679. (1922).
the case of a colony, if modelled on what obtains in the
metropolitan country, and that this consideration has no
doubt been an ever-present though seldom expressed factor in
the formulation of such demands*
But quite apart from the legacy of post-emancipation
developments, the changes which have taken place in the
British Caribbean colonies in the 20th Century have a pace
and a character all their own, and could not have been fore¬
seen, certainly, from 19th Century trends* One of the main
causes of this is the technological achievement© of the
industrial world of Europe and the United States of America
which have resulted in accelerating the "modernisation" of
non-industrial areas by putting them , so to speak, on the map#
Most notable from the point of view of this study was the
revolution in transport and communications of which the steam¬
ship (and more recently the aeroplane), the motorcar, radio,
the telegraph and the telephone are the examples that come
to mind. The 'shrinkage* of the globe which they made pos¬
sible brought current ideas and ideals into every West Indian's
orbit. More and more people, drawn from a wider circle
than was possible in the 19th Century, could travel abroad in
search of education or employment, and could see at first
hand what was happening in the outside world* Naturally,
travel was mainly to the United Kingdom or the United States
of America, apart from the flow of labourers to Central
America and Cuba? and the sophisticated ideals of indus¬
trialised societies were brought back to stir the aspirations
of an area dependent upon agriculture*
Corresponding with this revolution in transport
and communication with the outside world was the growth of
education, which had the effect of enabling greater use of
the increased facilities at the disposal of the Press,
European, and particularly United Kingdom news, has always
formed a large portion of the West Indian newspaper, some¬
times to the virtual exclusion of local reports; in Jamaica
where geographical proximity and population ties create an
added interest, United States news also figured prominently
from the beginning of the Century, And it was not news¬
papers alone which provided information for the rapidly
increasing element in the population which was talcing an
interest in the outside world. Books, periodicals and
other such media helped to bring the ideas and ideals of
Europe and the English-speaking countries to many a lonely
village, where the gleanings of an evening vigil by oil-
lamp or candlelight were communicated the next Saturday to
an interested audience at the village forum. The Two
World Wars have had a tremendous impact on the British
Caribbean; in particular, World War 1, in which many
volunteered for service abroad, and returned with ideas of
self-government, human rights, socialism and trade unionism,
to add to the ideological stock of a population to whom the
principles enunciated at the Treaty of Versailles were not
mere academic talk. Captain Cipriani, a white Creole
planter, who returned to lead Trinidad's embryonic labour
movement, is the outstanding example of this sort of influ-
1
ence.
The three territories with which this study deals
are the largest and most prominent in the area, both in terras
of West Indian development and in terms of the labour organ¬
isations which have emerged to date, A brief outline of
the framework in which the labour movement grew in each
territory is attempted at this point, as necessary to a full
appreciation of the role of Labour in the Caribbean context.
Constitutions and Politics,
The deciding factors in the political life of the
British Caribbean colonies have always been the constitutional
relationship between the individual territories and Great
Britain, and the governmental arrangements in the territories
themselves. In terms of its eventual implications,
1, For Captain Cipriani, see below, Ch, IV.
Emancipation was an even more signal revolution in West
Indian politics than in economics - it created the difficult
problem of the position of the Negro (and ultimately of the
Indian) in the scheme of things, and of their political
rights as equal citizens* The problem was not immediate*
All three territories, as colonies of Great Britain, were
to a varying degree under the control of the Colonial Office
ruling through its officials on the spot. Representative
assemblies in British Guiana and Jamaica in the mid-19th
Century had been highly oligarchic and undistinguished in
the sphere of effective government. The British Guiana
electorate in 1850-31 numbered 916, or 1*9% of the male
population over the age of fifteen;"'' Jamaica in 1864 had
. 2
an electorate of 1,903 in a population of 450,000. In
other islands the situation was no better. Crown Colony
government was held to be a more desirable alternative than
an extension of the franchise to the Negroes, and the
Morant Bay uprising in 1865 provided the opportunity for the
introduction into Jamaica of this system which had obtained
in Trinidad throughout the 19th Century. By 1900 only
Barbados and British Guiana retained something of their
1, Sir C* Clementi, Constitutional History of British
Guiana, (1928), p. 366.
2. W.L. Burn, The British West Indies. (1951)# P» 126*
old constitutions, the Dutch form of British Guiana's govern¬
ment having been liberalised*
The justification for Crown Colony government was
that it ensured representation and reconciliation of all
interests in the colony. It was even argued that the
official element were the representatives, in fact, of the
Negroes and Indians who, if given the vote, would have created
2
an atmosphere of 'carpet-bag' rule, and one writer has des¬
cribed it recently as "a sort of non-elective virtual
representation through the governor and the Colonial Office."
That this had ceased to be the case, at least in the opinion
of the working-class with whom we are concerned in this study,
in all throe territories in this Century is obvious from an
examination of such material as is available for the period.
The constitutional history of the 20th Century can
conveniently be divided into two periods, with the disturb¬
ances of the 1930's marking the end of the period of Crown
Colony rule and the start of the era of progress towards
responsible government. In his report in 1922, Major Wood
1, U.V, Sires, "Government in the British West Indies:
An Historical Outline," in Social and Economic Studies,
Vol, 6, No, 3, June 1957.
2, See Burn, op, clt«, pp. 142-147,
3, Sires, op, cit.
had foreseen that increased local representation in the
councils of government would have to be granted in response
to popular demand* In addition to the developments mentioned
above which raade for rapid change in the Caribbean after
World War I, he listed other specific factors which affected
the political situation - the willingness of the "coloured
and black intelligentsia ... to devote time and energy to
propaganda among their own people the grant of free
institutions to Cuba and the Phillipines by the United
States, and the exampie of Jamaica which, as we outline
below, already possessed a measure of elective government,*
In fact, just previous to his visit, Grenada had won in
principle its right to elect representatives to the Legis¬
lative Council, after a campaign in which Mr, T.A, Marryshow
sprang into prominence as leader of the new kind of West
Indian politican. But in the 20's, the demand for "the
inclusion in the legislature of a number of persons chosen
2
by direct election" did not include any desire for the
transfer of responsibility to representatives so elected.
The position in our three territories until the
changes effected after the disturbances of the 1930's was
as follows:
1, Cmd, l679, pp. 5-6,
2, ibid.
In Jamaica the constitution of I065 which sot up
a nominated Council of the •pure' Crown Colony variety in
place of the old elected Assembly had been modified and
amended in 1884 and 1395• It now provided for a Privy
Council to advise the Governor and a Legislature of 14
elected members and not more than 14 nominated and official
members presided over by the Governor with a casting vote
only# Any nine of the elected members could veto a money
bill or a new tax, while the unanimous vote of all fourteen
elected representatives could veto any proposal whatsoever#*
Against this veto, the Governor possessed reserve powers to
carry out any measures declared by him to be of *paramount
importance', powers which in practice he never used. The
franchise for candidates and electorate was based on property
and income qualifications. As fixed by Acts of 1908 and
1909 which reduced the levels fixed in 1884, the suffrage
was open to all adult males paying 10/- in rates on real
property or 30/- on personal property, or receiving a salary
2
or wage of £50 or more a year; women were admitted with
higher qualifications in 1919# "The franchise for both
Legislative Council and the Parochial Boards are low and the
1# Hume Wrong, Government of the West Indies (1923)»
pp. 125-129; Cmd# 1679. P. 11.
2. Wrong, op. eit., p. 130.
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great majority of the electors are persons of coloured or
African descent" wrote Major Wood in 1922. As far as the
Legislative Council franchise is concerned - that for the
Parochial Boards was slightly lower - this view was open to
serious criticism. A wage of £50 a year nieant earnings of
3/2}M# a day six days a week for 5- weeks a year; this was
far in excess of the rates paid even to skilled labour in
Kingston at the time# The working-class was effectively
excluded from participation in the politics of the day. In
fact, there was general political apathy* Wrong tells us
that such interest as there was in elections was confined to
the white and a few of the coloured inhabitants - a view
which is more in conformity with the evidence available than
Major Wood's opinion - and concludess "It seems impossible
to claim that tSie large majority of the people of Jamaica
takes even a momentary interest in the choice of representatives
,».##"* The numbers on the electoral lists lead us to this
conclusion as well#
1896 - 38,376 1905 -6 - 18,607
1901 ~ 16,256 1910-U - 27,257
Six seats were not contested in the 1906 elections, and in the
remaining eight divisions only 1,628 votes were cast# The
figures for 1920 tell a similar stery*
One result of this restriction of the franchise to
1# Wrong, op. cit., p. 30*
persons of property and income was that workers as a class
were compelled to rely upon the goodwill of individual elected
members for the protection and furtherance of their interests,
a pattern which we find also in the other territories. This
was made increasingly possible in Jamaica after 1925 by the
changing composition of the Council, which, with only 1 Negro
member in 1910 (and five coloured councillors) had by 1935
been 'degraded into a Council of black men', to cite some
1
contemporary opinions. This was a reflection of a change
in the political attitude of the Negro and coloured groups
which had already been hinted at in the Wood Report, and of
a growing interest in elections and the choice of represent¬
atives on the part of those who could qualify for the franchise.
The figures for the four elections held between 1920 and the
riots demonstrate this convincingly.
Jamaica Elections, 1920-35






1920 42,46? 3,858 9 21,25
1925 54,678 15,357 4 34,87
1930 66,626 28,178 1 46.40
1935 66,085 27,545 2 48.23
Source: Calculated from Jamaica Blue Books
1. Quoted in Sires,"Modified Crown Colony Government in
Jaraaicrt', Socio 1 and Economic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, June
1955.
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Of the elected members sympathetic to Labour, the chief was
J.A.G. Sniith, a coloured barrister who sat as Member for
Clarendon from 1917 until his death in 19;l2, and who sponsored
the passing of the Trade Unions Law in 1919* As president of
the Representative Government Association which agitated for
constitutional reform after 1920, he had the support of the
Kingston workers - whom Major Wood dismissed as 'the radieal
and least substantial elements in the town',* and such Negro
opinion as was organised in the United Negro Improvement
2
Association* The demands of the Representative Government
Association, and of the Political Reform Association which
worked along with it, were vague, apart from a general desire
to increase the control of elected members over fin-" ce by
giving them a majority in the Council. The negotiations
broke down, after Major Wood had made his recommendations for
a now constitution, on the question of the reserve powers
vested in the Governor to override decisions of the majority
#•???;taK.V? .
on matters of paramount interest. There was no further con¬
stitutional change until 19;*4»
Trinidad had never had representative institutions
at the central government level in the 19th Century, the
Governor remaining practically an autocrat after its capture
1. Cmd, l6?9« P» 13.
Sires, op. cit.
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from Spain until l831» The presence of a substantial number
of free coloured citizens of French origin had been one of
the reasons for the refusal of representative government to
the island in l8l0,* Movements for constitutional reform
in I85O and the lBdQ's produced little result and from 1898
until 1924, the Legislative Council was composed of 11
officials and 11 nominated unofficial members, the Governor
having both an original and a casting vote. The failure
to secure any degree of elective government had the effect
of focussing political attention on the Port-of-Spain
Town Council, an elected body which ran into financial
difficulties and was replaced by Tom Commissioners nominated
by the Governor in Xo99. The dispute between the Town Council
and the Government brought to the fore the coloured and Negro
professionals, many of them of free coloured ancestry, and
paved the way for an alliance with the city artisans, who
claimed to speak for the entire Negro working-class. It was
inevitable that some, at least, of these leaders should ne
nominated to the Legislative Council, In the successful
struggle for the restoration of the Port-of-Spain City Council
the artisans played a great part, under the leadership of
Alfred Richards and his Working Men's Association. Part of
1. Uewan Craig, The Legislative Council of Trinidad and
Tobago. (1952), p. 15.
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the difficulty was that the island was divi ed into a number
of racial and Interest groups, each concerned only with the
effect of any change on its own position; a useful des¬
cription of some of these is to be found in Major Wood's
Report.* Moreover, even at that time, great importance was
attached to avoiding any change which might create in the
minds of investors in the oil and asphalt industries of the
island fears or doubts about the stability of the local
political scene. The campaign in favour of the constitution
was led by a Legislative Refirm Committee, which claimed to
2
speak for the middle-class and for the peasants. One of
its most outspoken members was Captain Cipriani, at that
time an honourary committee member of the Trinidad Working
3
Men's Association which had been resurrected after the war.
The Constitution provided for a Legislative Council of 12
? 4
official, 6 nominated and 7 elected members, with the Governor
as President having both an original and a casting vote. The
Governor was advised by an Executive Council of 3 ex-officio,
5
1 official and 1 nominated member.
1. Cmd. l6?9t PP. 23-25.
2. ibid.
3. For the TWA see below Chs. Ill & IV.
4. One of the 7 electives sat for the Island of Tobago.
3. Craig, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
Franchise qualifications for both candidates and
voters were higher than in Jamaica and enough to exclude the
working-class. They were: i) ownership or occupancy of
property rated at £12.10 in a borough or £10 elsewhere; or
ii) payment of an annual rent of the same amount; or iii)
occupancy of property paying 10/- a year land tax; or iv)
an annual salary of £62,10,* Besides, voters were required
to understand spoken English, a provision which operated
against the large East Indian population. Women over 30
could vote if they satisfied the general requirements. The
measure of representation brought to Trinidad by this con¬
stitution was limited indeed; the degree of participation
granted to the population in general was small, as is shown
by the table below,
Trinidad Elections, 1923-1938
(7 Constituencies, Adult Population, 1921, 193,469 app.)
Registered Seats
Year Electors Voted Uncontested % Poll
1925 21,794 6,832 2 43.70
1928 22,020 2,407 4 41,19
1933 25,822 4,828 3 43.38
1938 30,911 3,592 3 48.18
Sources Calculated from Trinidad Blue Books
1. Craig, op, cit,, p. 39.
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The higher franchise qualifications in Trinidad meant a pro¬
portionately smaller electorate than in Jamaica (11.15% app.
as compared with 15.79)}* hut as can be seen, interest in
elections in Trinidad was greater until the mid-thirties.
The constitution did make it possible for Labour in
Trinidad to have spokesmen in the Legislative Council on the
same principles as in Jamaica though it did not allow them
to accomplish many tangible results. It remained in force
until 1945.
British Guiana's constitution between Emancipation
and 1891 provided for indirect election through electoral
colleges, based on a property franchise. There were two
bodies, the Court of Policy, which acted as both Legislative
and Executive Council, and the Combined Court consisting of
the Court of Policy plus specially elected Financial Repres¬
entatives, which had control over money matters. Popular
agitation led to constitutional reform in 1891, which pro¬
vided for direct elections based on property, tenancy or
income qualifications; but even after the franchise
I. Percentages are based on the figures in the respective
19^1 censuses of the population over the age of 30. Craig,
op, cit., (p. 40), bases his on the total population,
k5»9%) gets a more sinister picture of the franchise,
as over 1/3 of the population was under 20. His figure
for the percentage poll in 1925 is incorrect.
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qualifications were reduced by % in 1906, the incofae require¬
ment of £62* 10# a year was still high enough to exclude the -v
working-class. The Court of Policy was dissociated from the
Executive Council, which now consisted entirely of officials.
The Combined Court, in which 14 electives were a majority,
had control of finance, even though in the Court of Policy
the 8 electives were matched by 8 officials backed by the
Governor's casting vote. Under this Constitution a number
of liberal representatives, not all of them coloured or Negro,
sat in the Court, and both regarded themselves and were looked
upon as representing all the people of the country, but in
particular the negro working-class and peasantry. This was
illustrated in a dramatic fashion when Sir C. Clementi, Act¬
ing Governor in 1916 in the midst of a widespread movement
for the recall of the Governor Sir Walter Egerton, made the
claim that the official element in the Courts of Government
represented the unfranchised 99% of the population. His
words raised a storm of indignant denial from elected repre¬
sentatives, press and public alike.* Partly for this reason,
and because the officials could usually count upon the support
of such of the planters as were in the Court, the liberal
electives came to regard themselves as the opposition, in
practice if not avowedly.
1. See Daily Chronicle, passim, June/July, 1916.
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The friction between elected and official members of
the Court is mentioned by the 1927 British Guiana Commission
as one of its reasons for proposing a new form of Government J
"The Government ... have never been able to govern
The Commission took the view that the 1891 Constitution was
an impediment to the proper development of the country#
Five years before, Major Wood had found no grounds for a
material change of constitution, and had expressed the opinion
that to raise without adequate cause any question of revising
the constitution, with its traditional features of which the
Guianese were so proud, would be a serious error. His assess¬
ment of the state of public opinion on the subject proved
correct - the change, vyhen it did come in 1928, was most
unpopular, though the planter interests supported it. The
Courts of Government established under the 1891 Constitution
were replaced in 1928 by a Legislative Council of 2 ex-officio,
8 official, 14 elected and 5 nominated me ;bersj the fran¬
chise arrangements remained unchanged apart from the enfran-
3
chisement of women and were modified only slightly in 1935*
As a result, tfte new constitution wade little difference in
the numbers of the electorate, though it had the effect of
1. B.G, Commission. 1927, P* 51*
2. B.G. Constitution Order in Council. 1928.
3. B.G. Constitution Amendment Order in Council. 1935*
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reducing the powers of the elected representatives by vest¬
ing control of finance in the hands of the Governor, who
could command an official majority* Votes for women seem
to have caused no increase in the size of the electorate#
Of the three territories, British Guiana shows
most political awareness in the early 20th Century, probably
because of its smaller population and of the opportunities
offered by the 1891 constitution. The electorate was pro¬
portionately smaller than in either Jamaica or Trinidad, and
transport difficulties must have made representation an ard¬
uous affair. The figures of elections held between 1921
and 1935 are given for comparison.
British Guiana Elections, 1921-35#






1921 6,206 4,304 1 79.53
1926 1,208 8,123 m 72.47
1930 9,253 3,270 8 82.07
1935 10,009 3,165 8 76.41
Source: British Guiana Blue Books
In 1915» Negroes formed 62#7% of the electorate, East Indians
only 6,4%.* No figures of the racial composition of the
1# Clementi, op# cit>« p# 367#
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electorate have been found for the above years#
The period 19^3 - 1937 is remarkable in the history
of the area for the rapidity of constitutional change. With
the exception of the "Renison Constitution" now operating in
British Guiana, new constitutions have meant an acceleration
in the process of handing over responsibility for adminis¬
trative and legislative policy to the local population.
This has had the effect of involving Labour in the political
control of all the territories in no small way. Constitut¬
ional change has been only a part of the general process of
development in the area resulting from the disturbances of
the 1930,s. Political developments will be discussed further
on in this study, .and only the actual constitutional pro¬
visions are included here. The chan es may be summarised
as follows:
Under the new constitution of 19^, Jamaica adopted
a bi-cameral Legislature consisting of a House of Represent¬
atives of 3^2 members elected by universal adult suffrage, and
a Legislative Council, of 15 nominated official and unofficial
members. An Executive Committee of 10 members under the
Presidency of the Governor armed with a casting vote was the
principal instrument of policy, responsible for the initiation
of all legislation including money bills. The Committee was
- 21 -
was comprised of 5 Representatives elected by the House, 3
officials nominated by the Governor, and 2 unofficial members
of the Legislative Council. The Governor had •reserve*
powers to disallow legislation after consultation with the
Colonial Office."'' A further innovation was the establish¬
ment of an 'embryo ministerial system1 built around the 5
elected members of the Committee. This development extended
2
to full ministerial responsibility in 1953. "
Developments in Trinidad have been similar.
Changes in the constitution in 1945 allowed of elections on
a basis of universal adult suffrage the next year, and with
lower property and income qualifications for candidates.
In 1950 further reforms were enacted. The Legislative Coun¬
cil was enlarged to comprise 3 ex-officio, 5 nominated and
18 elected members, with a Speaker nominated by the Governor
from outside the Council. The main policy-making instrument
was to be the Executive Council, in which the Governor - with
a casting vote only - 3 ex-officio me bers and 1 nominated
member were joined with 5 Councillors elected by the Legis¬
lature and holding portfolios.^ The unofficial members of
1. Ctad. 6244. 1943.
2. Sir II. Foot, Constitutional Reform: A new system of
Government for Jamaica, 1955*
3. Craig, op. cit., p. 158.
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the Executive Council were to be elected by the Legislative
Council from among its members* In 1956 this process was
extended: 1 ex-officio and 1 nominated member were excluded
from the Legislative Council and 6 electives added, the
Speaker being elected by the House. Policy was placed in
the hands of a Cabinet of 9 Ministers, with a Chief Minister
elected by the House.*
In British Guiana, the process of rapid constitut¬
ional development was arrested suddenly with the suspension
of the Constitution in 1953. In 19^3» the composition of
the Legislative Council as instituted in 1928 had been altered,
to consist of the Governor as President, 3 ex-officio, 7 nom¬
inated and 14 elected members. The Governor was advised on
policy by an Executive Council of 3 ex-officio and 5 other
2
members of the Legislature nominated by him. A system of
Advisory Departmental Committees consisting of Councillors
was established at the same time.
. Franchise qualifications
for both candidates and electorate were reduced considerably
in 1945. The biggest step forward came with the 1951
1• Report of the Constitution Reform Committee, (Trinidad
and Tobago). 1955*
B.G. Constitution (AmendPient) Order in Council. 1943.
4 of the members of the Executive Council in 1950 were
from the elected section of the Legislature.
3. Col, Wo. 280.
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Constitution, which introduced a bi-cameral Legislature.
The lower House now included only 2 ex-officio members, the
eleetives being increased to 24; the nominated embers were
transported to the upper chamber, the Council of State.
The elected members chose a Chief Minister and 5 other Min¬
isters with portfolios to sit in the Executive Council along
with the 2 ex-officio members and 1 member elected from the
Council of State. Adult suffrage was introduced, and the
property and income qualifications for candidates were abol¬
ished** The suspension of the Constitution in 1953 was
followed by a period of interim rule by a wholly nominated
council which preserved, however, the practice of having
ministers (now called Members) responsible for the adminis¬
tration of various departments*. Recent amendments under
the constitution adopted in 1957 have retained the ministerial
arrangement, while providing for a uni-caraeral Legislature of
14 elected and up to 14 nominated members, on a basis of
adult franchise*
It will be gathered from this sketch that partici¬
pation by the entire population in the political life of the
area is a recent development. Adult suffrage in Jamaica
dates from 1944, in Trinidad from 1946, and in British
1. ibid*
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Guiana from 1951» This has had the effect of making the
working-class vote, which is an overwhelming majority in all
three territories, the arbiter of political life, as is
reflected in the trend of politics and political parties in
the area since 19^0. Another effect of adult suffrage in
British Guiana and Trinidad has been to bring into promin¬
ence the East Indian population, whose franchise had been
restricted under the old arrangements; in both these territ¬
ories the East Indian vote is now of vital importance, and
recent events in British Guiana have shown that, with the
constituencies arranged as at present, the East Indian voter
can decide the composition of the Government.
Until the 19^0*s too, politics in the area has been
uninspiring, being remarkable mainly for the failure of the
enfranchised property-owning and middle classes to evolve in
any territory a lasting political party. The pattern through¬
out the pre-adult suffrage period has been one of independent
candidature* or pre-election caucuses glorified by the name of
parties, which dissolved once the elections were over. There
have been, of course, exceptions, and some parties have sur¬
vived post-election apathy for a year or two; the Trinidad
Workingmen's Association, which became the l'rinidad Labour
Party in 1932, has a long history and a continuous record of
public activity dating from the 1920's, But its very
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difference, so to speak, provides at least one explanation!
it was an association of workers to look after their inter¬
ests, with a large membership in the 1920's and 1930's.
The smallness of the electorate, and the nature of the con¬
stitution, iiade continuous party organisation seem a waste
of time. This tradition of independents in political life
is a factor which is apt to be overlooked in discussions of
recent political developments, especially in Trinidad, In
the new atmosphere of local responsibility for the making
and execution of policy, it is a force to be reckoned with
even in the most formally constituted party organisations.
The Economic Background.
The pattern of the British Caribbean economy was
set long before the 19th Century, In the mercantilist era,
productive enterprise had centred around the operation of
large plantations for the growing of sugar, the main staple
of the area; and in exchange for exports of tropical
products, foodstuffs and manufactured goods were imported.
The prosperity which this arrangement had brought to the
area in the 18th Century hey-day of the system was on the
1
wane long before slavery was abolished; indeed, the
1. See L,J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in
the British Caribbean (1932); Eric h'illiams, Capitalism
and Slavery, (1944)»
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economic arguments for emancipation were an essential con¬
tributory factor in the success of the abolition movement.
No comprehensive study has yet been made of the
economic history of the British Caribbean in the post-Eman¬
cipation period of the 19th Century, though a few specialised
territorial studies and a brief history of the sugar industry
exist. There is no dearth of information, however, as to
the nain trends of the period. Emancipation, when it came,
did little to alter the main organisational structure of
economic life. Sugar remained the chief export, the estate
remained the unit of production, food and manufactured goods
continued to be imported on a large scale. The drift of
the emancipated slaves away from the estates, which is dis¬
cussed briefly in Chapter II, led to the gradual development
of a peasant sector of the economy which, in Jamaica at least,
was of considerable importance. The sugar industry con¬
tinued to decline, for reasons already listed, and by the
raid-lB90*s it was in serious difficulties.
The difficulties and their repercussion on economic
life led to the appointment of the West India Royal Commiss¬
ion of 1896-97, the first of the modern series of official
enquiries into conditions in the area. The main features of
the economy emerge clearly from these reports - the continu¬
ing dependence on agriculture, the importance of the sugar
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industry in spite of its difficulties and of attempts to
diversify production, the vulnerability of the main exports
to competition and to fluctuations in world market prices,
the poverty of mineral resources, and the unaltered depend¬
ence upon imjorted foodstuffs and manufactured goods*
The Agricultural Economy*
The importance of agriculture to the British Carib¬
bean is evident from Table IV below, which expresses the value
of the principal agricultural exports as percentages of the
value of all exports at 7-year intervals since 1913* The
principal crops included here are, for British Guiana, sugar
and rice; for Jamaica, bananas, sugar, coffee, fruit, nuts
and spices; for Trinidad, sugar and cocoa* The number of
exports included in the case of Jamaica is the result of the
greater diversity of that island's agricultural exports, a
development which had already taken place before the start of
the 20th Century. The smaller territories in the Caribbean,
which we are not considering here, are even more dependent
upon agriculture since they have no mineral resorces to
exploit. By-products of sugar, such as rum and molasses,
are included as sugar exports.
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Table IV
Value of Principal Agricultural Exports
as % of Total Domestic Exports.
Year British Guiana Jamaica Trinidad
1913 70.9 70.5 78.3
1920 89.8 80.5 79.1
1927 65.3 85.7 46.4
1934 77.8 91.6 33.9
1941 54.0 85.9 58.0
1947 69.0 57.1 21.8
1954 64.4 63.4 16.4
Source: Calculated from Annual Reports , Stat-
istical Abstracts of the British Empire.
It is clear that only in the case of Trinidad since the
1920's do principal agricultural exports account for less
than half the value of all exports; for this, Trinidad's
highly profitable oil industry is mainly responsible.
The high degree of dependence upon agriculture
makes it necessary to pay some attention here to the char¬
acter of agricultural enterprise. In spite of the move¬
ment towards peasant holding after emancipation, and of
land settleaient policies which have been pursued officially
since the l890's in an attempt to balance the monocultural
plantation system, it has remained true to say that "sugar
estates dominate the agriculture and the whole economic
life of the West India colonies."* But estate organisation
1. Cp.kI. 6607. (19^5), p. 45
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is not confined to sugar; many other crops, notably cocoa
in Trinidad and bananas in Jamaica, are cultivated in large
plantations. These estates vary in siae from 13,000 to
1,000 acres in the case of sugar, and from 2,000 to 100
acres in the case of other crops.* The number of estates,
particularly of sugar estates, has decreased since the mid-
19th Century, there being, for example, only 21 sugar estates
2
in British Guiana in 1950 compared with some 400 in l838."i'
This decline in numbers is not attributable solely to estates
being abandoned as a result of the industry's difficulties;
there has been a continuing process of amalgamation of
estates to form larger units in all three territories, so
that even before 1900 "the number of estates abandoned did
not mean a commensurate drop in sugar production." As
late as 1939 there is evidence that in Jamaica small estates
4
were still being amalgamated. The general view appears to
be that large estates are necessary for further efficiency
in West Indian agriculture. Professor W» Arthur Lewis
argues that:
1» Col. No. 281, Vol. IV. p. 65? Cmd. 6607. p. 42.
2. Col. No. 281. Vol. IV. p. 65.
3. R. V. Beachey, The B..¥»I» Sugar Industry in the Late
19th Century, (I957), p. 125.
4. Cmd. 6607. p. 46.
'•On the economic count, the advantage is practically
always with large-scale agriculture. It is not
only that this system is better capitalized .....
It is also that it applies superior knowledge. It
cultivates the land more carefully, and processes
the product more efficiently. It is quicker to
use new and better breeds of plant and animal, to
take measures for controlling the spread of^disease,
and to adopt new techniques of management
The Moyne Commission felt in 1939 that even more amalgama¬
tion was required, where possible, in the interests of
efficiency.^ At the same time the Commission felt that
concentration on a single crop was preventing the estates
from making full use of the possibilities open to them -
this in spite of improved production techniques, modern
machinery, central factories and other advances which
evoked the conclusion that 'the equipment and technical
management of the sugar estates in general are good and
... they have now attained a reasonable level of product-
3
ivity from the land.• Many estates which did not grow
sugar also showed this tendency to concentrate on a single
crop, though they taually had lower standards of efficiency.
The current acceptance of the need for large-
scale agriculture is in direct contrast to views held before
1. Quoted in M, Proudfoot, Britain and the U.S.A. in
the Caribbean, (1954), P« i$9n»
2. Crnd. 6607, p. 46.
3* ibid, p. 44.
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the 19^0's« The ex-slaves had been encouraged by their
champions, the missionaries, to establish peasant settle¬
ments, and this movement had received official encourage¬
ment from the decision to sell Crc.ro Lands in small lots at
the end of the Century, In fact, as late as 1938 one of the
first reactions to the unrest in Jamaica was the launching
of a land settlement scheme. The ideas behind this policy
were manifold - to increase the self-sufficiency of the
Negro population, to lessen the economic hold of the planter,
to offset the effects of depression in tne sugar industry,
to effect greater diversity in agricultural production, to
cite only a few reasons. The part played by the peasantry
in Jamaica in establishing the banana industry in the l8o0's
gave a fillip to land settlement advocates and encouraged
those who, like Lord Olivier, regarded the planter as an
exploiter of labour, to propose peasant holding as the
solution to the area's economic problems. The disadvantages
of all-out promotion of land settlement as an alternative to
estate cultivation are obvious, even apart from the argument
that large-scale agriculture is more efficient, in the con¬
text of the British Caribbean; it can provide, at best,
only a short-term.solution to the area's problems,
The proportion of small holdings to large estates
may be seen from the number and size of farms as revealed by
the 19^3-6 Census,
Table V
Number and Size of Farms
British Guiana Jamaica
1 - 5 acres 15,203 37,903
5 - 50 " 6,966 25,774
50 - 500 " 127 1,953
over 500 " 4 540
Sources West Indian Census, 1934-6.
Trinidad has not been included as only some 30% of the land
area is suitable for agriculture,"'' and, as we have seen from
Table IV, its economy is less dependent upon its principal
agricultural exports than the other territories.
The large number of extremely small holdings which
the figures disclose is in part explained by the practice of
dividing a holding between the heir,-? of the proprietor on
O
his death," Though there must be a stage at which this con¬
tinuous process of division ceases, it is worth noting that
there were 6,707 holdings of less than 1 acre in British
Guiana in 1943*
Peasant farmers practise, in the words of the
official economic survey of the area, "a diversified kind of
non-rotational farming including a variable proportion of
permanent crops such as citrus, cocoa, coffee, bananas and
1. Col. No. 281, Vol. IV.. p. 201
2, Cmd. 6607, p. 42.
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pimento and fruit-trees often mixed or intercropped, while
short-term food erops - peas, beans, yams, cocoes, sweet
potato and maize - are cultivated either on the shifting
or sedentary principle#"* Though this description was
written of Jamaica, it may be applied to the other two
territories as well# There are also specialised holdings,
devoted to coffee, bananas, or ginger in Jamaica, and to
rice in British Guiana, in particular areas# Usually a
few livestock are kept - goats, jig®, sheep or cattle.
By comparison with estate agriculture, peasant
farming in the area has been described as inefficient and
backward, with unsystematic husbandry, low productivity,
shifting cultivation, and almost universal indebtedness as
2
its dominant characteristics#"" In fairness it must be
re embered that much of the land worked in this way is
marginal, or worse, and that even estate agriculture, with
its greater resources, has suffered from soil erosion and
soil exhaustion, drought, poor seasons and all the other
disabilities which the peasant can plead in extenuation.
The task of improving peasant agriculture has been impeded
by various factors, such as popular attitudes to farming,
the shortage of skilled agricultural instructors, and, most
1, Col# No# 281. Vol, IV, p# 128,
2, Cmd# 6607, pp, 43-44,
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of all, limited funds, all of which are discussed in the
official report 011 developments in the period 1339-52.*
The Sugar Industry.
It has often been said that the history of the
West Indies is in fact the history of sugar; and this is
still partly true of the frist half of the 20th Century,
Sugar continued to be of prime importance, though not so
overridiagly important as in previous years, to the economy
of the area. The story of the sugar industry since 1896
is one of ups and downs* In that year when sugar exports
comprised 53% of the value of all exports from the area,
(73% if Jamaica were excluded as well as gold exports from
British Guiana), the industry was in the throes of depress-
2
ion," Its already difficult problems were aggravated by
an outbreak of cane-disease, by competition from subsidised
beet-sugar in the United Kingdom market, and by a 50% fall
in prices since l88l« The industry was rescued by the
acceptance at the 1903 Brussels Convention of the recommend¬
ation made by the 1897 Royal Commission that the system of
bounties on beet-sugar should be abolished* As a result,
it enjoyed a moderate increase in prosperity until World
1. Cmd. 8575* 1952,
2, C* 8655, (1897).
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War It when the sudden disappearance of beet-sugar from the
United Kingdom market produced a boom which reached its
peak in 1920, Gradually, however, the situation deterior¬
ated once more as improved techniques and increased pro¬
duction in the Caribbean and elsewhere in response to high
prices created a surplus of supply which brought prices
lower and lower, while a subsidized beet-sugar industry in
Britain itself competed for the market. By 1929 the pos¬
ition was so desperate, in spite of Imperial preference in
the United Kingdom market, that the Olivier Commission was
appointed. The recommendations of this Commission* led to
increased preferences for West Indian sugar in both the
United Kingdom and the Canadian markets, and t ese, along
with lower costs both in field and factory, so stimulated
production that datput increased by nearly 70% in the
2
period 1928-1939* But sugar prices continued to fall in
the 1930's, and the stage seemed set for another crisis in
the industry when the International Sugar Agreement was con¬
cluded in 1937 fixing quotas for the various sugar producing
countries in an effort to stabilise prices. The Moyne
Commission argued that artificial limitations, such as the
I,S,A., on the productive capacity of the British Caribbean
sugar industry were likely to have repercussions on employment
1, Cmd, 3317* (1930),
2, Calculated from Cmd, 6607, p, 25,
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opportunities in the area/ Except in the case of Jamaica,
World War II did not mean any substantial increase in sugar
output, though from 1939-52 the British Ministry of Food
2
purchased 'all the sugar which the colonies could export#'"
Indeed, the tendency was for output to decrease in both
British Guiana and Trinidad. By 195®, Trinidad was pro¬
ducing 10% more sugar than in 1938, and British Guiana's
production had not increased, but Jamaica's had jumped to
1 3
2 /3 times the 1939 figure#
Perhaps the most important factor, both for the
sugar industry and for the economy of the area so dependent
upon it, has been the great fluctuations in price throughout
the 20th Century# Prices dropped steadily after 1880 until
1903, then rose slowly until 1914, leapt during World War I
to the peak figure in 1920, and declined rapidly thereafter
till in 1934 they were back to the 1904 level# The cal¬
culations given below of the avc -age export value of one
hundredweight of raw sugar from British Guiana in various
years illustrate the situation before World War II#
1# ibid, pp# 26-7.
2# Col# No# 281. Pt, IV, App., p» 273.
3# Calculated from ibid# pp. 67, 131, 202,
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Table VI
Average Price of British Guiana Sugar per Cwt.
1904 8/11 1923 25/7
1905 11/11 1924 20/6
1908 9/11 1927 16/8
1913 12/7 1929 12/4
1917 21/11 1934 8/11
1920 50/- 1937 8/11
Source s Based on Statistical Abstracts of
the British Empire.
The position would have been worse but for preference of
3/8.8d per cwt. in the United Kingdom market after vorld A'ar
I. The open market price of sugar in London in 1923 and
1924 (25/9 and 21/9) is on par with the figures given above
for those years. But in January - May, 1929t it averaged
9/3» and by the end of December it had dropped to 8/3.
The Second .Vorld War, sugar quotas, and bulk pur¬
chase by the Ministry of Food in the United Kingdom at
negotiated prices have helped to keep the industry in a
fairly prosperous condition since 1939# In fact, between
1946 and 1952, the negotiated price of sugar increased from
2
19/6 io 38/6 per cwt., (though these figures include pre¬
war amounts of freight and insurance).
The importance of sugar to the economy of our
1.
2.
Crad. 3317. p. 10.
Col. No. 281, Pt. IV, App., p. 273
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three territories lies both in the employment opportunities
which it provides and in its continuing value as an export
product. Its role in providing employment is more fully
discussed in Chapter II; it suffices to say here that in
1930 the Olivier Commission estimated that abandonment of
sugar production would affect 50% of the "working population
in British Guiana, 33% in Trinidad, and 10% in Jamaica -
the proportion in the other islands was generally much
greater.* In terms of export value, sugar and its by¬
products averaged over 60% of British Guiana's total exports
before 1939$ and, even with the development of bauxite mining
recently, amounted to 53.1% of total exports in 1954.
Jamaica shows evidence of a great recovery on the part of the
industry, which in 1913 could account for only 6.9% of total
export values; the average since the War has been well over
30%. Trinidad has not been quite so dependent upon sugar
exports, because of its cocoa industry early in the Century,
and then because of its oil. But in 1941, with the oil
industry affected by wartime conditions, sugar exports climbed
to 46,8% of the total; in 1954 they stood at 11.4%."'
It is to be noticed here that while sugar is by and
large an estate crop, a substantial number of peasants cultivate
1. Cmd. 3517. p. 13.
2, Percentages have been calculated from B.E. Statistical
Abstracts and Annual Reports.
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it in both Jamaica and Trinidad. These cane-farmers, as
they are called, have been given much official encouragement
since the 1930's. They numbered some 10,000 and produced
slightly less than */3 the total crop in 1950-51 in Jamaica
where they have over 35»000 acres under cane (to the estates'
53,000),''' In Trinidad they produced just over */3 of the
1951 crop, but nearly % of their estimated 10-11,000 number
2
grew less than 10 tons a year. In British Guiana, where
the physical difficulties in the way of cane-farming are
enormous, there were only 800 of them, producing about 1% of
3
the crop in 1950.
Other Crops.
In addition to sugar, a number of other export
crops have enjoyed varying success in the three territories
in this Cent ry. Bananas in Jamaica and cocoa in Trinidad
have both surpassed sugar at times as the major export crop,
and in British Guiana rice growing continues to increase in
importance, In addition, citrus fruit, coconuts, coffee
and tonka beans are useful minor crops, none of them suffic¬
iently important to warrant detailed mention here. The
great disadvantage of all these crops, in West Indian terms,
1. Col, No, 281, Vol. IV, p. 151.
2. ibid, p. 202,
3. ibid, p. 65.
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is that they employ fewer workers per acre then sugar-cane,
and their increased cultivation in preference to sugar would
result in an even greater incidence of unemployment and under¬
employment in agriculture, even though they are well suited to
a peasant economy. In addition, they are all subject to
disease of various kinds, a factor \?hieh has proved a serious
handicap in the past.
Bananas have been, and still continue to be, of
great importance in the economic life of Jamaica. The crop
was developed at first by peasant enterprise in the 1870's,
being ideally suited for small-scale cultivation as it needed
little capital outlay and gave quick returns. The estates
soon took it up, existing sugar estates being converted in
so :e cases, so that by 1893 there were 113 banana estates
2 1
producing about /3 of the total crop. After World War I
peasant cultivation expanded rapidly, reaching 44% of total
production by 1930. In the last decade of the 19th Century,
production expanded at a great rate, accounting for 32*4% of
total exports in 1896, and for more than 50% by 1910, The
banana trade suffered during World War I but recovered quickly
in the 1920's; in 1934 it amounted to 54,2% of all exports,
nearly 3 times the value of the next largest item, sugar,
1. G, Eisner, The Importance of the Banana in the Economic
Development of Jamaica During the Years ldtiO-1920.
(Unpublished Paper, 1958),
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It enjoyed tariff perferences in British and Canadian markets,
a minimum price per count bunch, and an agreement with the
shipping companies which gave it a great price advantage over
its Costa Rican competitors.* Decline set in after the
1930's, however. The spread of Panama Disease and Leaf Spot
over a large area of banana cultivation seriously affected
both output and quality. By 1954 bananas constituted only
2
17.4% of total exports.
The cocoa industry, in Trinidad, achieved prominence
in the mid-19th Century, and during the years 1370-1920 'the
3
golden age of cocoa,' high prices and high yields led to a
great deal of expansion. Cocoa exports amounted to 43.4% of
the Island's total as late as 1920 when sugar prices were at
their highest, and they had exceeded 50% in earlier years.
Even as late as 1933, when the industry had already begun to
decline and */7 of the acreage in 1931 had passed out of culti¬
vation, a little over half the total cultivated area of the
4
island was under cocoa. Decline of the industry set in in
the early 1930's and accelerated after 1939; its causes, in
addition to the difficulties of all agricultural products at
its inception, were soil exhaustion, lower yields as a result
1. Cmd. 6607. pp. 19-20.
2. Figures based on Eisner, op. cit.; Statistical
Abstracts; Annual Reports.
3. Col, No. 182. (1942), p. 58.
4. idem.
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of the increasing age of the cultivations, and competition
from newer cocoa-producing areas such as Brazil and West
Africa. It had serious effects on the peasant population
of Trinidad, who tended about half the area under cocoa culti¬
vation on holdings of less than 50 acres. Production fell
from over 27,OGO tons in 1929 to an average of 15,600 tons
in the eriod 193^-3^5 in 19^9, as a result of improved
prices and of efforts to rehabilitate the industry, almost
6,0t 0 tons were exported."^ Prices had fallen suddenly from
an average of #21.00 per bag in the period 187^-1923, and a
peak figure of #33«00 j>er bag in 1921 to approximately #10.00
2
per bag after 1933. Because of its quality, Trinidad cocoa
still enjoys a limited market in which it is used for blending
with other varieties. It amounted to 5% of total export
■5
values in 195^«
Rice cultivation began in British Guiana at the end
of the 19th Century among East Indian immigrants who planted
on abandoned sugar lands. The flooded coastlands of the
country are ideally suited to rice growing. Cultivation
prospered, the crop finding a market not only in British
Guiana itself but in the West Indian islands, where it is a
staple article of diet. By" 1931 more than 80,000 acres
were being reaped, though rice exports averaged little more
1. idem; Col. No, 281, Vol. IV, p. 203.
2. Col. Mo. 182, p. 65,
3. Calculation based on Trinidad Annual Report for 195^»
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than 5% of the total export values. The industry has con¬
tinued to expand, and its success story is in contrast with
the story of other chief crops in the area. This is per¬
haps the result of catering mainly for a market within the
area, with its only competitors the rice-exporting countries
of the far I3ast. Though rice has never even challenged sugar
as British Guiana*s chief export crop, over 93,000 acres were
under rice in 1950 (as compared with 65,000 acres under sugar).*
Prices have shown a tendency to rise since the 19^0*s, and
plans are under way for an expansion of output, which in 1950
2
was over 35% higher than before iforld War II, Most of the
rice is grown by peasants who rent holdings of 2 to 3 acres
on properties varying in extent from 200 to 2,000 acres,
many of them abandoned or converted sugar estates. A Govern¬
ment-operated rice development scheme with substantially
larger holdings has been initiated to experiment with large-
scale mechanical cultivation; if successful, it may well lead
to rice-growing on an estate basis. In 195'*t rice exports
3
were 11,3% of British Guiana's total,
Non-A. ;ricul tural Production,
Apart from agriculture, productive enterprise in
1. Col. No. 182. p. 103,
2. Col, No, 281, Vol, IV, pp. 65-66.
3. Bused on British Guiana Annual Report for 195^»
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the British Caribbean territories is concerned mainly with
fisheries, forests, mineral extraction, and small manufactures.
Fisheries are the least important of these, though fish forms
an essential part of the diet of the area. In spite of the
absence of any sizeable fishing industry, Jamaican waters are
considered to be overfished, but considerable reserves exist
in Trinidad and particularly in British Guiana, No reliable
statistics of the size of the fishing industry are available
as a great deal of the catch does not pass through recognised
markets. Distribution and preservation arrangements are
unsatisfactory. Fishing employs a negligible number of
people, most of them independent small fishermen. Locally
caught fish forms less than 50% of consumption in British
Guiana and only 15% in Jamaica; the residue is made up by
imported dried and pickled fish, mainly cod from Newfoundland,
to the extent of several thousand tons a year.*' Efforts are
being made to develop the industry.
ij.
Forests cover more than /5 of the area of British
Guiana and several valuable types of wood, including the
unique Greenheart, are to be found; but only */5 of these
2
timber resoarses are at present accessible. Considerable use
is made of timber locally, and there is room for developing
1* Col, No, 281, Vol IV, pp. 69, 135.
^* ibid, p. 68,
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the export industry which has been impeded by difficulties of
internal transport. The forests, mainly Crown lands, are
exploited by small operators using primitive methods, and make
little contribution to the country^ export trade. Neither
Trinidad nor Jamaica can meet even their local requirements
in timber, though Trinidad has substantial forest reserves
w ich are being developed to meet local consumption. Jamaica,
where logwood dye formed an important minor export until World
War I, has embarked on a re-afforestation scheme to counter
the effects of over-exploitation.
Outside of agriculture, mineral extraction is the
form of activity of greatest importance for the economy of
the area in this century. This is a development brought about
by the discovery of oil in Trinidad and bauxite in British
Guiana in the years before World War I, and of bauxite in
Jamaica in 1942. Before then gold and diamonds in British
Guiana and asphalt in Trinidad had been the only known min¬
erals of any comsercial value. Various other substances are
known to exist in small or undefined quantities - gypsum,
copper, iron, lead and zinc, chrome and manganese in Jamaica,
kaolin, manganese, columbite, titanium, tungsten, mica and
quartz in British Guiana, iron and coal in Trinidad* - but few
of them are exploited. There are signs that the need for a
1. Col. No, 281, Vol. IV, passim.
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thorough geological survey of potential resources has at least
been realised, particularly in British Guiana. The chance
discovery of extremely rich bauxite deposits in Jamaica in
1942, the existence of which was unsuspected only 3 years
earlier when the Moyne Commission reported, has been a power-
ful argument in favour of comprehensive investigation of the
area's potential before any schemes of development are final¬
ised.
Until now, Trinidad's oil has been the most important
mineral export from the area. Oil mining or exploration leases
cover nearly 89^ of the total area of the island and there were,
1
in 1950, 11 companies actively engaged in drilling , as well
as a number of dormant ones. Locally produced crude oil is
refined in two refineries which also xwroeess crudes imported
from South America. Petroleum exports have risen steadily
from 3»1% of the island's total in 1913 to over 7&/a since the
2
end of World ar II. Production since the 1940's has aver¬
aged well over 20 million barrels, though average output per
producing well has declined due to the depletion of reserves.
It is expected that deep drilling and marine drilling in the
Gulf of Paria already in progress will avert the danger of
imminent exhaustion of supplies to which estimates of known
1. ibid, p. 205.
2. Unless otherwise stated, calculations throughout the rest
of this section are based on Statistical Abstracts of the
British Lmpire and the relevant Annual Reports.
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reserves point* The oil industry is extremely important as
a source of Government revenue, to which it contributes
through income tax, customs duties on imported equipment,
royalties for oil produced on Crown lands, and excise duties
3
on petrol and kerosene. Over /5 of the oil is produced on
Crown lands** This direct contribution of little less than
| 2
% of total revenue in the 1950,s had grown to #16.9 million,
1 3
or about /3, by 1950* The oil industry has meant that the
Trinidad Government is relatively affluent in terms of the
area, but it rovides employment for less than */10 of the
labour force*
The Pitch Lake, as Trinidad's unique asphalt deposit
is called, has been rained from the surface for many decades
now (Raleigh caulked his ships there in the 16th Century on
one of his abortive quests for El Dorado), but no large-scale
industry lias developed, and it offers employment for less than
1,000, It is operated by a private company which holds a
monopoly from the Government in return for a guaranteed min¬
imum revenue. Production has increased steadily and stood at
4
132,900 tons in 1950 of which was exported* The importance
1* Crnd* 6607, p* 13#
2* idem.
3* Col* No* 281. Vol. IV, pp. 209-10.
4. ibid, p. 206.
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of the asphalt industry has diminished with the development
of the oilfields, and asphalt exports since the war have aver¬
aged less than 2% of the island's total*
Bauxite mining in British Guiana was begun in 1917
by the Demerara Bauxite Company, a subsidiary of the Canadian
Aluminium Company; a second company, with American finance,
started production in 1942, The industry employs, even now,
less than 3.000 people (about 2% of the labour force), but
bauxite has become the second largest export item, contribut¬
ing 27.6% of total export values in 1954. Production rose
frora 2,000 tons in 1917 to 500,000 in 1937, and to over
1,500,000 in 1950.1 Operations are entirely extractive, the
ore being washed and crushed and, in the case of the Dcmerara
Bauxite Company's product, transported to a transfer station
in Trinidad for transhipment to ocean-going vessels. The
extent of the country's bauxite reserves, though unknown, is
held to be considerable. In addition to ordinary taxation,
bauxite in British Guiana is subject to an ad valore . export
duty, but it does not bolster up the revenue to the extent
that oil does in Trinidad.
Gold has been worked in British Guiana since the late
19th Century, mainly in small workings with hand o orations,
as the deposits found so far have been alluvial. Though 4
companies are engaged in goldmining, there are also a con¬
siderable number of independent proprietors. Output has
1. ibid, p. 69.
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declined steadily since the 1930's, and in 1950 it stood at
only */3 of the 1933 figure. Diamonds, first discovered in
1387, are also found entirely in alluvial deposits, and min¬
ing is carried on mainly by small producers. Production
figures vary considerably from year to year. Both diamonds
and gold are subject to export duty, but their share of total
export values has decreased steadily since the 1930's.
Jamaica's infant bauxite industry has begun only
recently to make an impact on the economy of the island.
Three companies, one Canadian and two United States-owned,
are in operation, and Alumina Jamaica, the Canadian-owned com¬
pany, manufactures alumina (semi-processed bauxite) on the
island instead of shipping the ore unprocessed. The island's
bauxite deposits are extremely rich, though estimates of their
extent vary considerably. Bauxite and alumina exports
amounted to 18.4% of total exports in 195^*
There has always been a certain amount of manufactur¬
ing for export in the area, based on the processing of sugar
and the production of molasses and rum. This may be regarded
merely as a practical extension of the sugar industry. Apart
from these, there have been only a handful of industries
engaged in producing for export; Trinidad's long-established
Angostura Bitters industry is probably the only one of any
note, and it produced in 1950 less than ,k% of the island's
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export trade.* The recent emphasis upon industrial develop¬
ment has led to the introduction, under active Government
encouragement, of a number of light manufacturing industries,
ranging from laundry blue and textiles to cement and pre-
stressed concrete, which, it is hoped, will cater eventually
for neighbouring markets in addition to supplying local needs.
Besides these, there have been throughout this century manu¬
factures of articles such as soft drinks, beer, matches, soap
and cigarettes for local consumption. Statistics relating to
these industries have roved to be virtually non-existent so
far; but they appear, in general, to be relatively unimport¬
ant to the economy, and with only one or two factories employ¬
ing as many as a hundred workers, to have done little in the
way of providing alternative employment to agriculture.
In spite of the predominance of agriculture in econ¬
omic life, the area has remained highly dependent upon imports
of foodstuffs, as well as of necessities like clothing and
footwear. This dependence is only in part attributable to
the need to import items, such as wheaten flour, which cannot
be produced in the tropics. Emphasis has been placed for so
long upon production for export that little atte tion is paid
to producing for the home market. The role w ich imports of
i. ibid, p. 217.
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necessities play in the total iport figure is large indeed.
Food, drink and tobacco formed 31«0% of Trinidad's imports in
1925, 26.8% in 1939, 21.3% in 1950. Cotton, wool and art
silk piece goods, ap arel, boots and shoes accounted for an
additional 13.0%. 10,1% and 9*6% in the respective years.
Figures for British Guiana and Jamaica are similar, though
Trinidad is more dependent upon imported foodstuffs than they
are and buys much tropical produce frora the smaller islands.
In spite of efforts to reduce imports of this nature (exempli¬
fied by Grow-More-Food campaigns and local manufacture of
shirts and underwear), the two categories of imports listed
above amounted to 30.6% of British Guiana's total figure in
1950 and 30.O% of Jamaica's. Several individual items of
food - flour, milk, fish, butter and cheese, for example -
merit permanent inclusion in the list of chief imports in all
three territories* The necessities of life therefore make
an important contribution to import duties which, averaging
8094 of indirect revenue in 1958*", still provided in 1950
38% of total revenue in British Guiana, 33% in Jamaica and
2
23% in Trinidad." The Moyne Commission Report makes the
3
point :
1. Crad. 6607. p.
2. Col. No, 281. Pt. IV, pp. 74, 142, 210.
5« Cmd. 6607« p. 71.
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Any marked change in the spending power of the
people of a West Indian Colony is therefore
likely to be reflected at once in the revenues
of their Government. That power depends in
the main upon the sale abroad of agricultural
produce and it follo\ys that the necessity for
the relief of distress is liable to be greatest,
through the failure of crops or inability to
find a profitable market for them, at a time
when the Government, through the consequent
curtailment of their revenue, are least able
to meet that need.
This state of affairs has a still more particular application,
decline in trie earning power of the working-classes as a
result of poor market prices for West Indian crops is not
likely to be compensated for by a corresponding decline in the
f
prices of food and clothing 'which are determined by production
factors outside, and not within, the West Indian eeono<:tyi
Conversely, the pegging of wages to the cost-of-living could
easily raise production costs to an uneconomic level in a
period of depression and lead to various cost-saving expedients
which create an even greater degree of unemployment, con¬
cealed or open, in a situation of already chronic under¬
employment*
West Indian Society.
Serious study of society in the British nap^hhean
has been neglected until very recently, and such
are available tend to be inadequate for cur purpose and uneven
in worth. This deficiency is even more difficult to offset
than in the fields of economics or politics as little inform¬
ation of authentic value can be gleaned from the official
sources which serve so well otherwise. It is proposed to
attempt in the following pages a mere outline of those features
of British Caribbean society which are most relevant to our
study, drawing upon observation and personal experience as
well as upon written sources.
West Indian society is multi-racial. The 1946
Census of Population classified British Guianese into 8
"racial" groups J "East Indians," "Africans," "Mixed or
Coloured," "Amerindians," "Portuguese," "Chinese," "Europeans
(other than Portuguese)", and "Other Asiatics." Trinidad's
classification into "racial or colour groups" allowed of
greater ambiguity in its effort to achieve an impossible
precision: (e.g. "African descent" instead of "African"),
did not isolate Portuguese, who are not so important numer¬
ically as in British Guiana, from other Europeans, and replaced
"Amerindians" by "Carib descent". The process 'went furthest
in Jamaica which is, if anything, less cosmopolitan than the
other two territories; the 1943 Census divided the population
into "Black (African)," "Coloured (European-African)", "..hite
(European)", "East Indian", "East Indian Coloured", "Syrian",
"Syrian Coloured", "Chinese", "Chinese Coloured", and "Others".
This divergence of classification, apart from the interesting
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insight which it provides into differences of social attitude
in the three territories, demonstrates the problems created
by the two factors of greatest importance in /est Indian
Society - race and colour, The table below gives a com¬
parative picture of the ''racial" composition of poiuiation,
t
an attempt having been made to systematize classification.
All mixed groups in Jamaica, such as "Syrian Coloured" have
been included in the "Coloured or Mixed" category, and the
"Portuguese" in British Guiana have been included as "Europ¬
ean", The unspecified groups are numerically unimportant.
Table VII
Racial Composition of Population 1943-6,
Racial Group British Guiana Jamaica Trinidad
African 38.17% 78.10% 46.88%
East Indian 43.51 1.73 35.09
Coloured or
Mixed 10.03 18.35 14.12
European 2.93 1.12 2.74
Amerindian 4.35 - -
Others 1.01 .70 1.17
Source: -.V.I. Census, 1943-6.
It will be evident from these figures that the "African" or,
as we refer to it throughout this study, Negro group is over¬
whelmingly larger in Jamaica than it is in the other two
territories, which Lave correspondingly greater numbers of
East Indians, In fact, the Negro and Coloured groups in
Jamaica, that is to say, people of African descent, amount to
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96.45% of the total population of the Island, In British
Guiana and Trinidad, Negroes and East Indians form two almost
equal sections of the population, with rather smaller coloured
groups. It must be observed here that to some extent these
figures must be regarded as merely presenting a broad picture,
and not as detailed analysis. The line between "African"
and "Coloured", or "Coloured" and "European" is not precise,
and blurring often occurs on both sides of it. In some
cases (for instance in the census district of "visidad to
which the author belongs) it was left to the person inter¬
viewed to decide into which category he or she fell; in
others, the enumerator made the choice upon physical or other
evidence. Thus these figures represent neither the percent¬
ages of those in each territory who consider themselves .mem¬
bers of a specific racial group ( an amalgam of social
attitudes which might be of considerable interest) nor totals
arrived at by the use of identical criteria. For our purpose,
however, the broad picture will suffice.
Race, Colour and Class.
Preoccupation with race and colour is perhaps the
most lasting legacy of slavery and the plantation system to
the inhabitants of the area. The unit of organised life in
slave society, the estate, was run on the principle of owner¬
ship by one race and the subjection of another. Differences
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between French, English, or Spanish were insignificant com¬
pared to the social distance between white master and black
slave. The process of miscegenation produced individuals
who occupied the intermediate positions in the spectrum of
colour, and by the 19th Century a whole number of identifiable
colour-groups had evolved, in which the degree of "white
blood" was calculated with computer-like precision. In
politics, in economic life, and in social intercourse, the
pyramid of privilege became identical with the pyramid of
colour. Emancipation did nothing to change this situation.
The immigration to the area which took place in the late 19th
and early 20th Centuries added to the population at the level
of the lowest group in the social system, the agricultural
labourers. Until the 19^0*s the pattern which Caribbean
society presents is one which, though infinitely more complex
than slave society, still preserved as its essential feature
the determination of privilege and social position on the
basis of race and colour#
It has been argued that the issue in the British
Caribbean (and in the entire Caribbean area) is not one of
race but of class. Dr. Eric Williams, writing of Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands but extending his arguments to
embrace the whole area, contrasts the colour question there
with that in the United States and concludes:
- 56 -
The absence of legal discrimination against the
Negro arises from the fact that racial differ¬
ences are subordinate to those of class .....
White denotes class and status rather than
colour and race. In the Caribbean generally a
man is not only as white as he looks. If by
Virtue of his position or his wealth he moves
about in white society he automatically becomes
w t
'white' ..... Munoa Marin puts the same idea in
different words: there are in Puerto Rico only
two classes, those who wear neckties and those
who don't. The situation is the same in the
British West Indies, where the mark of differ¬
entiation is the wearing of shoes rather than
of neckties.''"
Williams cites in support of his view the conclusions reached
in a study of a Puerto R can community that "social dis¬
tinctions were based on class and not on race, and that the
two coalesced merely because the Negro is never found in the
upper class.""
This view holds true of Puerto Rico with its pre¬
dominantly white population which belongs to all classes in
3
society ; but it cannot be accepted as an accurate description
of the situation in the British Caribbean. In all three
1. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, January, 19^5•
2. idem.
3. See Proudfood, op. cit., Ch. IV, passim.
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territories there is a fundamental correlation between race
and colour on the one hand and class status on the other.
Not only is colour more important than in Puerto Rico -
census tables in that island do not distinguish between Negro
and Coloured, for instance. The major racial and colour
groups, Negroes and East Indians, are mainly peasants and
workers, whereas the tiny white community is predominantly
upper class, proj>erty-owning planters, businessmen and admin¬
istrators. Class divisions arc not racially exclusive, and
so ie degree of mobility has taken place as considerations of
occupation and economic status, as well as of political
reality, begin to replace the determinant of colour. "Degree
of wealth and degree of colour are by no means completely
associated, and exceptions to even their general correspond-
1
ence are fre uent and striking," Negroes and East Indians
are to be found in both the upper and middle classes; and
there are the hundreds of "Others", Syrians, Chinese, Jews,
etc., who cannot be grouped en masse in any particular social
class. "If race is seldom a complete barrier to the acquisit¬
ion of social status," Siney tells us, "it nay make this very
2
difficult," And Mrs. Proudfoot, writing in 1954 after a
prolonged visit to the area, reports that "although the position
1. Cmd. 6607, p. 61.
2. T.S. Siney, >'el fare and Planning in the Jest Indies,
(1946), p. 20.
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is changing, skin colour is still one of the most important
factors in determining a man's position in society."*
The identification of different economic classes
with separate racial groups is a factor which conditions the
whole character of organised Labour in the British Caribbean.
It underlies relations between worker and employer, between
union and employers' association, between labour politician
and administrator. The sugar estates, the oil companies and
the bauxite enterprises are owned and managed by whites, many
of them imported for the job from outside the area. Until
recently, control of the Government, which is a large e ployer
of labour as well (apart from the Civil Service) was in the
hands of white officials. The great inequalities of income
between the upper- and working-classes are easily transposable
in terms of white opulence and black poverty. In Blanshard's
words, "the most obvious fact in Caribbean life (is) that
there is a basic causal connection between colour, class and
ownership, and that the three things form a single social
2
pattern.""
The problems which are created by racial differences
of economic opportunity do not end with employer-employee
relations. There has been, and continues to be, considerable
1. Proudfood, op. cit., p. 70•
2. Paul Blanshard, Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean,
(19'i7), p. 51.
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antipathy between Negroes and East Indians in British Guiana
and Trinidad, which has influenced developments both in the
field of organised Labour and in politics. The differences
of occupation and location which modify its effects in the
industrial field are discussed in Chapter II. In politics,
where no such modification obtains, race appears to be becom¬
ing an increasingly important issue in British Guiana and in
Trinidad.
Race and colour discrimination have applied until
very recently in innumerable fields of employment, even at
the level of department store clerks and bank clerks.* The
same was true of the Civil Service, where senior officials
were invariably white because few Negroes, East Indians or
2
Coloured Civil Servants possessed the necess ry qualifications",
and where lightness of skin was as indispensibie to the
3
secretary to a Head of Department as ability to type. The
more obvious manifestations of discrimination in employment
have disappeared in the last ten years, but it would be
optimistic to say that all discrimination is a thing of the
past.
The values which obtain in British Caribbean society
have fostered an attitude towards manual work which makes it
1. cf. Blanshard, op. cit., pp. 3^-55*
2. Cffld. 6607. p. 60.
3. cf. F. Henriques, Family and Colour in Jamaica, (l95/±)»
p. 52.
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the least socially desirable form of employment. This is not
only the result of the identification of white planter and
merchant with the upper class, and the "taboos ... which
characterize white society in the tropics."^ It is also a
carry-over from the revulsion against slavery which caused
agricultural wage labour to be regarded with disfavour by
Negroes in the 19th Century. It is largely with the people
who perform this type of socially undesirable labour that the
industrial aspect of this study deals, and some attention will
be given to this attitude in Chapter II*
Recent developments in the British Caribbean are
creating upheavals in the structure of society and evolving
new sets of values. Adult suffrage, trade unionism, social
welfare facilities, and in particular, opportunities for
education, have achieved a great deal in the way of replacing
the criteria of race and colour by determinants more compatible
with the multi-racial character of the area. It is of some
significance that these changes in society date from the
period of unrest which marks the beginning of Labour Movements
in most of the territories.




The multi-racial character of the British Carib¬
bean population is almost entirely the result of efforts
on the part of the European planter-class to ensure a suf¬
ficient and suitable labour force* Except in British
Guiana, the original inhabitants had been virtually exter¬
minated before the heydey of sugar cane cultivation. A
first attempt at filling the need with indentured Englishmen
or Irishmen, convicted and sentenced to transportation or
snatched by press-gangs, soon gave way to Negro slavery,
which was introduced as a source of labour which satisfied
more ideally the requirements of plantation sugar cultivation.
This development was to have serious consequences
for the labour situation. It meant that the plantation
system was maintained only by the subordination of one con¬
cept of society to another, the European planter concept
being dominant. All that Emancipation did when it came,
was to abolish the legal sanction for this dominance; it
Xjrovided no remedy for the inherent situation of conflict,
nor was it accompanied by the political and .'economic adjust¬
ments which alone could ensure the smooth transition to a
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society of wage-relationships.* It had not been taken
for granted that owner and slave would fall into their new
roles of employer and employee - or, to use the terminology
of a less liberal 19th Century, master and servant - auto¬
matically; but the experiment of 'Apprenticeship', which
was to allow time for adjustment, was not a success.
The effect of Emancipation was not merely to
make the Negro a free man at law. It left him with a
choice - either to accept the new European wage-labour
system and to live within it, or to reject its implications
and evolve his own separate organisation of society. By
implication, the influx to the city which occurred in all
these territories immediately aftcrEmancipation was an
admission of acceptance of the wage-labour system, which
could be the only basis of city life, by such of the
.migrants as forsook their old homes permanently for the
capital and the glamour of the higher wages paid to artis-
2
ans. But the city dwellers were, by all accounts, a min¬
ority of the labouring population, though we have no figures
to show the extent of migration at this period.
1. See Phillip D. Curtin, The Two Jamaica's I85O-65,
(1955)» for an excellent case-study of this clash of con¬
cepts.
2. James Rodway, History of British Guiana, (189^), Vol.
3, p. 50, quotes a contemporary report that "tradesmen...
were paid so high that field labour was looked on as
degrading by comparison."
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Labour Relations in the post-Emancipation period*
On the plantations, the ex-slaves continued at
first to work, though now for wages which they had agreed
upon with the planters, and did not immediately withdraw
from the estates. Rodway cites a contemporary local
review of the first year of freedom in British Guiana
which affirmed that "some of the labourers had become
partial vagrants, but the greater number remained steadily
at work#"* Curtin s ows that while the rate of desertion
from the estates varied from district to district in Jamaica,
it was not until the devices thought up by the planters to
secure control of the free labour force were put into oper-
2
ation that the trek to the backlands commenced. In
Trinidad, de Verteuil tells us, "the majority .#. continued
to live on the estates, actually occupying houses and lands
free from all rent, and yet exacting from their masters
3
whatever wages they thought proper
In the first few years of freedom there were a
number of disputes, mainly over wages• The planter could




Rodway, op# ext., Vol. 3» p. 36.
Curtin, op. cit«, pp. 127-130.
L.A.A. de Verteuil, Trinidad, (1884), p. 16.
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rate per day or per task, or he could increase the size of
the task to be performed while continuing to pay the exist¬
ing rate. Both these methods were employed, though at first
task work was not usual on sugar estates. An able-bodied
man could perform a task at that period in 4 hours, and
often completed 2 to 2% tasks in a day in Trinidad.* In
1350, we are told, it took six hours to complete a task in
2
British Guiana."" By 1900, a task had come to mean the
3
equivalent of a full day's work of 7 to 9 hours.
Towards the end of l84l relations between planter
and Negro labourer in British Guiana deteriorated. At a
meeting in December, the planters agreed to combine to cut
their cost of production and to enforce the following uni¬
form conditions: 1) no wages would be paid for tasks improp¬
erly done} 2) labourers who refused to work would be turned
off the estates; 3) the granting of provisions, free housing,
free medical attendance and free grounds was to be discon¬
tinued; 4) wages were to be reduced uniformly to 32/ a day
for field hands, and 48/ for factory hands. This decision
of the planters was influenced as much by their lavish
1. ibid.
2. Rodway, op, cit., Vol. 3, p. 73.
3. Cd, 5193, Evidence, passim, Cf. also II.G. Dalton,
History of British Guiana, Vol. 1., p. 441.
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expenditure on unsucessful immigration schemes a® by the
price of sugar; 9*100 immigrants were brought into British
Guiana at private expense between 1855 - l340.^ District
Agricultural Societies were formed in Demerara and Essequibo
to enforce the new conditions, but in Berbice, where lower
wages were paid, the planters had nothing to do with the
movement. No effort was made to prepare the Negroes for
these changes which were to come into operation in January,
1842, and they went on strike. At the end of six weeks
the planters had to give in and agree to the same wages and
2
conditions as before. Labour had won the first round.
Four years later an attempt on the part of the proprietor
to reduce wages one one of the estates in Leguan resulted in
3
rioting by the labourers. They so took advantage of the
continued scarcity of labour that by 1847 able-bodied males
working a /%•*hour day were earning 09 and 010 a week; when
Apprenticeship came to an end in 1838, most planters had
refused to agree to the rate of #1G a month with house,
medical attendance and grounds, which one or two of their
1. Dalton, op. cit«. Vol. 2, App., p. 491.
2. Rodway, opjcit,, Vol. 3» pp. 62-64; Dalton, op. cit.,
Vol. 1, pp. 481-483; British Guiana Local Guide, (loo4),
p. 24. The views of both planters and labourers at the
time are described in Barton Premium, Eight Years in
British Guiana, (185O), Premium himself was a resident
planter.
3. British Guiana Local Guide, 1864, p. 28.
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number had wanted to fix.* But with the Free Traders at
work in England the wages boom could not last; 1848 saw
reduced wages and general distress in the colony. The
strike in 1842 had had one other important consequence - it
was followed by a widespread movement towards peasant hold¬
ings, In that year alone, 15,000 acres of estates were
2
bought by Negroes in co-operation, at a cost of #25G,000}""
Plantations Bel Air and Ithaca in Berbice, Victoria, Buxton
and Friendship in Deaerara, now Negro villages, were all
bought at this time at prices ranging from 25,000 to 250,000
guilders (ajjproximately £166 to £1,660). Daiton estimates
that of 80,000 field labourers at Emancipation, only a
quarter were now prepared to perform wage-labour.^ A
local commission of enquiry in 1850 found only 19,041 able-
4
bodied men residing on the estates. Some planters were
obliged to rent their estates out in holdings. The Negroes
established free villages in which they devoted themselves to
the cultivation of local foodstuffs, and the estate labour
5
supply suffered in consequence.
1. A.R.F. Webber, Centenary History of British Guiana,
(1938), p. 194 & p. 220.
idem, p. 191.
3. Dalton, op. cit.. Vol. 1, p. 483.
4. idem, Vol, 2, App,, p. 5*1.
5. For the growth of a peasant population in this period
see also R.E.G. Farley, "Aspects of the Economic History of
British Guiana, 1781 - 1852," (1956)•
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Trinidad had been suffering an acute labour short¬
age even before Emancipation, and there had been trouble
between planters and government over the illegal importation
of slaves from Barbados in 1832.*" In 1339 strikes for
higher wages took place on several estates in the island,
the strikers demanding a 100% increase on the current rate of
2/2d. a day. Unlike the British Guiana planters three years
later, the Trinidad estates refused to pay a rate which they
claimed would put their cost of production 5°% above the sell¬
ing price, and despite the loss of a large part of the crop,
2
succeeded in breaking the strike after several weeks. Con¬
sequently, when in 1844 the planters, many of whom had already
been ruined, decided to reduce wages upon the suggestion of
the Agricultural Society, opposition was desultory, the
reduction being "opposed by the Labourers in some districts,
3
though acceded to by those of others." This measure was
introduced in as tactless a manner as that which we have
already described in British Guiana two years earlier; and
it proved the occasion for a labourers' combination, which,
however, accepted the new rates. But the labourers remained
dissatisfied and began to neglect work on the estates; as a
1. L.M. Fraser, History of Trinidad, (1896), Vol. 2, pp.
305-317. ~~ —— -
2. H.C. Pitts, 100 fears Together, (n.d.), p. 33*
3. Trinidad Standard, 15th August, 1844, Editorial.
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result, large numbers were ejected from the estate houses
which they occupied, and their provision grounds were des¬
troyed.*
The planters' decision to reduce wages had caused
a meeting of 600 labourers "at the Couva river" on July
2
22nd,"" Organised by one Charles G. McKay, the meeting agreed
to form the 'Trinidad Free Labourers' Society' to aim at
colony-wide membership. McKay was to prepare a report on
the 'Statistical Accounts of the Island' for the benefit of
members, and the next meeting was fixed for August 1st. On
the actual reason for ifca assembly the meeting was very tame,
accepting the reduced rates and affirming that the interests
of the labourers were bound up with the continuance of culti-
vation on the estates. Its business was conducted "peace¬
ably and with propriety." But in spite of the temperate and
level-headed attitude which seems to have prevailed among its
members, the combination was not well-received. While the
right of labourers to unite "for any purposes, particularly
such as would seen to affect their interest", was conceded,
there was fear of "the consequences which may speedily ensue
from any combination based on wrong principles, and having no
1. de Verteuil, op. cit., p. 17.
2. Trinidad Standard, 1st August, 1844.
3. ibid.
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reasonable or definite object in view, as such is likely to
be under the circumstances «...."* Neither "Missionaries,
Clergy, Teachers nor Magistrates", the labourers' usual
advisers, had a hand in the formation of the Society. There
is no evidence that the Trinidad Free Labourers' Society was
anything but an 'ephemeral combination.' It is certain
that it would meet with severe reprisals from planters; and
the difficulties involved in maintaining its organisation in
1344 must have proved insurmountable. No similar attempt
at combination was made in British Guiana or Jamaica. The
Trinidad Free Labourers' Society is a unique instance on the
19th Century labour scene.
The Jamaica planters had been the most determined in
their opposition to Emancipation, and were now the most vin¬
dictive in their relations with the new free labourers. The
latter, in turn, through the missionary churches - Baptist and
Presbyterian and to a lesser extent Moravian - were better
organised than in British Guiana or Trinidad." When the
planters combined to keep the rate of wages as low as possible
immediately wages because payable - they offered lOd. a day
with use of cottages, house and grounds as compared with the
•2
2/4 - 3/4 at which labour was valued during Apprenticeship -
1. Trinidad Standard. 15th August, 1844, Editorial.
2. Curtin, op. cit», pp. 114-116.
3. J.K. Kinton, Memoir of v'illiam Knibb, (1894), pp. 286-
87; tf.F. Burchell, Memoir of Thomas Burchell, (1849), pp.
345-52.
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the missionaries often stepped in, advised the labourers what
wage to accept, and bargained on their behalf with the planters;
the planters in return accused the missionaries of forming
workers* combinations and calling strikes** During the
period of Apprenticeship, many Negroes had bought land in the
mountains and migrated there to form the beginnings of small¬
holding free-peasantry; the encouragement which the mission¬
aries gave to this movement was prompted both by the desire
to maintain the adherence of tSieir congregations and by genuine
concern to protect labourers from t e poverty and insecurity
which total dependence on estate wage-labour would mean in
Jamaica, In their efforts to ensure control of the free
labour force, planters adopted methods which only resulted in
driving labour away all the faster, or in forcing upon the
labourer a consciousness of how necessary his own house and
land were for security* Thus they imposed a rent for each
member of the family, raised rents arbitarily if a labourer
failed to turn out, and even ejected tenants, destroying the
provision grounds, livestock and fruit-trees on which their
food supply depended, in a vain attempt to re-introduce
2
slavery in the economic sphere* The inability of many
1. Curtin, op, cit., p* 115*
2. See J*J* Gurney, A Letter to the Planters of Jamaica,
(1840), pp. 11-12; Curtin, op* cit., pp. 123-130.
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estates to pay their labourers regularly, owing to a shortage
of circulating capital, further encouraged labourers away.
Among those who remained, there were outbreaks of strikes in
1863-6^, a period of general distress and political discon¬
tent, in Cornwall and Hanover parishes for increased wages.*
The second half of the 19th Century saw the Negroes
established as a peasant proprietary class in all three territ¬
ories. In addition to the private estate lands which they
could buy as estates were abandoned, Crown lands .-ere offered
for sale at cheap prices though, in British Guiana particularly,
the regulations made their purchase more difficult than the
2
rate would suggest. In Jamaica where the mountainous nature
of the country is well suited to small-holding the most intense
settlement had taken place, there being 92,979 small free-
■7
holders by 1896, In Trinidad, "by l8?0 the old negro Creole
population had fallen back mostly into villages on the borders
4
of estates or newly opened lands of the interior."
1. Falmouth Post. 19th January, 1864; 12th February, 1864.
2. See, e.g., 1897 Royal Commission, App. C., Vol. II, Pt.
II, Evidence of N.i). Davis, Comptroller of Customs, p. 54.
3. Amy K. Lopez, "Land and Labour to 1900" in Jamaica
Historical Review, Vol. I, No. 3» December, 194TH
4. Beachey, "The British Jest Indies Sugar Industry in the
Late 19th Century". (1957). P. 102.
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The East Indian Indenture System.
The planters, deprived of one source of labour, set
about finding replacements. Already before the Negroes had
turned en masse to peasant holding attempts had been made to
establish alternative supplies of labour. Between 1834 and
1837 there arrived in Jamaica over 2,000 'north-European
blonds', mainly Scotsmen and Germans, and about 100 Irishmen";
another 1,363 had entered the Island by 1845. British Guiana
imported more than 30,000 Madeirans between 1835 and 18?2.
Trinidad had no sizeable immigration of non-Africans in the
first years after Emancipation, but from 1835 numbers of free
Negro labourers from the smaller West Indian colonies entered
the Island* In addition the Negro labouring population of
all three territories was increased by 'liberated Africans',
slaves captured on the high seas or settled in St. Helena, and
by labourers from Sierra Leone and the Kroo Coast. By l86l,
nearly 8,000 free Negro immigrants had entered Jamaica; by
1872, 29,581 had gone to British Guiana, 18,150 to Trinidad.
More than 23,000 Chinese were introduced under indenture to
the three territories in the period 1852-1881, about /3 of
them going to British Guiana. But Chinese coolie immigration
is more akin to East Indian immigration which was to prove the
biggest source of replacement for the plantations' lost
1* Figures for immigration in the post-emancipation period
re taken from N, Deerr, The History of Sugar, (1950), Vol.
2, Che. XXIII, XXIV.
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labour supply#
The first East Indians in the area arrived in British
Guiana in 1833*# Their introduction, the work of John
Gladstone (father of the famous Liberal statesman) who owned
Plantation Vreedestein in Deraerara, -was sanctioned by an
Order-in-Council which also stipulated a contract of five
years' service with repatriation rights for the immigrants at
2
the end of their tern. Opposition from the Anti-Si ery
Society and from liberal opinion in England■prevented any
further immigration until 1844, when permission for the intro¬
duction of East Indian to British Guiana, Jamaica and Trinidad
was granted by Act of Parliament# The unsatisfactory character
of the first ira igrants introduced at this time, and the inade¬
quacy of the arrangements made for them caused a temporary
halt to the scheme in 1845# It was started again in 1851
(l8bu in the case of Jamaica), and continued until 1917 when
pressure of public opinion forced the Indian Government, which
had never been coatpletely at ease about the scheme, to bring
it to an end. By then 239*220 East Indians had gone to
British Guiana, 134,183 to Trinidad, and 35*533 to Jamaica.
The modification of the scheme in later years which allowed the
i. idem', Cd# 5* 92 (1909), p. 52.
ibid, p. 391#
3. ibid* p. 398.
I 74 -
indentured immigrant to renew his indenture for a further
period of time, and then to relinquish his repatriation rights
in return for a grant of land, resulted in the permanent settle¬
ment of a large number of East Indians in British Guiana and
Trinidad part icular ly •
Opposition to East Indian immigration continued in
the British Caribbean until the system was abolished. In the
beginning, it was the Anti-Slavery Society and the missionaries
who opposed the indenture as a new and subtle form of slavery#
By the turn of the Century, the voice of the Negroes, or of
those who claimed to be their spokesmen, had joined in the
protest. They alleged that East Indian immigration was keep¬
ing the rate of wages down, that Negroes were being deprived
of employment, that through taxation, the public was being
made to support a system detrimental to its interests for the
benefit of the planters.*
The wages and conditions of employment of indentured
labour were regulated by a number of laws passed locally in
each territory. The following extract from a memorandum of
the Protector of Immigrants, Jamaica, may be regarded as
2
typical of the conditions of service in the 20th Century s
1. See, e.g., Cd. 3194 (191C), pp. 18-22, Memorandum from
the People's Association of British Guiana; p. 77, Secret¬
ary* Jamaica Baptist Union to Governor of Jamaica; Cd. 5193,
Evidence of Alfred Richards, pp# 225-236.
2. Cd. 5194, p. 70.
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2. The immigrant is required to work every day in
the week except Sunday and authorised holidays.
3. When ill he is sent to a hospital provided by
the Government, and receives medical attendance,
medicines, medical comforts, and food free of
all charge.
4. His employer is bound to find him work on each
working day or pay him his wages*
5. All earnings are paid weekly. No deductions
whatever, except for rations during the first
three months (the proscribed period of initi¬
ation) are allowed.
6. Suitable dwellings are provided for the immi¬
grants on estates, free of rent. These are
erected on sites approved by the Immigration
and Medical Officers and are kept in good
repair by the employers.
Detailed provision was made concerning hours and co ditions,
wages, leave of absence, dwelling and hospital accommodation,
marriage and education; regulations for dealing with deserters
and vagrants were in force, and statutory medical inspection
carried out at regular intervals. The responsibility for
carrying out the Immigration Ordinances rested with a special
officer, the Immigration Agent-General (sometimes called Pro¬
tector of Immigrants) who was assisted by agents residing in
various parts of the territory.
Wages and hours differed according to the territory
in which the labourer was indentured. Payment was on a
piece-rate rather than a time-rate basis, particularly in the
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case of field-work on the estates; an enquiry into East
Indian conditions raade just before the system was abolished
revealed that between 80% and 90% the labour jjerformed on
estates in Trinidad was paid for by the task^. The concept
of the task, as prescribed by law, was simple. In British
Guiana and Trinidad, it was the work which "the immigrant to
whom it is assigned" ought to be able to perform "within one
2
working day of seven hours without extraordinary exertion."
In Jamaica, an Ordinance passed in 1912 stipulated that a
task should allow an "able-bodied trained ale", 18 years old
or over, to earn "upwards of 1/6 a day for a fair day's work
of nine hours with ordinary exertion." In practice the
determination of the sirse of a task was much more complicated,
and not always so equita >le. No account was taken, for
4
instance, of the differing capacities of different workers.
Differences of soil, of soil condition, or of crop growth
which depended upon the particular field, the season of the
year, the weather, or upon the nature of the work previously
performed on the particular site made anything like a stand¬
ard task an impossibility and left it to the discretion of the
1. Cd. 7744 (1914-16), P. 16.
2. ibid, pp. 15, 65.
3- Cd. 7745 (1914-16), p. 206.
4. Cd. 7744. p. 15.
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overseer, who would be forced to make an on-the-spot decision
when assigning the day's tasks. On the whole, it appears
that in Trinidad t ere was little grumbling about the size of
the tasks, which in British Guiana was the cause of many com¬
plaints.'"' Men employed on ordinary work, seldom performed
more than one task a day (though it was not unknown for a man
to perform two).
Task workers in Trinidad were usually in the field
from 6,00 or 6,30 a,m, to 2,00 or 4.00 p.m., with a break of
36 an hour to 1 hour at 10,30 a.m. for meals. Time workers
finished later, at 4.30 p.m. In British Guiana all workers
kept the hours 8,00 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. with an hour off for
meals in the middle of the day. Jamaican indentured labour¬
ers worked longer hours, as their legal ivorking day was 9
hours; no provision for rest periods was made in the regulat-
2
ions governing the hours of their employment.
In the factory, time-work was more usual. This
was also the rule in the case of skilful field labourers assigned
to special jobs, or weak labourers who were incapable of pro¬
longed effort. In practice most workers had 5 days' work a
week, taking half-days off on Monday and Saturday,
A minimum wage for able-bodied labourers of 1/- or
24 cents per working day in Jamaica and British Guiana and of
25 cents in Trinidad was fixed by law. For women in Jamaica
1. ibid., pp. 18, 69.
2. Cd. 7745. p. 206.
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the rate was 9d., for the non-able-bodied in British Guiana
and Trinidad it was 16 cents'1. Kates fixed for task work
were required by law not to fall below these minima. In
other respects the rate of wages was to be governed by rates
paid to the Negroes and other unindentured immigrants on the
estate, and by rates on neighbouring estates. Official
reports of the period, even those based on first-hand visits
to the estates, all unite in lamenting the absence of reliable
information about average earnings. The memoranda and evid¬
ence submitted to the Committee on Emigration from India to
2
the Crown Colonies and Protectorates reveal wide divergence
of opinion both about actual rates of wages and about average
earnings in all three territories. Figures of average earn¬
ings differed so widely as to render them of little value.
It would appear that in general the legal minimum wage was
paid, but that few labourers worked for the full 280 days a
year on which the estates were required to provide them with
employment.
Relations between indentured labourer and his employ¬
ers depended to a great degree upon the character and temper¬
ament of the white manager. As head of the estate adminis¬
tration, he was the visible symbol of authority in the lives






manager; next in the order came the overseers, also white
but occasionally coloured, who had charge of gangs of workmen.
Supervision of the gangs in the field was provided by headmen,
who were mainly East Indian. The manager was a patriarch
who was often called upon to fill the role of judge, father
confessor, adviser and even savings bank.* The nature of
labour-management relations on an estate could be gathered
from the number of prosecutions against its labourers for
infringing their terms of contract, and the frequency of
their complaints (usually about the size or rate of task-work)
to the Immigration Agent. The Indian Government's investigators
found in 191^-16" that in general relations on estates were
cordial, though British Guiana was less so titan Trinidad. One
possible source of misunderstanding, which they criticised, was
the inaccessibility of the management, resulting from the
absence of any established procedure for workers to ai>proach
the manager about personal or labour problems. Difficulties
stemmed from other causes as well. East Indian indentured
immigrants were imprisoned for infringements of the code which
could in no way be considered crimes. They were excitable by
nature, easy to misunderstand and to be misunderstood.
Irregular sexual relationships between East Indian women and
overseers, forbidden by law, were an inevitable source of
trouble. That the number of serious disturbances which
1. Cd. 7744. p. 35.
2. Cd. 77^*, 77^51 passim
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occurred on estates were so few is to the ci-edit of the
Immigration Departments in all three territories.
Free Wage Labour,
During the years when the indenture system obtained,
a number of free labourers co Id still find employment on the
estates. Unskilled labour in the towns and skilled or semi¬
skilled industrial employment was almost entirely the province
of Negroes - this was particularly true of employment groups
like the dock-workers, where great physical strength was
required. In agriculture, however, the Negroes were out¬
numbered (except in Jamaica) by large numbers of free East
Indians, who remained resident on the estates after their terms
of indenture. In British Guiana in 1908, 69,140 East Indians,
more than half of the total number in the country, were resident
on sugar estates, and of these only 9,784 were under indenture*.
Of more than 10,000 East Indians employed on estates in St,
Mary and Vere in Jamaica in the same year, only 2,833 were
2
indentured. Free labourers were usually better workers than
3
indentured labourers, even in the performance of ordinary work.
It was stated that free East Indians in British Guiana chose to
remain on the estates because while they enjoyed the same
1. Cd. 3194. p. 9.
2. ibid, pp, 80-8l.
3. Cd. 7744, p. 22.
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advantages as the indentured labourer, their superior skill
and familiarity with the work to be done enabled them to earn
twice as much#* They were given greater latitude by manage¬
ments which feared to lose their services, and so they worked
at their own pleasure; moreover, they were allowed facilities
for raising cattle on the estates. To some extent the better
treatment meted out to free East Indians on the estates was
an inducement held out by planters anxious to retain an abund¬
ant supply of labour#
The estates made use also of free non-resident labour,
both Negro and East Indian, during the crop season and for
heavier jobs. These non-residents might be regular wage-earn¬
ers who also cultivated a peasant holding (their own property
or rented), or else peasants who became occasional wage-earners
during the crop in response to the greater seasonal demand for
2
labour." The laws which fixed a minimum wage for indentured
labour had made it clear that higher rates were payable if
free labourers received them. It had not been the intention
to regard the minimum wage as an adequate rate, but merely as a
figure below which wages should not fall. In effect, the
planters seem to have looked upon the legal minimum wage rather
as the optimum wage which they should pay. Only in Jamaica
where free labour was at a premium (large numbers of indentured
1. ibid, p. 67»
2. See, e.g., Cd. 519;*t PP« 85-88.
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labourers were to be found only in Portland, St. Mary and
Clarendon )"*" did free labourers receive higher wages - 1/6 to
2/- a day compared v/ith lC^d, to 1/5% paid to indentured
2
labourers. In British Guiana and Trinidad the same rates
for task-work were paid to all labourers. Higher wages were
paid in Trinidad to free men for time-work, which was allowed
only in the c se of jobs requiring superior skill or strength,
3
usually of a casual nature. The Committee which inquired
into the Labour Question in Trinidad in 1906 had recommended
differential task-rates which would take into account the extra
benefits, such as free housing, etc., enjoyed by estate resid-
4
ents. This recommendation became lav/ in 1908, an addition
5
of 15 cents a da to the wage of free labourers being sanctioned ;
but in 1914 Messrs. McNeill and Lai reported that "the free
Indian labourer worked at the same rate as the indentured
Indian, whether the former lived on or off the estate."'" In
British Guiana there had even been instances of free labourers
being offered marginally useful work on take-it or leave-it
1. ibid, p. 79; Beachey, op. cit.. p. 108,
2* Cd. 7745, PP. 206-208.
p. Cd« 7744, p. 22.
4. Trinidad Council Paper, 13 of 1906.
5. Cd. 5192. p. 67.
6. Cd. 7744, p. 22.
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terms at wages below the statutory minimum for indentured
labour; another practice was to give work out on contract,
when there was a surplus of labour available, at a rate lower
than that paid to indentured workers,* No instance was dis¬
covered in British Guiana by the investigators of higher
wages being paid to non-resident labour. The inadequacy of
the wages paid to free agricultural labour for the needs of
some sections at least of the labour force was stressed by
the Acting Governor of British Guiana in a dispatch to the
2
Secretary of State for the Colonies"":
The African labourer ••• cannot attain his stand¬
ard of comfort on a shilling a day, the statutory
minimum wage of the indentured East Indian .••..
A shilling a day, however, gives the East Indian
a degree of comfort, indeed of luxury, unknown in
his country.
Even in agriculture there was occupational differ-
ention between Negro and East Indian. 4 out of every 5 skilled
workers on the sugar estates - blacksmiths, mechanics, carpen-
3
ters, engineers, coopers, etc., - were Negroes, In the field,
the Negro was given jobs "where his greater strength told in
4
his favour" f heavy labour suOh as cane-cutting, trenching and
1, ibid, pp. 66, 70,
2. 26/5/1909, Cd, 5194. p, 6.
3, idem,
4. Cd. 7744, p. 22.
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cleaning drains.* Beucliey, writing of the period before
1903, says that planters in British Guiana preferred to pay a
Negro ahovelman 4/- a day rather than engage an East Indian
2
to do the same job at 1/4. The more tedious and less
arduous routine work, such as weeding and cane-thrashing, was
performed by the East Indian who was considered to be better
suited by temperament for this type of occupation than the
Negro. In Jamaica the situation was different because of the
small number of East Indians. All estate labour in Trelawny
was performed by Negroes - it is of interest to note that their
wages and conditions were held to be worse than anywhere else
in the Island, a state of affairs which was attributed to
their complete dependence upon estate employment." In other
areas, many Negroes, the sons of small landowners and peasants,
were said to be averse to certain kinds of work - banana-head¬
ing, cane-thrashing, hoeing and weeding, for example - which
4
they considered fit only "for coolies and women," Unemploy¬
ment ap ears to have existed in some areas of Jamaica at the
same time as shortage of labour in other districts, without
any flow of labourers from the one to the other resulting.
This was particularly so in the case of banana plantations
1. Cd. 3192. p. 59.
2. Seachey, op. cit., p. 103.
3. Cd, 5193, Evidence of Sir S. Olivier, p. 225;
Cd. 5194. p. 91.
4. ibid, p. 90.
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which advertised for labourers without success while at the
same time more than 10,000 labourers were migrating to Panama
every year under the lure of high wages*. This sort of sit¬
uation, which had obtained on Jamaican estates since the 1870's,
was attributable to labour attitudes to estate employment, to
poor wages which the estates could offer, to the distance of
most Negro villages from the estates, and to the inability of
estate managements to provide work for more than 3 or 4 days
a week*^
The custom of allowing free East Indians to reside
on estates on the same conditions as indentured labour had
important consequences for the system of estate labour once
indenture was abandoned. Just as the essential features of
the indenture system accorded well with estate organisation in
the days of slavery - housing provided on the estate free of
cost, employer responsibility for labourers, workers identified
with the estate, labour performed in gangs under a foreuian -
so did the change to completely free labour come about without
disturbing the set patterns of estate life. The perennially
migrant character of a section of the labour force, which was
a feature of indentured labour, disappeared. But the fact
that a large number of employees - in latter years the greater
portion - had always been unindentured served to disguise the
1. ibid, p. 91#
2. Beachey, op, cit., pp. 106 - 109.
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need for a new appraisal of labour relationships. Workers
continued to reside on the estate and to identify themselves
with it. The management, not wishing to alienate its employ¬
ers, made no effort to disclaim responsibility for those
special amenities which free resident labourers had enjoyed
along with indentured immigrants. In essence, however, the
situation had changed. "The abandonment of indentured labour
introduced an important change in the position of the labour
force, though this appears to have passed quite unrecognised."*
The labourer now had no legal rights to safeguard his residence
on the estate. As a workman he was bound by no special con¬
tract; but conversely he had no claim to anything except his
wages in return for his labour. He and his family could be
evicted at any time if they displeased the management, or if
he refused to work. Any extra inducements held out to him,
such as the privilege of keeping cattle or jjlanting a kitchen
garden, were at the discretion of the manager and could be
revoked* He was now dependent upon wages for a living without
any guarantee that he could find employment on the estate all
year round. This had been the position of free labour resident
on the estates while the indenture system obtained, it is true;
but the presence of indentured labourers who were under the
protection of the Government did not leave the estate manager
complete licence in dealing with his labourers. In fact, the
Protectors of Immigrants continued to look after the interests
1• Cmd. 6070. p. 15
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of free Ear '. Indians until the posts were abolished early in
the 1930's"» The position of the free labourer on the estate
after the indenture system came to an end was substantially the
same as that of the ex-slave in the first years of freedom
after 183&. In the surging prosperity of the sugar industry
after World War I, the planter needed all the labour he could
get and could afford to hold out every inducement to labourers
to stay on the estates. By the time depression set in in
the 1930's, the pattern of estate free labour had been set,
and the planter had grown to accept the implications of the
system - responsibility not only for the housing and living
conditions of the labour force, but also for ]>roviding einploy-
2
ment to resident labour." This was partly the outcome of the
patriarchal nature of the estate community; it was also
dictated by long-term self-interest, as the estate which
looked after its workers in bad tiraes could expect not to suffer
from a shortage of labour when it was needed.
Occupations, Employment and Unemployment.
The statistics of occupation and employment available
for the area in our period are very unsatisfactory. There has
1, cf. D. Nath, A History of Indians in British Guiana,
(1950), passim,
2. Cmd. 6070. p. l6.
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been no attempt to standardise classification in ho different
territories and even in the aa ;e territory successive census
report® classified the sane people in different way®. It was
not until the last census, taken in 19%6 (19%3-in the case of
Jam ilea) that the approach was made towards resenting as clear
a picture as possible. The entire question of occupations,
e ployaont and unemployment has been befogged, even as late a®
1930*0, by traditional attitudes and prejudices, by false and
rash generalisations, and by the absence of facilities for
acquiring more precise information through the medium of
statistic®. Information of a particular nature ori mtlng
in one territory often cannot be compared, even now, with the
situation in other territories because similar investigation®
have not been carried out. Tims, for exam le, the racial
distribution of the working population of Jamaica in the main
industrial groups is available from the 19'*3 Census? but sim¬
ilar statistics were not to be had for British Guiana as late
as 1930, the only information available being that "generally
spending, it c a be said that field workers on the sugar plant¬
ations, and other manual writers, are East Indian, African or
of mixed race. Persons of all race groups are found in com¬
mercial and professional occupations and in the civil service."*
'"''he number of wage-earners at the time of the last
census is shown below.
1. C.-t, be. i.i, oi. IV, p. >1.
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Table VIII
Wage and Salary Earners
Wage % of Gainfully % of Total
Earners Employed Population
British
Guiana 94,392 64.58 25.12
Jamaica 233,439 56.12 22.91
Trinidad 153,003 71.80 27.42
Sources Census of Population, 1943-6.
The census data reveal that in all three territories the wage-
earning force shows certain interesting features - a preponder¬
ance of unskilled labour, both in agriculture and in other pur¬
suits; a high percentage of domestic and personal service
workers; and a relatively small number of skilled isrorkers.
Almost i of all wage-earners in each territory were women.
There were, moreover, large numbers of unpaid helpers (47,611
in Jamaica alone) who are not included in the figures for wage-
earners given above. Unskilled labour occupied 599" of the
wage-earning population in British Guiana, 51% in Jamaica, and
35% in Trinidad; of these, agricultural labourers alone
amounted to 43%, 36% and 21% of the wage-earning population in
the respective territories. More than >4 of all wage-earners
in Jamaica were in domestic or personal service, which occupied
a little over */10 of the labour force in British Guiana and
Trinidad. It is difficult to arrive at a figure for the num¬
ber of skilled workers; in general the level of skills in the
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area is not very high, both skilled and semi-skilled workers
being included in this category without distinction. Cumper
estimates that of some 60,000 Jnaaican artisans shown in the
Census, not more than half could really be considered skilled
workers.* This would amount to approximately 10% of all
wage-earners, or less than 6% of the labour force. The same
considerations hold good of British Guiana and Trinidad, where
the uncorrected figures for skilled tradesmen amount to 16.0/
and 22,l'/o respectively of the labour force.
The importance of agriculture in providing employment
is emphasized by the figures for industrial distribution of
the working population shown in Table IX.
Table IX
Industrial Distribution of the Labour Force
B.G. Jamaica Trinidad
Agriculture 41.82% 43.83% 25.27%
Mining to • ©5 0.12 3.18
Forestry 3.35 0.46 1*56
Fishing & Hunting 0,98 0.35 0.75
Manufacture & Repair 15.88 11.97 17.78
Construction 4.96 6.78 10.14
Transport 4.24 2.26 6.00
Commerce 8.24 7.81 8.84
Professions 3.61 2.17 3.61
Public Service 4*09 2.01 8.24
Personal Service 8.79 16.11 10.59
Others 1.21 5.65 5.62
Sources W.I. Census, 1943-6.
1. G. Cumper, The Social Structure of Jamaica, (n.d), p. 57.
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In all three territories the total numbers engaged in agri¬
culture, and particularly the numbers of farm labourers,
showed a considerable decline since the 1921 Census. In
Trinidad this has been regu -ded as evidence of the change from
an agricultural to a semi-industrial economy, an interpretation
which is in part borne out by the size of the construction,
manufacture and repair sectors of the labour force. A similar
change to industrial employment does not appear to have taken
place in British Guiana or Jamaica; in the latter the surplus
appears to have been diverted largely into domestic and personal
service occupations. The inability of agriculture to absorb
its share of the rapidly increasing population has been worsened
by its decreasing need for manpower as a result of mechanization.
Sugar remains the biggest employer of labour. The
problems presented by any attempt to discuss the industry as a
field of employment in detailed terras are well expressed in the
Report of the Jamaica Sugar Industry Commission, 1944-45 S
The labour situation in the industry is complex,
and an assessment of the many associated factors
has in the past always presented considerable
difficulty. The reasons for this are several:
There is a wide seasonal variation in the num¬
bers employed. There is a high proportion of
part-time workers even among what may be regarded
1. Col. No. 281. Vol. IV, p. 120.
2. p. 142.
as the regular labour force. There is a wide
range of operations demanding all degrees of
skill. Labour is employed on a task or piece
work basis, and on a daily or weekly basis
depending upon the nature of the work; and
finally, little attempt has been made, until
recently, to keep even elementary statistics in
regard to the employment of labour.
This may be ta^en as a fair statement of the position in all
three territories. The importance of the sugar industry as
a source of employment does not end with the workers whom it
employs directly, as a large number employed in ancillary
services, such as transport and shipping, are also dependent
upon sugar.
Seasonal variation in employment levels and the
number of part-time workers it employs are perhaps the two out¬
standing features of the sugar industry. The number of vyork-
ers who gave sugar as their main field of employment at the
time of the census is considerably in excess of the average
numbers employed by the sugar estates; while some of this
excess is attributable to wage-earners on cane farms, it is
nevertheless true to say that there is "an appreciable amount
of labour moving in and out of the industry."^ Thus the
average numbers employed on the sugar estates - 22,788 in
Jamaica (1943), 21,423 in British Guiana (1949), 18,710 in
1. Col. Ho. 281. Vol. IV, p. 202.
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Trinidad (1946-50) - are substantially smaller than the 35»000,
33,000 and 23,000 who are estimated to find employment in the
industry (exclusive of office and supervisory staff.)" The
average numbers employed annually are the mean between average
employment figures in and out of crop which show considerable
variation. The following are given a® random examples. In
Trinidad in 1950 the fortnightly average for the crop season
of 19«873 workers employed on the sugar estates dropped to
17,113 in the out-of-crop season, the highest number employed
in any fortnight being 21,843 and the lowest 13»ICC. For
Jamaica in 1943 numbers employed on the sugar estates averaged
30,290 in the crop season and 18,645 during the rest of the
year; the peak employment figure of 29,998 field-workers on
sugar estates in British Guiana during the 1949 crop was 1,7
times the figure of 17»4l4 employed in the worst fortnight of
+ ? 2tne year.
Workers 011 the sugar estates may be divided into
three categories: the permanent establishment, the unskilled
1. Figures for employment in the sugar industry are taken
fromJ 1943-6 Censusj Sugar Industry Commission Report.
Jamaica, 1944-5? B.G. Sugar Industry Commission Report, 1947;
CoEvnissioner of Labour's Administration leport, Trinidad
and Tofango. 1951} Annual Reports.
2. For seasonal employment cf. II,D. Iluggins, "Seasonal
Variation and Employment in Jamaica" in Social and Economic
Studies, Vol. I, No. 3, 1953. '
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labourers, and the seasonal part-time workers.* The first
group, which includes most of the skilled and semi-skilled
factory workers, is entirely dependent upon the industry for
employment and works all the year round. The second group,
the unskilled labourers, is by far the largest of the three;
its. v embers, mainly employed as field-workers, also look to
the industry for their entire earnings. The majority of
workers in both these categories are resident on the estates.
A survey in Jamaica showed that 39% of estate employees in the
crop season and 50/" of those employed out of crop were pro-
2
vided ?/ith estate housing free of rent. In British Guiana
nearly 20,000 of the 28,000 employed by the estates in field
and factory in 1949 were resident workers, while the total
population on the estates numbered 77,985* The third category
of estate worker normally earns his living by some other means
- and supplements his income by putting in six or eight weeks
4
work on the estate at the peak of the crop season. While it
is not possible to calculate precisely the size of this category
of workers, comparison of the average figures for the two
1. Ctnd. 6070, pp. 17-18.
2, Sugar Industry Commission Report, Jamaica. 1944-3»
p. 150.
5. Col. No. 281, Vol. IV, p. 72.
4. Cmd. 6070. p. 17.
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seasons of the year suggests that there must be considerable
variation from territory to territory and from year to year.
It follows that the majority of sugar workers "can¬
not expect tc be earning wages for more than half the year,"*
even when they are entirely dependent upon the industry for
their livelihood. Various arguments have been advanced at
different times in an attempt to modify this aspect of the
employment situation by showing that the value of free hous¬
ing, of allotments and of privileges such as grazing cattle
on estate grounds goes a considerable way towards relieving
unemployment and lack of wages in the out-of-crop season of the
year. Orde lirowne, after an enquiry into the entire sit¬
uation, came to the conclusion that in general these allot¬
ments "probably furnish only a meagre amount of employment
or produce," and that for a large portion of each year many
o
sugar workers were "idle, underfed and naturally discontented."w
It is possible to make too much of both sides of this contro¬
versy. The sugar estates, which need the surplus labour in
the crop season, and are therefore anxious to keep a large
resident labour force in reserve, dbviously have an interest
in putting the best construction upon the situation. On
the other hand Orde Browne's Report shows him to be thoroughly




the estates for free housing, not only because it is ineffic¬
ient and underproductive, but because of the complications for
labour-management relations. Recent official enquiries show
that in general estates are able to provide on an average only
yM to 4 days work a week for each worker, but very frequently
the resident labourer works fewer days per week on the average
than he might.* The seasonal employment position is probably
at its worst in Jamaica where in some areas it has beer found
necessary to provide seasonal relief work to offset uneraploy-
2
inent in the out-of-crop period. The availability of alter¬
native employment, in any territory, varies with the district.
In numerous instances workers resident on the estates must
find themselves deterred from seeking other work by the loss
3
of a home which this would involve.
Outside of agriculture there are very few sizable
employers of labour. One of the largest fields of industrial
employment, the oil industry in Trinidad, had an average of
13»074 wage-earners (in the pay either of the companies or of
contractors) in 1939 » by 1950 the number had risen to
16,530. By comparison, British Guiana's bauxite industry
1. See, e.g., Col. Ho. 249. p. 3; Col. No. 281, Vol. IV,
pp. 139-140.
Sugar Industry Comsnissioa Report, Jamaica, 1944-5, p. 150.
3. Cmd« 6070, p. 17.
4. Col. No. 281, Vol. IV, p. 205.
5. Commissioner of Labour's Administration Report, Trinidad
and Tobago, 1951.
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occupies a mere 2,50C - 2,800 workers.* In all three terri¬
tories the Government is one of the largest employers of lab¬
our, skilled and unskilled wage-earners (as distinct from
salaried staff) being found in departments such as Agriculture
and Public Works. In British Guiana, for example, the latter
department alone had as many daily-paid workers in 1954
2
the entire bauxite industry. In Trinidad in 1950 the monthly
average of daily-paid workers employed by Government was
22,363 (with an additional 1,366 port ivorkers and 1,703 man¬
ual employees of City and Borough Councils), a figure slightly
higher than the peak number of 21,843 for the sugar industry
3
in the same year. Such statistics of employment in other
industrial fields as are available show that opportunities
are spread over a number of tiny units. 621 establishments
registered in Jamaica as factories in 1949 (excluding sugar
factories) employed only 13,856 workers, an average of 22
4
workers per factory ; an official estimate of numbers employed
in 154 factories in Trinidad in 1950 yields an average of 27
5
workers per factory.
1. B.G. Annual Report, 1954, P* 25.
2. ibid, p. 24.
5. Commissioner of Labour's Administration Report,
Trinidad and Tobago, 1951* App. 1, p. 30.
4. Col. No. 281. Vol. IV, p. 139.
5. ibid, p. 206.
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As in agricultural labour, a large portion of the
industrial wage-earning population is unskilled; 16% of all
wage-earners in British Guiana, 15% in Jamaica and 14% in
Trinidad were so classified at the last census. For many
persons in this group, usually referred to as casual labour¬
ers, regular work is a matter of chance and odd-jobbing a
familiar experience. i'/orking conditions, when employment is
available, are often unsatisfactory, particularly as long
hours and relatively low wages tend to be the rule."^" The
rates of pay for unskilled indu trial labour, however, have
been higher usually than those given to agricultural labourers.
Even from Labour Department sources no employment figures are
available except for major industries and services, and no
detailed account of this unskilled industrial labour can be
given.
Unemployment is a serious problem in the area, part¬
icularly since the rapid rate of population growth (more than
2% per annum) means that the supply of labour is increasing
faster than the demand. The position has been most critical
in Jaiaaica where the 19^*3 Census revealed that in the week
ending December 12th, 139»^99 persons or approximately 25%
*
of the total labour force were unemployed, /7 of these being
women. Of this number, 50,518 were young persons seeking
a first job; this meant that 31 »Wo of those who were normally
1. cf. Cffld. 6070, p. 75
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wage-earners were unemployed in that week. At the other end
of the scale, less than 3»OGO wage-earners in British Guiana
were found to be unemployed at the time of the 1946 Census.
The measurement of unemployment levels has been hindered by
the unwillingness of labourers to use the Employment Exchanges,
some of which have been functioning since the 1920's. Even
if satisfactory statistics of unemployment were available,
however, their value would be limited, because the seasonal
nature of employment, the high incidence of under-eraployment
and the number of marginally productive "own-account" workers
who might work for wages if jobs could be obtained, would
create intricate problems of interpretation»*
Under-employment is an equally serious feature of
the labour situation in the area, and is common to almost
every category of wage-labour. Even more than in the case
of unemployment, its incidence is difficult to measure, but
it follows logically enough from the other characteristics
of the labour situation. It was particularly noticeable
among dock-workers (until the introduction of Registration
Schemes for port labour) and is still a prime factor in non-
urban areas, aided by the practice in many quarters of employ¬
ing people for brief spells on a rotational basis in order to
1. cf. Proudfoot, op. cit., p. 224. She gives an example
of estimates of the number of unemployed in Jamaica in 1945
by two economists which differed by 100,000!
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offset the hardships of seasonal unemployment.
Wages and The Cost-of-Living.
The high incidence of unemployment and under¬
employment has serious consequences for the labouring pop¬
ulation which must be borne in mind in any appraisal of wage
rates and wage levels. In the conditions which have obtained
in the area in our period, wage rates are no guide to workers*
incomes. No realistic picture of living levels can be
obtained unless the rate of payment is considered in con¬
junction with the availability of work and the number of days
actually put in. Qrde Browne, noting that the wage rate had
been the point at issue in many of the disputes which occurred
prior to his visit to the area, observes*:
Any estimate of conditions founded upon consider¬
ation of the wage rate alone will be erroneous
and misleading; the only true valuation must be
based upon a combination of the wage rate, the
cost of living and the availability of employment
».. Clearly the crucial point is the amount of
money earned by the worker from January to December
rather than the actual figure of the wage to which
he is entitled.
Recent figures of aggregate annual incomes, where they are
available, indicate that in general the level of working-
class incomes is extremely low, in spite of the increases in
1. Cmd. 6070. p. 28.
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wages which have been obtained since the 1930's. The act¬
ual figures of annual earnings, again, mean little except in
relation to the cost of living; but one indication of the low
level of incomes is the fact that, while income tax is gen¬
erally assessed on net incomes of #1200 (£250) or over, only
a tiny proportion of the gainfully occupied population -
less than y/o in British Guiana, for example - is liable to
income tax.^" Prest calls atte tion to the sums paid out
each year in poor relief, the number of beggars in the street
in the towns, and the leisurely pace at which work is carried
out as evidence of the high degree of unemployment or under¬
employment and of low productivity which combine to keep earn¬
ings at a low level*'"
The blame for the low level of earnings and for the
incidence of poverty or near-poverty is often placed on the
workers themselves. It has long been alleged that West
Indian workers are idle and lazy, and will work for only
enough wages to keep them above the subsistence level; that
this dislike of work often means that a rise in the rate of
wages is followed by a reduction in the amount of work per¬
formed, and in the time spent at work. "Anyone at all fam¬
iliar with the West Indian scene will be aware that the lazi¬
ness and unreliability of West Indian workers has been the
1. Based on Col. No. 281, Vol IV, passim.
2, A»R. Prest, A Fiscal Survey of the British Caribbean,
(1957), p. 12.
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particular motif cry of th. sugar planters in the B.W,I, for
many generations," Mrs. Proudfoot reminds us.* It is poss¬
ible to bring statistical evidence to the support of this
view - male employees on sugar estates in British Guiana,
for instance, "worked an average of only 2,3 days per week
in the case of residents and three days per week in the case
of non-residents" in .194?, when the average amount of work
available throughout the year was 3*66 days per week. But
this apparently simple proposition is not to be accepted so
easily. Varioas factors, some traditional, some environ¬
mental, and some aychological, affect the attitude of work¬
ers in the area to labour, and complicate the straightforward
2
picture of a laay people unwilling to work. Aversion to
estate labour, which offers little prospect of advancement
or improvement in one's standard of living, has persisted
since the post-emancipation period; even in the period of
indentured labour, the Erst Indians seldom worked on all of
the 280 days a year on which they were entitled to claim
wages. Recent surveys have revealed deficiencies of diet
which made continuous labour among some groups of workers
impossible.^ The long hours - 10 to 12 hours per working
1# op. cit., p. 237.
2. cf. ibid, pp. 236-240.
3. See, e.g., Report of the Nutrition Committee, Jamaica,
1936-37; Report of the Sugar Industry Welfare Com iittee,
Trinidad, 19'i4; Report on Nutrition in the Colonial"
Empire, 1939*
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day - which until recently have been the rule in most fields
of unskilled employment greatly reduced efficiency in the hot
tropical climates, Much of the work is arduous or tiresome.
And in the conditions which prevailed in all territories
until the disturbances of the 1930's - and even afterwards
in many cases - there was little incentive for workers to try
and improve t eir lot, since the level of their aspirations
was severely limited by the realities of life in West Indian
society. It is worthy of mention that workers outside of
agricultural labour in the area who receive higher wages are
1 at so open to charges of absenteeism and unreliability, and
hat West Indian workers have an excellent reputation in
Central America and the United States. For this reason, Mrs,
Proudfoot concludes that the limitations which are noticeable
in the aspirations of workers in the area are due to back¬
wardness, lack of education, and the absence of a large
enough artisan or middle-class to emulcite,* It would be
fairer to say that the worker's attitude to labour in the
British Caribbean reflects with some accuracy those features
of upper-class life which he desires most: a love of leisure
and an indisposition to hard physical work. Some allowance
must be made when applying standards which are not those of
West Indian society to workers in the area.
Consideration of the cost of living is bedevilled
op, cit,, p, 239,
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by tlie same absence of reliable statistics which has been
noted in other spheres. There is a marked differentiation
in expenses according to territory, and between town and
country, dependent upon the level of rents, the pattern of
consumption, and the availability of supplementary articles
of diet.'' The early estimates of average weekly expend¬
iture which have been discovered all appear to be based upon
more or less arbitrary allocations, but they are unanimous
2
in showing expenditure to be more than income. Orde Browne
in 1939 came to the conclusion that "in comparison with the
moderate cost of living it (the low rate of wages) would
frequently suffice to maintain the worker in fair comfort
were it not for the constant depressing effect of intermittent
3
employment." This is rather inconsistent with his other
conclusion about the cost of living - that it was impossible
to estimate on the basis of the information available and in
view of the great variations in ex enditure. Attempts made
recently to work out cost-of-living indicies have been no
more satisfactory than the earlier guesses. The comment
upon the Index for Trinidad (based on the estimated expenditure
1. Cmd. 6070. p. 28.
2. e.g., images Committee, Trinidad, 1920; estimates by
3GLU in rtaily Chronicle, passim, 1916-30,
3. Cmd. 6070. p. 29.
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of a working man on consumer goods and rent) that "the com¬
bined effects; of changes in consumption standards and govern¬
ment subsidization of items heavily weighted in the Index
have tended to make it unrealistic" indicates the difficult¬
ies which arise even when information is available. The
unsatisfactory nature of cost-of-living estimates has caused
a change recently to Indicies of Retail Prices. Even though
special estimates have been made for sugar 'workers in some
territories, the great diversity in conditions even within
the same territory makes for extreme caution in using them.
Differences in diet and in expenditure patterns between Negro
an East Indian are a further complication.
The investigations on which some of these recent
estimates have been based reveal a considerable degree of
poverty in some households. Of l,4l8 households in George¬
town with incomes of less than /6o a month (£150 per annum)
in 1942, 381 had less than #5 & week and 663 others less than
010 a week, while average weekly expenditure was 08*23, food
alone costing #4.53 (56%). There was, on the average, one
wage-earner for every 2 dependents.* Estimates made in
Jamaica in 1944 gave the average weekly expenditure of regu¬
lar field workers on sugar estates as 23/9 (/6»90), 35% of
this being spent on food; average weekly expenditure exceeded
average weekly income by 3/6j a phenomenon which is described
1. Col. No. 281. Vol. IV, p. 78.
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as "a usual feature in all Income and Expenditure Surveys
covering v/orking class people in Jamaica#"
Several features of the labour situation ivhich has
been surveyed briefly above appear worthy of additional men¬
tion, in conclusion, because of their bearing on the charac¬
ter of organised labour in the British Caribbean. The sur¬
plus of labour supply, the high incidence of unemployment
and under-emplo.yment, and the low level of earnings, combine
to produce a climate of perpetual slump (alleviated only by
occasional accidental factors like the building of United
States bases during World War II) which is usually a deter¬
rent to trade unionism, as instanced by the history of trade
unions in countries where they have been established for a
longer time# The workers of the area are predominantly
unskilled and agricultural labourers - precisely the kind of
workers who are most difficult to organise. In British
Guiana and Trinidad, the continued existence in large measure
of an occupational differential between Negro and East Indian
workers, along with a degree of racial rivalry, has its effect
on trade union unity within the territories. The practice of
company housing, free on the estates or at low rentals in the
oil and bauxite industries, is a potential deterrent to trade
union membership# The absence of large units of employment
outside of sugar, oil and bauxite, and some Government depart¬
ments, increases the difficulties of organisation for the
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unions. And the identification of race and economic class
in the area creates complications in political and social
life which have their repercussions on the trade union move¬
ment, as well as on the role of organised labour in politics.
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CHAPTER 111
LABOUR UNREST. 1896 - 1915
The first permanent labour organisations in the
British Caribbean were formed at the end of the first World
War. But their formation had been preceded by sporadic
unrest and various isolated attempts at organisation for
some two decades. With one exception, none of these
pioneer associations lasted long enough to leave any record
of its activities, nor did they achieve much in the way of
benefits for their members. They did, however, have this
value - they planted the seeds of the idea of organising
labour in each of our three territories.
The main factor underlying labour unrest at the
turn of the century was the pressure of population gror/th,
particularly of the urban population, at a time when the
sugar industry was in serious difficulties. It is signi¬
ficant that British Guiana, which was most dependent upon
sugar, was the most troubled territory, and that in Jamaica,
with its greater diversification, there was no sign of
trouble. The improvements which had been effected in the
technique of sugar cane production, coupled with the effects
of continuing competition even after the abolition of
bounties on beet sugar, tended to reduce the volume of the
labour force which the industry needed. For example, it is
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estimated that in Jamaica whereas 30»000 people were employed
in sugar in i860, only 20,000 could find work on the estates
in 1910.* In British Guiana and Trinidad, too, the con¬
tinued introduction of indentured immigrants down to 1917
had the same effect of reducing the amount of employment
open to the free rural wage-earner. The decline of sugar
did not affect the rural labourer alone; the regularity
with which the urban worker obtained employment varied
with the volume of trade in sugar exports. The standard
of living of the entire working-class was affected.
The emergence of a large landless urban working-class.
The preponderance of small-holding peasant farmers
and indentured labourers in the population in the 19th Cent¬
ury, created conditions in which it was unlikely that workers'
organisations would develop. Labour movements demand the
existence of a landless class of urban wage-earners, whom
circumstances force to form "a continuous association ...
for the purpose of maintaining or improving the condition
2
of their working lives." While a man can grow his own
1. G.E. Camper, "Labour Demand and Supply in the Jamaican
Sugar Industry, 1830 - 1950" in Social and Economic Studies.
Vol. 2, No. 4. (195*0.
2. S. & 8. Webb, History of Trade Unionism. (1920 ed),
p. 1.
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food crops or migrate easily to employment where better
wages are offered, he has little incentive to rely upon com¬
bination in order to better his condition* The period
1891 * 1946 saw the growth in the British Caribbean of a
large city population dependent upon wage-labour, faced with
rising costs and high house rents, and caught up in a web
of increasing underemployment. The rate and incidence of
this growth varied in the three territories; its effects
were felt soonest in British Guiana and latest in Jamaica,
The factor mainly responsible for this development
was the increase in the jjopulation of all three colonies,
both as a result of natural causes and through immigration*
Inadequate or inelastic supply of manpower had been the
labour problem of the 19th Century; unemployment and under¬
employment were to be the problem of the 20th, Jamaica and
Trinidad are small islands and can accommodate and provide
employment only for a limited population, even with the
application of intensive cultivation, planning, controls,
industrialisation, and all the other paraphernalia of intell¬
igent modern government, British Guiana, with its vast
hinterland, is capable in theory of supporting an unlimited
increase in population for many a generation; in actual
fact, physical difficulties such as drainage, water-supply,
transport, communications and other factors in the special
circumstances of the territory make successful expansion into
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the interior a venture beyond the capabilities of any
peasantry or population without planned development schemes
calling for resources and reserves far in excess of the
country's modest means.
Hie population of British Guiana in 1891 was just
over twice the I85I figure; much of the increase was due
to immigration, mainly of East Indians, though numbers of
Portuguese, Chinese and West Indian Negroes helped to swell
the growth. It increased a mere 6.5% between 1891 and 1921,
but by 19^6 it was */5 as large again as in 1921. Population
growth in Jamaica was slower between 1844 and 1891, the
increase being 69,4% of the 1844 total. There had been a
negligible amount of immigration to the island, most of it
consisting of Indians and Chinese who amounted to just over
22,000, less than 5% of the population in 19H»* Moreover,
considerable emigration from Jamaica had been going on since
i860 - no accurate figure or satisfactory estimate has been
obtained, the figure for the years 1881 - 1921 being put at
146,000." Between I89I and 1921 the population increased
1
by /3» and the rate of increase in the ensuing generation
was only slightly less. There were almost twice as many
1. Census of Jamaica, 1911*
2. G.W. Roberts, The Population of Jamaica, (1957), p»
140. —
- 112 -
inhabitants in 1943 a® in 1891, a serious state of affairs
when it is remembered that Jamaica was by no means 'undevel¬
oped1 in the 19th Century in the sense that British Guiana
and Trinidad were. It is in Trinidad that population
growth has been greatest. The number of inhabitants in
1891 was almost three times the 1851 figure, and by 1946
the population was more than 27A times that of 1891. This
rate of growth was due largely to immigration, not only of
East Indians, but of Negroes from the other islands, who
numbered almost 50,000 (*/llth of the population) in 1946.
Population figures and percentage increases in the
period I89I - 1946 are shown in the tables below. The fig¬
ures for British Guiana are given exclusive of the Amerindian
population of the interior. The figures for Trinidad do not
include the island of Tobago.
Growth of Population. 1851 - 1946*
British
Year Guiana Trinidad Jamaica
1851 127,675 68,600 377,433*
1891 270,865 200,028 639,491
1911 289,140 312,790 831,383
1921 288,541 342,532 858,118
1931 302,585 387,418 No census
1946 359,379 530,762 1,237,063*
* Figure for 1844
** Figure for 1943
1, Source! Census Reports for years given.
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The population of the chief towns grew even more
rapidly than the total population. The number of citizens
in Georgetown increased by over 94 between 1891 and 1946,
almost two-thirds of this increase occurring after 1921.
The population of both Kingston and Port-of-Spain in the
19'iO's stood at 2)4 times the 1891 figure. The widespread
drift into the city which is noticeable in Port-of-Spain
after 1891 and in Kingston after 1921 had already occurred
in Georgetown between 1861 and 1891* when its population
increased from 30,863 to 53•17b.
Concentration of population was greatest in George¬
town where the ratio of city population to total population
had risen steadily from 1 in 5 in 1891 to 1 in 4 in 1946.
Port-of-Spain's 1 inhabitant for every 6 of the Trinidad pop¬
ulation in 1891 had increased to 1 in 5 by 1911; the lower
ratio of subsequent years is attributable to the development
of the oil industry in the southern half of the Island, at
the furthest remove from the city. Concentration in urban
Trinidad is greater than the figures suggest, especially
since the 1930's, because the effective city area extends
both east and west of Port-of-Spain proper, much in the
same way as the effective city area in Jamaica is Kingston -
St. Andrew, that is, Kingston and surrounding districts.
In Jamaica the city population remained at 2 in every 15
until 1921, but had grown by 1943 to 1 in 5* The correlation
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between these figures and the incidence of urban labour
unrest is striking. Georgetown's ivorkers were uneasy from
1905* Port-of-Spain's from 1917? but a comparable situation
did not develop in Kingston until the 1930's.















































The drift to the cities was not due entirely to
the decline in the sugar industry. Better rates of pay pre¬
vailed in the city and were conducive to urban migration.
This had a greater effect in British Guiana and in Trinidad
than in Jamaica, where there was the counter-attraction of
high wages in Panama, Cuba, Costa Rica and the United States
of America. As a result, heavy concentration of population
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did not take place in Kingston until after the completion of
the Panama Canal and the imposition of immigration restrict¬
ions in 1924# But while most of Georgetown's increase seems
due to Negro migration from the country districts, Port-of-
Spain's is more attributable to the decision of a large
percentage of immigrants from the neighbouring islands to
stay to swell the city's general labour force. There were
good reasons for this greater migration into Georgetown.
The facility with which Crown Lands could be obtained in
Trinidad between 1870 and 1906 was not matched in British
Guiana where more restrictive rules were applied.* Rice
growing did not develop on any scale in British Guiana until
after 1910, and while the Trinidadian had cocoa cultivation
as an alternative, the Guianese went prospecting in the
interior or to Georgetown} even prospecting was curtailed
by regulations made in 1909« Just as hurricanes aid drought
helped to accelerate Jamaican migration by the distress and
;i I
uncertainty they caused the peasant population, so did
drought, as in 1898 - 1900, and the physical difficulties of
peasant cultivation in British Guiana, increase the attraction
2
of Georgetown. w Some enticement, too, must ha\-e come from
1. See, e.g., 1897 Royal Commission. App. C., Vol. II, Pt.
II, Evidence of Hon. N. Darnell Davis, p. 54.
2, Berbice Gazette, 1900 - 1902, passim.
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the introduction of modern entertainment media like the
picture palaces of the early years of this century. And
even crowded slum 'yards' can acquire allure to a naturally
gregarious people by their contrast to the eerie stillness
and the early darkness of the lonely tropical countryside.
The importance of all three towns as seats of
Government and centres of commercial activity was reinforced
by the introduction of railways in the late 19th Century,
In addition to providing regular and easier means of com¬
munication with country districts, - in itself an inducement -
railways helped to confirm the capital as the focus of com¬
mercial and industrial life, and to stimulate in it secondary
activities offering further fields of employment*
The Causes of Unrest,
The causes of the growing labour unrest at the turn
of the last century were mainly economic, Cundall's collect¬
ion of West Indian Riots between 1838 and 1906 reveals the
interesting conclusion that five of the seven disturbances
which took place after I896 were concerned with financial
matters, four of them being caused by dissatisfaction over
wages. Of these four, three occurred in British Guiana,
1, F. Cundall, Political and Social Disturbances in the
West Indies, (1906), p. 7«
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two of them among indentured East Indians on plantations in
1896 and 1903, the third in Georgetown in 1905« There had
been no riots caused by wages before 1896, and only three of
the eighteen which occurred before that date had been the
result of dissatisfaction over financial arrangements (taxes
or land tenure)* There seem to be grounds for the view
that the cost of living of the working-class rose steadily
after 1890, though, on the whole, this conclusion is based
upon assertions to this effect which appear to have been
accepted generally at the time, and not upon statistical
evidence, as no reliable figures are available** In his
evidence to the 1897 Koyal Commission, the Comptroller of
Customs in British Guiana said that poverty and distress had
been widespread in Georgetown for some ten years, and were
not confined to the working-class. It is possible that, in
addition to the increased cost of food and clothing which we
may infer from these references, a more urbanized pattern of
consumption and a gradual replacement of ex-slave and peasant
by European-orientated tastes may have contributed to this
state of affairs.
At the same time wages not only failed to rise
proportionately, but were reduced in many cases as a result
1. See, e.g., 1897 Royal Commission, App. C., Vol, II,
Pt. IIj Evidence of Hon. N.D. Davis, p. 565 of Rev. D.J,
Reynolds, p. 965 idem, Pt. IV, Letter from Working Men's
Reform Club, pp. 3VP9.
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of the general distress. The 1897 Royal Commission reports
that "the wages of artisans have already been substantially
reduced," though the reduction in the wages of ordinary lab¬
ourers was less general, and while predicting that "there
may yet be a general reduction in the wages of labour,"*
warned that wages in the sugar industry could be lowered no
further." In Jamaica, where the rate paid on estates was
9d. - 1/- a day, there had been no increase since the post-
fiotancipation period, and few labourers could find more than
rt
3 or 4 days' work a week. Wages in Trinidad had been
reduced in 1884, and unsuccessful attempts at further reduct-
ion had been made. In British Guiana sugar workers' wages
were reduced in the l890's, and rates for unskilled labour in
5
Georgetown had fallen by 13%. The dockers claimed in 1905
that they had worked for the sane wages 'for thirty years',
a claim which the British Guiana merchants did not deny
g
but rather used as an argument against granting an increase!
1. idem. Report, p. 36.
2. idem, p. 15.
3. Curaper, op. cit.g Beachey, op. cit.. p. 125,
4. 1897 Royal Com ission. Report, p. 36. Also App. C.,
Vol. II, Pt. IV, Evidence of C.W. Mitchell, pp. 262-65|
Letter from Working Men's Reform Club, p. 349. See also'
Trinidad Council Paper, No. 15 of 1906. App, J} Beachey,
op. cit., p. 105.
5. 1897 Royal Commission, App. C., Vol. II, Pt. II, Evid¬
ence of J.H. Re Jonge, merchant, pp. 43-45, Beachey,
op. cit.« p. 101.
6. Daily Chronicle, 1st December, 1905.
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Attempts at Organisation.
Attempts at organisation are to be found only among
the Negro working-class population before 1918. No perman¬
ent form of industrial combination could emerge among workers
who were bound to give their services for a period of time
and were not free to labour for another employer, the pos¬
ition in which indentured East Indian labourers found them¬
selves. Strikes and disturbances occurred among them often
and on almost all estates, usually over the rate to be paid
for a particular job. There was a fixed procedure for
settling these disputes: the labourers took their case to
the nearest Immigration Officer, who then went to inspect
the job and tried to arrange a settlement5 if his efforts
failed, the case was brought before a magistrate, outside
assessors being retained by both sides.1 By extension,
this system of conciliation and arbitration applied to free
East Indians who remained on the estates. Lord Oliver
suggests that the Government, through the Protector of Immi¬
grants, acted as a sort of trade union on behalf of the East
2
Indians, a view in which we concur. The Immigration
Officers always represented the 'coolies * if the dispute
1. The Immigration Office, or Department of the Protector
of Immigrants, as it was called in Trinidad, was concerned
with all matters relating to East Indian immigrants. See
D. Nath, op. cit.. for an outline of its working in
British Guiana.
2. Olivier, White Capital, (1907 ed,), pp. 121-26.
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reached the magistrate. Political interest among East
Indians in these years was directed towards the situation
in India; few of them possessed the property or literacy
qualifications essential for West Indian politics of the pre-
19^0 period. There were East Indian Associations in both
British Guiana and Trinidad which paid attention to local
civil rights and identified themselves with the rising
nationalist movement in India**
The attempts to organise the Negro working-class
before World War I are best considered separately for each
territory*
1* BRITISH GUIANA
No attempt had been made to organise the working-
class in British Guiana before 1900, though Political Assoc¬
iations with labour support had helped to secure the 1891
constitutional reforms and had contested election in 1896*
Some Guianese Negro labourers realised the value of combin¬
ation but seemed to expect a lead from outside their own
ranks* For example, A*E. Trots, a carpenter, speaking for
some 200 general labourers and artisans before the 1897 West
1* In Trinidad there were both an East Indian National
Association and an East Indian National Congress, The
British Guiana East Indian Association absorbed a splinter
group, called the National Congress, after a few weeks*
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India Royal Commission complained: "We arevery much dis¬
couraged in respect of the method of banding ourselves
together as a body of mechanics ... There is no trade union
amongst the people, there is just the chance of catching
1
work wherever you can."
Shirley and 'The People*
The first sign of such a lead came from the Rev¬
erend H.J, Shirley, a young minister of the Scots Congregat¬
ional Church who was appointed to the Mission Chapel, New
Amsterdam, in July 1900 after successfully organising thrift
clubs among workers in the Fulham area of London. He found
a country impoverished by the depression in the sugar indus¬
try, the peasantry suffering severe distress because of con¬
tinued drought in 1898 and 1899, the East Indian population
seething with discontent, and the Government blithely ignor¬
ing public feeling in its pursuit of unpopular policies.
Six weeks after his arrival he was criticising the existing
order in a manner which no cleric had dared to use since the
Reverend John Smith had been 'martyred1 for his sympathy
with the slaves some 80 years before. He attacked in part¬
icular the system of taxation - its burden, he said "fell
upon the poor and was meant to fall upon the poor" - and
1. 1897 Royal Commission, App. C.« Vol, II, Pt. II. p.
89.
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Governments controversal education policy which he denounced
as "designed to keep the black and coolie races in ignorance."1
Fresh from the London of Ben Tillett and Tom Mann, he
rejected the local liberals* preference for political action
by elected members in the Courts of Government and called for
more direct working-class action through a well-organised
labour movement# He outlined four practical aims for the
working-class to improve its loti 1) All wage-earners
"from the clerk to the coolie" should form Trade Unions to
protect their rights} 2) the now defunct political assoc¬
iations of the 1890*s should be revived with a labour bias;
3) public opinion should be educated and apathy dispelled
by frequent public meetings; 4) the British public and
press should be kept informed of events in British Guiana
so as to exercise influence in London# " He opposed hostility
to planters as a class, as long as they paid fair wages, and
supported East Indian iramigration, since a controllable
3
labour force was needed for the country's staple crop#
His criticisms touched off a stormy controversy, with both
the people and the liberals rallying to his support#
Apart from organising Young People's Improvement
1# Reported in Daily Chronicle# 12th September, 1900#
and Daily Argosy of same date. Also Berbice Gazette,
19th September, 1900#
2. ibid.
5* Berbice Gazette, 1st May, 1901#
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Societies to stimulate the interest of the youth, and a non-
denominational Sick and Provident Society in New Amsterdam
"to encourage thrift and mutual helpfulness between the
working men of the town,"* his most significant activity was
the establishment of a people's paper, owned and published
by the Negroes in their own interest. After a widespread
campaign for support, the People's Newspaper Company Limited
was registered in September 1901 with a nominal capital of
#20,000 in #2 shares, the biggest shareholder having only
2
twenty shares." 'The People* appeared fortnightly from
the end of 1901, priced at one penny, with Shirley as its
first editor. The first board of Directors comprised
Patrick Dargan, A.B. Browne, C.E.D. Farnum, A.A. Thome,
Dr. Wills and Shirley. All of these, except Dr. Wills and
Shirley, were, or were to become, elected members in the
Combined Court; Dargan, Browne and Farnum were barristers-
at-law, while Thorne was an immigrant Barbadian who had
taken an active part in the struggle for the 1891 Constit¬
ution, and who now ran a private school in Georgetovm.
It was intended to be "an unpretentious paper, unscurrilous,
dignified, earnest, devoted to truth and fearless in its
expression always."""* From the first, returns were
1. Berbice Gazette, l6th January, 1901.
2. Daily Chronicle. 6th October, 1901.
3. Daily Chronicle, 24th March, 1901. Reported words
of Shirley.
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disappointing, and after Shirley's departure from British
Guiana in 1903, both sales and standards declined rapidly.
It seems to have been subsidised by Government during 1904,
and this led to popular criticism of its policy on the
grounds that its literary and political standfirds had become
less important than favourable balance-sheets.* At a noisy
meeting of shareholders on March 1st, 1909» it was claimed
that circulation was falling, that the paper had deviated
from its aims, and that it was losing its following among
the people. Many of these criticisms appear to have been
justified; 'The People' seems to have suffered fros» inept
business management, incompetent editorial guidance, and a
series of directors who wanted to 'play politics' with the
1 2
paper. It appears to have ceased publication in 1914.
Shirley's brief sojourn is interesting as being the
first direct call to workers in British Guiana to organise as
labour, and to use these organisations for bettering their
position within the wage-labour system. All the liberals'
protests of the period looked backward, as it were, to sav¬
ing the situation by further extension of peasant settlement.
1. e.g. 'Onlooker' to Editor, Daily Chronicle, 11th
February, 1905; 'Plebian' to Editor, Daily Chronicle, 15th
February, 1905. See also reply of N.R. Salton, one of the
directors, Daily Chronicle, 19th February, 1905*
2. It has not proved possible to examine any files of
'The People'. The Annual Blue Book for British Guiana does
not include it in the list of Colony newspapers after 1914.
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Two minor attempts at combination are reported
at this time. The tailors of Berbice formed a union early
in 19^1 "to seek the tailoristic advancement of its members."'''
But this may have been rather a craft guild for fixing
prices and standards than a combination of journeymen tail¬
ors, as most tailors worked independently for the public.
The overseers on the sugar estates had also combined in
2
December 1901 in an effort to secure increased wages. But
both these combinations seem to have been shortlived.
The Georgetown Riots of 1905*
Much more important for the rise of organised
labour in British Guiana were the disturbances which occurred
in Georgetown in 1905 and their aftermath. The trouble
began in November with a strike for wages on the wharves.
Wharf labour provided the bi ;;gest field of employment for
unskilled labourers in the city. Each firm had its own
wharf, and employed a number of regular porters in the course
of its business; in addition large numbers of occasional
labourers would be hired to load and unload ships when they
were in port, for periods varying from a few hours to a few
days. It was by such casual labour that the majority of
1. Berbice Gazette, 3rd April, 1901.
2. Daily Chronicle. 1st June, 1902, says they failed to
win an increase, and asks what has become of the Union,
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wharf labourers made a living. When a ship arrived in
port, they would flock to the offices of the firm concerned,
in the hope of catching the stevedore's recruiting eye, but
none of them could expect work for more than two days a
week* Occasionally ships would remain 'out in the stream,*
and then lighters were employed to convey cargo from ship to
shore. Both men and boys were employed, the wage for boys
being lower*
The strike started among the boys on one wharf on
Tuesday, November 28th; the men on that wharf came out soon
after, and by the next day the entire waterfront was on strike*
It was the city's first strike, and by Thursday afternoon
the novel spectacle had drawn 'thousands, the majority of
whom had never worked on a wharf,including numbers of
women* This was only to be expected in an overcrowded city
where unemployment and poverty had been rife, both among
working-class and impoverished middle-class families, for
more than 10 years; prominent in the Thursday crowds were
the products of the city's slum 'yards', the 'centipedes' as
they were known locally* % Thursday evening the holiday
mood of the first two days, the result in large measure of
tactful handling by Inspector Kerr in charge of the George¬
town police, and of the feeling that police were in sympathy
1* Daily Chronicle, 1st December, 1905*
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with strikers, had changed to one of muttered menaces and
pent-up passions at bursting point. This was due, not so
much to the blunt refusal of the merchants to consider an
increase which the Inspector as self-appointed negotiator
had to convey to the strikers, as by the arrival of armed
policement with fixed bayonets to control a crowd which had
limited its indiscretions to a few brief scuffles at points
where black-legs were attempting to work, and to extracting
from one employer*" - who subsequently maintained his belief
in the need for an increase - a promise that he would pay
2
higher wages if in future he took on any casual labour."
The Riot Act was read four times in a vain attempt to dis¬
perse the crowds and the Governor issued proclamations clos¬
ing all liquor shops between dusk and dawn and announcing
his resolve to put down riotous assemblies by force. That
night the city bakers went on strike.
Meanwhile the strike fever had spread to Ruimveldt,
an estate on the immediate outskirts of Georgetown where
1. J.P. Santos & Co. Mr. Santos, a Portuguese merchant,
took the lone view at a meeting of merchants called by the
Governor on Monday, December 4th, that wages^'vere too low.
He was filling to give an 6^ rise - 16 /3%) to men
and boys, with 16^ an hour for broken periods of work.
P.P. 1906. Cd. 2822. Governor to Lyttleton, 5th Dece .ber,
1905.
2. Daily Chronicle, 1st December, 1905.
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wages were particularly low,* First the Negro porters in
the factory case out on Wednesday (the second day of the
wharf-labourers' strike), and by Friday morning all Negroes
employed on the estate had struck. On Wednesday evening,
the artillery had arrived, bringing with them part of the
curious city crowd, and the cane-cutters had .joined the
strikers. Early on "Black Friday" morning a banner-bearing
crowd arrived from the city to swell the numbers of the
Ruimveldt strikers. The police, under Major De Rinzy,
foolishly tried to arrest one of the demonstrators, were
stoned by the mob at 50 yards range, and fired "in self-
2
defence." The sight of the wounded being convoyed to
hospital in the city maddened a people excited from the day
before, and Europeans, Portuguese, and all known to be con¬
nected with the administration or with the merchants were
stoned and attacked on sight. Twice during the day crowds
were fired upon in the city, and at the day's end, there
were 7 dead and 18 wounded by rifle fire. Only the
1, Cane-cutters at Ruiraveldt were paid 2/ - 3/ a bed as
compared with hfi - 8/ at the neighbouring Dia ?ond estate,
and claimed that 12/- a week was their average maximum
earning. All the cane-cutters at Ruimveldt were Negroes,
employed seasonally. Daily Chronicle, 5th December, 1905,
2, Daily Chronicle, 2nd December, 1905*
3, ibid.
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Governor's assurance that there would be no more shooting,
and the heavy rains of Friday evening saved the situation.
Warships raced into port over the week-end, and though by
Monday strikes had broken out among labourers on both banks
of the Demerara, there was no further serious disturbance.
On Wednesday the wharf labourers returned to work.
The outburst of strikes and rioting had important
sequels. First of all, the wharf labourers won a partial
victory. Although they failed to gain an actual increase
h
in wages, which remained at 48/1 a day for boys, 64/f for men
with night work paid double, they had wrung from the mer¬
chants agreement to forego the practice of employing men for
•broken hours* and to pay a minimum of 34 day's pay for work
done.* The merchants also agreed to put down objection¬
able practices by which labourers had been kept idle "until
certain carts (or lighters) in the earnings of which one or
more wharfingers were interested were available.
Secondly, the labourer's traditional belief in the
justice and impartiality of Governors, as representatives of
the Crown, received a severe jolt when tiovernor Hodgson's
part in the affair became fully known. The estate labourers
1. H.G. Williams, Secretary, Georgetown Chamber of Com¬
merce to Government Secretary, 5th December, 1905$ in
Daily Chronicle, 6th December, 1905,
2. Daily Chronicle, 5th December, 1905*
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who had gone on strike had won no increase in wa ;es because
the Governor had used his influence, and in the case of
Schoon Ord estate and one or two others where the manage¬
ments were willing to grant an increase, had resorted to
threats of withdrawing police protection, in order to pre¬
vent an increase being given.1 Yet when approached, on
the day before the shooting took place, by Dr. J.M. Rohlehr
who had been commissioned by a deputation of Ruiraveldt cane-
cutters to put their case to the Governor "Sir Frederick
Hodgson caused a reply to be sent to the effect that he
could not interfere in a dispute of the kind affecting the
<2 ?
wages paid on a sugar estate." Even on the face of it
this attitude to the cane-cutters was inconsistent with his
public undertaking, given at the Public Buildings on "Black
Friday" in the heat of the riots, that he would look into
the dockers' grievances. But the Governor's role was even
more partial and two-faced than either strikers or public
knew. Before this meeting with the City merchants about
the dockers' claims - all he did at this meeting was to ask
the Chamber of Commerce to draft "a tariff to include rates
3
of pay for all classes of work at the wharves" } no effort
1. Creole, 30th December, 1905; Daily Chronicle, 3rd
January, 1906; P.P. 1906. Cd. 2822, Hodgson to Elgin,
9th January, 1906'. ™
2. Daily Chronicle, 5th December, 1905.
3. idem.
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was made to secure fairer rates of pay for the men who put
such pathetic faith in the integrity of his office - he had
already decided that "it would be most impolitic to consider
m any question of changing the current rate#"1 He later just¬
ified his action on the ground that the grant of an increase
at that time would have led to Colony-wide demands and "a
general rising on the plea that wages must be increased" ,
and, in support of this view, rationalised that the Negro
« labourers on the estates could have no ligitimate grievance
since "at no timr during the last ten years have they repre¬
sented to their employers that they had, nor have they shown
that they were dissatisfied,"
The most charitable assessment which can be made of
Sir Frederick Hodgson's behaviour in this question is that he
was abysmally ignorant of conditions among the people he was
supposed to govern, and that he allowed his personal and
social prejudices to blind him to the responsibilities of his
office. His conduct was regarded by labourers and liberals
as a breach of faith, and his recall was demanded. Attempts
to have a Royal Commission of Investigation appointed failed,
and a People's Petition with over 6,000 signatures was
rejected by Lord Elgin as representative of the views of "only
1, P.P. 1906, Cd. 2822, Hodgson to Lyttleton, 5th
December, 1905»
2. P.P. 1906. Cd. 2822, Hodgson to Elgin, 9th January,
1906,
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one section of the population, and that not the most numer¬
ous"* - which is merely another illustration of how mis¬
informed the Colonial Office could be.
The Labour Union Scheme, 1906,
The most important result of the disturbances was
the general awareness of the need for industrial organisation
among the Negro labourers which was created, and the interest
taken by the liberal middle-class in promoting such a com¬
bination, Architect of the Labour Union Scheme of 1906 was
Dr, J, M, Rohlehr, a coloured Guianese who had been an enthus¬
iastic associate of Shirley in New Amsterdam, Support for
the idea was widespread, an organising committee was appointed
at a well-attended meeting held on January 8th, 1906, "for
the purpose of forming a labour and trade union for British
Guiana and meetings were held in several country dis-
2
tricts to publicise the movement."- But good intentions are
no substitute for knowledge, and the committee had not the
faintest idea of how to create a union structure, and only
a distant acquaintance with the practical problems involved}
its membership consisted of middle-class professionals,
clerics, doctors and lawyers, with a schoolmaster as pro¬
visional secretary. Their dilemma was obvious from the
1, Daily Chronicle. 1st July, 1906*
2. Daily Chronicle, 10th January, 1906; 21st January,
1906;
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beginning. Rohlehr had defined the objects of the new
union: to prevent a recurrence of bloodshed and disturbances
and "being wrong through ignorance;" and to bring together
"men capable of discussing the subject and able to speak to
employers of labour and have matters settled*" His words
envisaged some sort of middle-class leadership and active
participation in the set-up; and inevitably the union -would
fulfil a political function.1 The concept of independent
liberal political action had been discarded for united
labour activity. The circular letter issued by the Com¬
mittee's secretary began with a ponderous recital about
"Recent events having pressed upon the attention of all who
are interested in the welfare of the labouring classes of
the colony the necessity of labour ... being organised
•••••" and a plea to sympathisers "to impress upon those of
the labouring people within your influence through the medium
of public meetings where possible, the advantages to be
derived from such a combination ..•••"$ but it postponed
giving information about the aims or working of the proposed
2
union and invited suggestions as to what was to be done.
1. "if they had a union they would be able to get rid of
such a Governor," Speech of Dr. J.M. Rohlehr at the
Demerara Missionary Industrial Institute, 8th January,
1906. Reported in Daily Chronicle, 10th January, 1906.
2, Circular letter from m, Wallace Wilson, Honorary Sec¬
retary, re the proposed Labour Union, in Daily Chronicle,
19th January, 1906,
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Excluding fatuous generalisations like "the actions of the
union will be governed by certain rules/' the committee
could make only one concrete suggestion as to organisation
- that the funds be all put in a common treasury - and two
affecting policy - the preference for snowball strikes, and
the need for strike pay^* both of which were unrealistic
unless the union were first properly organised. The entire
effort resembled rather an exercise in political stomping
than a determined attempt at creating a workers' organisation.
It is no surprise to learn that two months later Dr« Rohlehr
in distress had written for draft rules to John Burns and
Mr, Shirley in London, and that the formation of the union was
"unavoidably held in abeyance pending the arrival of comnsun-
2
ications from England," Later in the year, Rohlehr left
for England, to return in a cloud of unpopularity caused by
3
suspicions of his having 'sold out his people,' The Labour
Union Scheme was to remain a dream for nearly thirteen years.
It had not been well-received in all quarters.
Among the critics were the influential Catholic authorities
who foresaw "mutual mistrust" between workers' and employers*
organisations, and would have preferred an Arbitration Board
1, Speech of Dr» Prowd at Providence School Hall, 19th
January, 19°6» Reported in Daily Chronicle, 21st January,
1906,
2, Daily Chronicle, 21st March, 1906,
5, Daily Chronicle, 19th August, 1906,
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with purely judicial functions, and power to bind both sides
to adhere to its decisions for a given period.
Unrest, 1905-1J*»
After 1905» unrest continued among both urban and
estate labourers in British Guiana, and the years 1905-1^
were punctuated by minor strikes and stoppages, usually abort¬
ive but on the whole non-violent. The most interesting was
the dock strike of September, 1906. The dockers had learnt
one or two lessons from 1905» among them the need for level¬
headed action and for keeping their strike under control.
When the truck-boys struck for a 50% increase in September,
1906, it was on no sudden impulse; their action had been
planned and previously discussed. "The strike was timed to
affect the handling of the cargo of the Armstrong line steamer
2
Uller ... and the C.M.S. Ocamo ....." Though few men
among the wharf labourers joined in the strike, they seem to
have supported the boys' stand. The strikers prudently kept
away from the business area of the city which \?as affected
by the stoppage* Four days later, many of them had lost
their jobs and the strike had been broken* Among the tem¬
porarily unemployed was one Hubert Critchlow, one of the
1. Daily Chronicle. 20th January, 1906 J Catholic Standard,
February, 1906.
2» Daily Chronicle, 26th September, 1906,
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ringleaders, against whom the police failed to prove a charge
of assault upon a non-striker while on picket duty. He was
soon to found the first trade union in the territory, now the
oldest existing union in the area.
2. TRINIDAD.
In 1897 Trinidad celebrated the centenary of its
capture from Spain by the British. Amidst all the ceremony,
the first meeting of the Working Men's Reform Club might
have passed unrecorded had not "an humble congratulatory
address to the Queen" on the occasion of the celebrations
been proposed by Mr. Chairman Phillips. The Club drew its
membership from the "licensed watermen, via., boatmen, drogher-
men and ships1 labourers" on the Port-of-Spain waterfront,
and it appears that its leading spirit was Charles Phillips,
who was chairman of that first meeting and who is described
2
as being the 'father of labour movements,'" - an indication
perhaps of his role in the attempt to organise the workers
of the city. The imminent visit of the Royal Commissioners
in 1897, and the need to have an organisation which could put
1. Port-of-Spaln Gazette, 11th February, 1897,
2. 1897 Royal Commission, Appendix C., Vol. II, Pt. IV,
Trinidad, Letter of Working Men's Reform Club, pp. 3'*8-49.
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the views of the labourers to them, may well have been the
motive behind the founding of the Working Hen's Reform Club,
Its protest against increased taxation, higher rents, the
depression in trade, reduced wages and the utter destitut¬
ion which was the lot of the working-class, shows little
difference, except in the unsophisticated style of its
language, from the liberal middle-class protests of the
period. There is no further record of the Club's activities,
and it seems safe to assume its early dissolution. By 1906,
at any rate, its founder Charles Phillips had become a member,
of the Trinidad dorkin men's Association,
Alfred Richards and the TvA,
Less authentic as a working-class organisation in
this period, but more permanent, was the Trinidad Vorkingmen's
Association, Founded in 1897 also\ it seems to have been
at first a sort of civic rights group which came into exist¬
ence during one of those struggles between the Port-ef—Spain
1 • W«A. Lewis, Labour in the -vest Indies, (1939), dates it
from the early 1890's; this view is given some support by
the statement of M.E. Corbie, Secretary and a founding mem¬
ber, at a meeting on May 3rd, 1906, that the Association
had been 'inaugurated twelve years ago*, i.e., in 1904,
Mirror, 7th May, 1906. But the official notices of the
Association in the Press and elsewhere give its date of
foundation as 1897* J, Parry and A. Sherlock, A Short
History of the West Indies, (1956)» P* 280, incorrectly
give the date as 1907♦
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Town Counci1 and the Trinidad Government which ended with the
temporary abolition of an elected Town Council; the Assoc¬
iation survived until 1932 when it became the Trinidad Labour
Party, but after 1913 its aims and activities altered so aiuch
that all it retained of its earlier character was the name#
Its membership comprised "both ordinary and professional
workers"^ and a special invitation was made to "all honest
and industrious workmen of a good character and not deemed to
be a convict, and •»• above the age of 18 years""' to join up#
But in actuality it appears to have consisted largely of
small property owners, one or two professional men, and a few
artisans; in 1897» W.M, Mills, President, had claimed a mem¬
bership of "carpenters, masons, labourers, tailors, and other
trades." Its numbers, fifty in 1897, had risen to some 200
by 1909, though there were allegations that it was a one man
4
Association# The stated objects of the Trinidad dorkingraen's
Association placed heavy emphasis on its character as an
1# Address of Alfred Richards, President, on May 3rd, in
Mirror, 7th May, 1906.
2# Notice in Mirror# 13th May, 1906#
3# 1897 Royal Commission, App# C», Vol. II, Pt. IV, p# 301.
4. See, e.g., evidence of Peter Abel, ibid, p. 146. Sir
N. Lubbock, President of the West India Committee and Chair¬
man of a Company owning large sugar estates in Trinidad,
denied the existence of "... real organisations of that sort
in the West xndies and was sure that its members, if
any, would be white! ibid, p. 93# In fact most of its
members wore Negroes, many of them immigrants from the other
islands; most of the Committee were men of some substance.
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organisation of workers, but its aims and policies were only
mildly liberal social-reformist. It did not, for instance,
demand adult suffrage in its call for representative institut¬
ions, would have been content to leave the initiative of Legis-
iation in the hands of an Executive Committee with an over¬
whelming majority of official members, and would have been
satisfied -with property or income qualifications for voters
which 'would limit the electorate to "at least 50,000
in a population of over 300,000.* It. performed no trade
union functions. If
Of the early activity of the Association no coherent
record has been found. Lewis asserts that its leaders were
11
prosecuted for their part in the Water Riots in Port-of-Spain
2
in 1903, and that it declined in consequence. * The election
of Alfred Richards as President in 1906 was the beginning of
a period of activity of some interest to this study.
3
Richards registered the TWA as an incorporated body in 1906,
His purpose in doing so is obscure, unless it was felt that
legal recognition of its activities was some sort of protection
1. See letter of John I). Alcaaar in Mirror, 5th April, 1910.
2. Lewis, op. cit. The leading role in the 1903 riots
was played by the Ratepayers Association, not the T&'A, and
it appears from the official and press reports of the incid¬
ent, that Lewis* view is incorrect. He seems to have been
unaware of the active role of the TWA in 1906 and sub¬
sequently*
Mirror, 2?th April, 1906, and 7th May, 1906. The
Association was exempted from paying the £50 registration
fee required by law.
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against police interference. It is a reflection of the
insecure position in which radical and liberal leaders felt
they were placed at the time, and an indication that organis¬
ing or speaking on behalf of the people was a hazardous
undertaking*. Cipriani was to follow this example of incor¬
porating his organisation in 1932 when he refused to accept
a trade union law which did not allow., of peaceful picketing,
Richards did not envisage the IV/A as filling the
role of a trade union, however. Perhaps because of the
absence of an elected element in the Legislative Council, the
Association was to be concerned mainly with political action,
and for this purpose Richards converted it into a unique kind
of pressure group. The TWA was affiliated to the British
Labour Party in 1906, and besides petitioning and pressing
the local Government, exerted pressure through the medium of
questions asked by Labour Members of Parliament in the House
of Commons.
Thomas Susunerbell, Labour M.P, for Sunderland,
acted as corresponding representative of the TWA until his
death in 1910 when Joseph Pointer, M.P. for Atterclife,
Sheffield, and a Junior Labour Whip, took over. Pointer,
who was known in the House as 'the Member for Trinidad,**
1. He acquired his name *by reason of the fact that he
inherited from the late Thomas Suramerbell the right to
ask questions in the House on behalf of that part of the
Empire.' Obituary Notice in .Manchester Guardian, 20.11.1914.
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paid a fraternal visit to the Island in 1912. Richards
felt that this arrangement gave his group the advantage of
"enjoying Parliamentary Representation in a peculiar way.""''
No evidence of the official nature of this relationship has
been found in British Labour Party sources? the TWA is
not listed among it ; affiliated bodies at the time. This
attempt to use the Labour Party as a proletarian counter¬
balance to the Vest India Committee achieved little tangible
result apart from the restoration of an elected City Council
in Port-of-Spain.
The pressure-group policy eventually met with
opposition. At a stormy meeting on December 1st, 1910, dis¬
satisfied members protested that monthly meetings were not
held, that subscriptions were not being paid, and that no
corporate functions were being carried out. There was
obviously a body of opinion in favour of more active organ¬
isation and agitation among the workers? the leaders of
this group, John Corbie, J, Sydney de Bourg and Leon Fuentes
claimed to have taken the lead in founding the Association
originally, A spirited defence of the committee system of
pressure-group activity was made by E.M, Laaare, a Negro
solicitor who soon afterwards became one of the nominated
1* Mirror, 7th May, 190S,
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member's of the Legislative Council, on the plea that "«.# the
system of government was such that the Association might be
misconstrued and it might be said that the Association desired
to misrepresent facts and raise trouble among the working-men
of Trinidad,"* This divergence of opinion as to method led
ultimately to the secession of one section of the membership
who set up a rival association of the same name. The date
of this parting of the ways cannot be ascertained accurately,
but it seems to have occurred about 1916, By the end of
that year, at any rate, it is certain that there were two
•branches* "neither of which can truthfully claim to repre¬




The restricted activity of the TWA obviously could
not meet the need for composite action which the city workers
would, feel in the face of rising living costs. Two attempts
to organise trade unions for this purpose are to be found in
1910. The city bakers formed the Trinidad Bakers Association
to protect its members against unfair working conditions and
1. Mirror, 2nd December, 1906,
2, Enclosure in Trinidad Dispatch No, 102, 10th March,
1917. " " ™ ~
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to agitate for the improvement of standards in city bakeries.
Their demand for a rise in wages was met in a large number
of cases by dismissal, and their subsequent strike was not
a success. The Association seems to have been shortlived.*
More ambitious was the aim of the Progressive
Crafts Union 'to bring together artisans of all crafts in
Trinidad and Tobago, and to form a co-operative body of such
2
craftsmen.' Disclaiming the intention to incite discontent
or strikes, it called upon the Government to proteet local
craftsmen against competition from imported articles which
could well be made locally. No further record of this
Association has come to light.
By 1914 there had failed to emerge in Trinidad any





There is little evidence of serious unrest among
the working-classes in Jamaica before 1916. This is as we
would expect. The steady flow of migration to Panama, Costa
Rica, Cuba and the United States of America provided an out¬
let for dissatisfied labourers which was not so readily
1. Mirror, 23rd June, 1910.
2. Mirror, 27th June, 1910#
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available to the territories further south, while the greater
diversity of the Island's agricultural crops and its pro¬
portionally larger peasant population helped to cushion the
effects of the decline in sugar prosperity. Minor stoppages
of work are reported in Kingston from time to time, but the
unemployed 'countrymen' could always be found willing to
replace strikers at current rates of wages.
The only serious strike took place in 1907. and is
of some interest, in that it provides evidence of the existence
of at least one trade union at the time. In January of that
year, a terrible earthquake wreaked havoc in the island, and
one of its temporary consequences was a sudden steep rise in
the cost of living in Kingston, caused by scarcity of food¬
stuffs. This led to a strike of workers in the printing
trade for increased wages, the strikers being organised in
the Printers' Union. The strike was led by Marcus Garvey,
the famous ne -ro leader of the United Negro Improvement Assoc¬
iation in the post World-War 1 period, who, though only 20 at
the time, was already employed as a master printer in Kingston.
Garvey had had no hand in planning the strike, which, indeed,
took him by surprise,* but once the journeymen had come out
he joined them and, as the only foreman on strike, was elected
1. E.D. Cronon, Black loses, (1955)» pp. 12-13.
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their leader. The strike won no support from other workers
in Kingston, It dragged on for three weeks until "the union
treasurer absconded with the funds and the employers began to
introduce linotype machines with imported printers to operate
them." Then the union collapsed, and the men drifted back
to work without having won any increase*
Garvey, now blacklisted in the printing trade, had
had his first taste of mass leadership and a first awareness
of the power of his oratory. lie soon helped to found, in
association with Dr. Thomas Love, a Negro member of the Legis¬
lature, a political discussion group called the National Club.
The Club appears to have had little influence, though it may
have served as a forum for informed Negro opinion in Kingston,
The Daily Gleaner of 12th June, 1909* reports one of its
debates on a motion calling for the aid of the Labour Unions
to end East Indian immigration - this was in line with simiiar
objections to immigration made by the TWA in Trinidad and by
the negro People's Association in British Guiana.
The motion is noteworthy in that it lends support
to the view that there was a number of trade unions operating
in Jamaica at this time. This is also the inference con¬
tained in Cronon's description of the Printers' Union as
"one of the oldest and most powerful labor organisations in
1, idem.
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the Island,""'' Cronon, however, bases his reconstruction of
Garvey's early life in Jamaica on popular accounts in various
later newspapers connected with the Garvey movement of the
1920's, particularly in the 'New World', and the expression
may be mere journalese. We are left to conclude that there
may well have been one or two unions, most probably small
unions of craftsmen, operating in Kingston in the early
1900's; but the evidence is too slender to reach any firm
conclusion on this. In the more sophisticated society of
Jamaica, such organisations would not have received the
attention which would have been theirs in either British
Guiana or Trinidad at the time.
One other attempt to organise a trade union in
Jamaica has been discovered - a local branch of the Inter¬
national Brotherhood of Bookbinders was formed in 1908, but
it soon fizzled out. The bookbinding trade was extremely
small, and it is not difficult to understand why the union
did not survive.
With these exceptions, there is little to show
that the idea of organising labour had taken any root in
Jamaica before 1916, As in Trinidad and British Guiana, the
working-classes were totally unorganised when the effects of





PIONEER ASSOCIATIONS. 1916 - 1933.
The end of »iorld War I was followed by world-wide
unrest among the working-class, caused by the economic and
psychological consequences of the war and influenced by the
Russian Revolution. Even in the under-developed areas,
various currents of unrest, labour, agrarian and social,
contributed to manifestations of labo r awakening, marked
by the beginnings of trade unionism in Africa and Asia, and
in Latin America by "mass strikes, some of which assumed
X
the character of uprisings without any clear objectives."
Developments in the British Caribbean territories fit into
this general pattern, beginning with the post-war strikes
and sporadic disturbances out of which emerged the first
permanent labour organisations in the area.
The unrest in our three territories had distinct¬
ive features stemming from the particular circumstances of
the area. The last years of the war had been a time of
high food prices, which had not been accompanied by any
adjustments in the level of earnings. Soon there were
social overtones to the demonstrations of dissatisfaction
with this economic grievance. The primary influence in
this development was the awakening of race-consciousness on
1. L.L. Lorwin, The International Labour Movement, (1955),
pp. 61-62.
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the part of the Negro population, as a result of the move¬
ments associated with the names of W.E.B, DuBois and Marcus
Gari'ey. DuBois, a coloured American with a "comfortable
middle-class" background*, had taken the lead in "the Niagara
Movement" for full equal rights for Negroes in the United
States, and was one of the founders of the National Associ¬
ation for the Advancement of Coloured People. At the end of
World War I, he took up the idea of Pan-Africanism, first
expounded by K, Sylvester-Williams, a Trinidadian barrister,
who had organised a Pan-African Conference in London in 1900.
DuBois convened a Pan-African Congress in Paris during the
Peace Conference at Versailles in the hope of winning some
sort of international recognition of a charter of human rights
2
for Negroes* A dignified, respectable movement of intellect¬
uals, the DuBois protest was concei-ned with securing for
Negroes free loin and equality of opportunity in whatever country
they happened to live. 'Black Zionism', as Garvey's move¬
ment has bee called, was entirely different in character and
method, though its ultimate objective, social justice for the
Negro, was the same. Garvey had returned to Jamaica from
England in 1914 to found, on August 1st, the anniversary of
the abolition of slavery, the Universal Negro Improvement and
1. G. Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Co. i. lunisra, (195&) p.
106.
2. ibid, pp. 117-119.
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Conservation Association and African Communities League.^"
Crossing to New York in 1916 to seek support for his associ¬
ation which enjoyed a luke-warm reception in Jamaica, Garvey
launched upon the path which was to make the U.N.I.A. the
most potent force in the Nc-gro awakening of the 20th Century.
The burden of Garvey's doctrine was that all Africans should
return to Africa, and he set up in anticipation a paper Negro
State, complete with nobility and military, with high-sounding
titles and resplendent uniforms. The grandiose character of
the Garvey movement, with its flamboyant vision, had more
appeal than the dry intellectualism of DuBois. Both move¬
ments, particularly through their periodica s and magazines,
The Crisis, Negro World, and Black Man, played their part in
arousing among Negroes in the British Caribbean a conscious¬
ness of their colour that held promise rather than shame.
There were other local influences at work channell¬
ing the expression of labour unrest into permanent organis¬
ations. Chief among these was the return of numbers of West
Indians and Guianese who had served in /orld War I, and some
of whom had come into contact with socialist or trade union
circles while abroad, or had been impressed by the social
reforms which had been carried out in England in the years
before the War. Cipriani, the most important of these in
this period, had already been mentioned; but there were
1. Cronon, op. eit., p. 16.
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numerous others, and in British Guiana especially, there is
evidence that they played some part in establishing the
British Guiana Labour Onion. In the middle 'twenties,
this influence was reinforced by pers nal contact between
the British Labour Movement and the rising labour leaders in
the area. Both Cipriani and Critchlow visited England at
the invitation of the Labour Party, while the Hon. F.O,
Roberts, Labour M.P. for /est Brorawich and Chairman of the
National Executive of the Labour Party in 1926-27, visited
the Trinidad /orking Men's Associat on in 1926, * Again
the influence of its contact t'/ith the British Labour Movement
is distinctly noticeable in the BGLU after 1925.
The labour organisations which esierged in this period
were not part of an integrated movement, but separate and
isolated manifestations of a common discontent. There was
more intercourse between the individual territories and the
United Kingdom than between one territory and another* Physical
distance, which even to-day makes for a great degree of isol¬
ation in the area, was reflected in an isolation of thought,
interests and attitudes on the part of most sections of the
population. Jamaica, which belongs geographically to the
Greater Antilles group, was, for practical purposes, further
from the two southernmost territories than London or New York.
Between British Guiana and Trinidad there was, traditionally,
1, R. Mitchell, His Best Orations, (n.d.), p. 91•
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more contact, and a feeling of kinship and co-operation soon
developed between organised labour in these two countries.
Individual visits in the earlier years led to the First
British Guiana and West Indies Labour Conference called by
the 3GLU in Georgetown in 1925, to which delegates came from
Grenada, Trinidad and Surinam. Though little that was per¬
manent emerged from this and two subsequent conferences, they
foreshadowed the formation in 19^5 of the Caribbean Labour
Congress in which all trade union, labour and socialist organ¬
isations in the area were associated once labour movements
began to develop*
The associations formed in the period 1915-33 differed
from earlier attempts at organisation in the area in that they
were general unions, drawing most of their active membership
from among the unskilled city labourers. This was in direct
contrast with the unions formed or attempted in the years
before 1915, all of which were exclusively concerned with
skilled workers with the exception of the abortive Labour
Union Scheme of 1906 in British Guiana. That craft unionism
should bo the form of organisation first to appear on the
scene is in line v/ith trade union development in other parts
of the world - in Britain, France, Australia, and the
Scandinavian countries, for example. It is not easy to
account for the failure of these early craft unions to survive.
The depressed nature of the economy, the absence of any high
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standard of skills or of a demand for it, the breakdown of
the practice of apprenticeship in crafts*, the fact that many
craftsmen were own-account workers, and the strength of the
friendly society movement which may have decreased the attract¬
ion of unionism, all appear to have contributed in some measure.
The Printers' strike in Jamaica in 1907 illustrates quite
clearly the weakness of small craft unions when faced with
intransigent and ruthless employers. The area offered so few
fields for skilled employment, that labour was at a disadvan¬
tage; and even on the estates, where a number of artisans
were employed, the same factors which affected the agricultural
labourer's attitude to combination operated to the disadvantage
of craft unionism.
Among the unskilled workers who were the main support
of those labour organisations which emerged in these years,
the dockers were the leading group in all three territories.
In British Guiana they provided the outstanding figure in the
trade union movement in the entire area before 1939, Hubert
Nathaniel Critchlow, the only working man to emerge as a leader
at this time. Critchlow, a Negro born in Georgetown of
Barbadian parents, -was virtually self-educated, having had to
leave school at the age of 13 years to help support his mother
1. cf. Commission of Enquiry into the Condition of the
Juvenile Population of Jamaica, 187^".
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after his father's death. A trim, neat-looking man of
medium height is the impression which photograj^hs of him in
the 1920*6 convey. Even in old age, his softly modulated
voice had an arresting quality which must have given a dis-
tinclive appeal to his oratory. By his own account, the
riots in Georgetown in 1905, and the failure of the 1906
dock-boys' strike of which he was one of the leaders, made a
deep impression upon him. In the years after these events
he read voraciously to compensate for his lack of schooling,
motivated by a desire to improve his lot and that of his
fellow-dockers; the achievements and ideals of trade union¬
ism in England at the ime interested him enormously. As
a result he showed, from the first days of the BQLU, an
awareness of his goal and a clarity of purpose so superior
to the ideas of his comrades that his leadership was ensured.
He was not, however, a fanatic with no time for anything but
his obsession. He was a young man of considerable athletic
ability, and was an excellent cricketer (it has been claimed
that he was worth a place in the Colony team); one of the
most popular non-union functions of the BQLU was its sports
section, and Critchlow captained the cricket team in the
local club competitions in the first few years of the union's
existence.
Andre Arthur Cipriani, the other outstanding labour
leader of the period, presents quite a contrast to the pro¬
letarian background of Critchlow. A descendant of French-
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Corsican families which had settled in Trinidad in the early
19th Century and played a leading role, as planters and mer¬
chants, in the public life of the island, Cipriani was a
true patrician. He was educated at the Island's leading
Catholic College, and followed the family tradition of cocoa
planting until World War I, when he was the first Trinidndian
to enlist in the B.W.I* Regiment, in which he received a
Captain's Commission. His sympathy for the underprivileged
Negro, already in evidence during his college days, was
strengthened by his war experiences, and on his return to
Trinidad he plunged into public life, associating himself
with the TWA. At some stage of his career he acquired the
occupations of auctioneer and conveyancer. Dressed in his
uniform of Khaki which he adopted to indicate his association
with 'the barefoot man' as he described the worker, Cipriani
was a strange blend of socialist, nationalist and conservative,
with a firm belief in the British Empire. He was certainly
the most outstanding figure in public: life in Trinidad between
the wars. He too was a keen sportsman, and one of the lead¬
ing race-horse owners in the island.
Critchlow in British Guiana and Cipriani in Trinidad
were responsible for the emergence of the tiro most important
labour organisations in the area in the years 1916-35, the
British Guiana Labour Union and the Trinidad Working Men's
Association. Ko permanent association of lasting importance
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appeared in Jamaica in this period, bat there were a number
of transient combinations both in that island and in the
other two territories, which are mentioned further on in
this study#
1» THE BRITISH GUIANA LABOUR UKICN.
The BGLU was formed in 1919 after two years cf
unrest among the Georgetown dockers during which Critchlow
emerged as their leader. The events of 1905-6*", however,
are regarded by the Union as the real beginning of the
2 -
struggle. The immediate cause of the unrest in 1916 was
the rise in the cost of living brought about by high food
prices due to the war. The dockers prepared a comprehen¬
sive list of grievances which they wanted to discuss, and
submitted it to the merchants who took no notice. Only
when they found, a strike on their hands some weeks later
did the merchants agree to discuss the men's claims, and
even then, only after mediation by the liberal-minded
Colonel of Police. The offer of a reduction in the length
of the working day from 10% hours, excluding mealtimes, to
10 hours was the only concession which the employers were
1. Above, pp. 125-136.
2. See, e.g., Report of 1st Annual Conference, BGLU, in
Daily Chronicle, 19th March, 1920; 31st Anniversary and
Labour Conference, Report, 1950.
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prepared to make.* After another stop: age, however, they
were forced to give an increase of wages, the first on the
waterfront for at least 40 years.
It was the failure of the next strike on the water¬
front that led to the formation of the BGLU. Critchlow, in
2
describing himself as "an agitator for higher wages" was
telling only a part of the story; his real aim was to make
labour conditions on the Georgetown waterfront comparable
with what was Labour's aim in Europe. In this his ideas
were often far in advance of those of the dockers who fol¬
lowed him. tVhen he launched his 8-hour day movement in
1918 - the only word one employer could find to describe
3
it was 'preposterous* - even some of his fellow-workers
felt it was too radical a demand. This time strike act¬
ion failed, and the Government turned a deaf ear to the
workers' requests that it intervene. As a result "the
labourers realised the advisibility of a labour organis¬
ation, and on the 11th day of January the British Guiana
4
Labour Union was formed." The Union grow rapidly. The
1. H. Critchlow's Address at inaugural meeting of Buxton
Branch, BGLU, Daily Chronicle, 18th June, 1919*
2. ibid. This was his retort to police accusations
that he was inciting strikes in 1916.
3. ibid.
4. Statement on History of the BGLU, Daily Argosy, 2nd
February, 1922.
original 16 me bers in January had become 1,400 by June and
between 12,000 and 13,COG at the end of 1919* It shows the
measure of Critehlow's leadership even at the time, that he
could suffer defeat without losing support,
A great deal of the popularity of the Union in the
first year of its existence was the result of its signal
success in its early negotiations with employers. At a
1
meeting on April 5th 1919 two directors of Booker Bros, who
were present suggested a "Labourers' Industrial Board" (a
form of Joint Industrial Council) composed of 3 merchants
and 3 dockers, to discuss the Union's demands* The suggest¬
ion was taken up and three days later, the Union emerged
triumphant from the discussions; the 8-hour day on the docks
had been won, as well as a further increase in wages!
The result was an immediate surge of enthusiasm
in the city, which was soon followed by the formation of
branches by the Negro villagers all over the country; the
creation of the first country branches seems to have been
due in large measure to judicious canvassing by Mr, J«L«
Griffith, who had been closely allied with the Georgetown
1, Booker Bros,, Mc Connell & Co,, are the largest employ¬
ers of labour in British Guiana. They control and own 80%
of the sugar industry, run an import and export business
•which does a substantial portion of the country's trade,
operate retail shops and own a number of ships which pro¬
vide transport and cargo facilities. Because of this,
the initials "B,G," rre often alluded to as meaning "Bookers'
Guiana," Cf, Michael Swan, Guiana, Land of Six Peoples,
(1957).
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movement from its inception, and /ho possessed soiae standing
among the villagers in Denterara's East Coast. In the course
of the next months, Griffith, Critchlow, A,A. Thorne,
IVorvj.lle, a founder-member, and Hosannah, the Union's
first President, travelled all over the inhabited coastlands
inaugurating branches. Their aim was to organise the entire
labouring community, as otherwise 'the Union would be handi¬
capped. •^ By the January of the following year, 36 branches
were in existence.^
By the very fact of its expansion in the country
districts the Union was broadening the base of its proposed
activities, and acquiring a political flavour to colour its
industrial character. This was inevitable from the nature
of the country membership - propertied wage-earners and
occasional labourers, with a tradition of independent action
and thought which was more positive than the city dwellers
had been able to achieve. It is arguable that in the con¬
ditions of British Guiana in the 1920's, it could not be long
before the Union would find itself compelled to take a stand
and voice its opinion on political issues. Even more valid
is the view that in the circumstances, no purely industrial
association could have maintained its success for any time.
1. Daily Chronicle, l6th July, 1919»
2. Resolution of Confidence in Hubert Critchlow, Secret¬
ary-Treasurer, passed by branches of the BGLU, in Daily
Chronicle, 4th January, 1920.
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The entire social and economic climate of the country raade
political agitation a necessary adjunct to industrial organ¬
isation.^ The British Guiana Labour Union movement was not
merely an acceptance of the value i industrial combination,
2
but a form of 'social protest' of the same essential charac¬
ter as, though better ordered than, the unorganised rioting
of the 1930*s in other parts of the area.
British Guiana Labour Union - The Fight for
Recognition.
The period of harmony between Union and merchants
was brief. The settlement reached in 1919 had been formal¬
ised by written agreement binding on both parties for a year.
As soon as this term had expired, the Union demanded a fur¬
ther increase, basing its claim on the abnormal rise in the
cost of living, which it estimated to be between 200% and
300%. "In keeping with the method adopted by the several
recognised Labour Unions throughout the 'world", a detailed
draft agreement covering wage rates and overtime rates,
working hours and conditions, legal holidays, provision for
1. cf. J.H. Richardson, An Introduction to the Study of
Industrial Relations, (1954), p. 138."In order to gain
its objectives both industrial and political action are
essential to trade unionism."
2. cf. J.D.M. Bell, "Trade Unions" in A. Flanders 3c H.A.
Clegg, ed,, Industrial Relations in Great Britain, p. 130.
5. Secretary, BGLU to Secretary Georgetown Chamber of
Commerce, 28/4/1930, in llaily Chronicle, 23rd Gay, 1920.
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the hiring of casual labour, and a closed shop on the vwnter-
front for Union members, was submitted to tne Chamber of Com¬
merce; the agreement also led ed the Union "not to uphold
incompetency, striking of work, pilfering, or broaching of
cargo" and to take action against offending workers* The
Chamber of Commerce decided to postpone its reply until a
Sub-Committee could go into the question, and so the Union
announced a •general strike* on the waterfront to begin on
2
May 21st. The reply of the Chamber, dated the 22nd May,
questioned the legality of the Union, its right to enter
into agreements, and the accuracy of its cost of living fig¬
ures; it offered all-round increases of from IQf/a to 20?o on
existing rates, but on the understanding that the Chamber
had no power to bind its member-merchants to these terns,
and suggested a wage-freeze for 12 months; and it pointed
out to the Union that the real cause of the current discon¬
tent /as not on inadequate rate f wages to meet the high
cost of living, but the effect of over-concentration of
unskilled labour in Georgetown on the incomes of casual lab-
3
ourers. The Union failed in its attempt to bring out the
4
regular porters in support of the strike, but the casuals
1. idem,
2. ibid. 9th May, 1920.
3. President, Georgetown Chamber of Commerce to Secret¬
ary, BGLU, ibid. 23rd May, 1920.
ibid, 22nd May, 1920; 27th May, 1920.
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stayed out* After a week the merchants offered further
increases, amounting in all to j6% of the former rates*
A mass meeting of strikers decided to return t work, but
to do no overtime until their demands on this point were met*
The next morning they refused to work along with non-strikers,
and walked out again.* The strike lingered on for another
week, until 150 city youths, volunteer strike-breakers, were
introduced to load a ship held up by the strike, and paid at
the new rates offered* Critchlow admitted partial defeat
2
and advised a return to work*
The stoppage on the docks touched off a series of
strikes in the city, not all of them connected with the Union*
All through June and July the stoppages continued, and when
the city workers had settled their differences, sugar workers
began to show signs of unrest in August. The main reason
for these strikes was the continuous increase in the cost of
living since the dockers won their first claim in April 1919*
Though this was in part the result of post-war economic con¬
ditions, it does appear that the increased cost of handling
imported foodstuffs which the dockers had brought about was
being passed on to the consumer; and as imported goods went
up in price, so did the price of locally grown foods, including
1* gaily Argcs.y, 28th May, 1920 and 2nd June, 1920*
ibid, 5th June, 1920.
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the Government controlled rice market crop.* Comparison
of lists of retail prices for various articles of food in
Georgetown in April 1919 and May 1920 shoivs rises in price
ranging from 14% for flour (from 7/ to 8/ per lb.) to 200%
for potatoes (from 4/ to 12/ per lb.). Most imported items
of food on the lists showed a 20% to 33*% increase, milk,
butter and cheese being among them. Locally produced food¬
stuffs were not listed, but rice which was included had risen
from 5#/ to 6/ per pint, and muscovado sugar had increased in
2
price by 22%, yellow sugar by 43% (from 7/ to 10/ per pound).
That there was general distress and unrest is
undeniable. Municipal council workers, journeymen tailors,
seasastresses, public works labourers, hospital porters and
cooks, city scavengers, all demanded increases or went on
strike in alarming progression. The newspapers of this time
report complaints of unemployment, reduction of staff, and
attempts to reduce wages in the city, on sugar estates, and
up-river at the Bauxite Company's works. Critchlow claimed
that by mid-June, merchants were employing only 50-60% of the
3
labour force they wanted normally.
In the midst of this turmoil the Union found its
1. Daily Argosy, 19th June, 1920. See also letter of
C.G. Colthrust in Daily Chronicle, 2Gth August, 1919»
2. Daily Argosy, passim, April 1919» May 1920.
3. Daily Chronicle, 22nd June, 1920.
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fight for better conditions suddenly transformed into a
struggle for recognition. An Ordinance to legalise Trade
Unions had been passed in the Court of Policy on May 26th,
all three readings being taken in the same day.* The Union
had been agitating for 'incorporation' for some time, and it
was obvious that, as the only Trade Union in existence in
the country, the Ordinance was meant to give official bless¬
ing to the BGLU. It was even whispered that the Governor,
Sir Wilfred Collett, was in sympathy i?ith the Union's aim ;
he had confessed his inability to influence the attitude of
2
the employers. The accusation made by the Chamber of Com¬
merce on May 22nd that the Union was an illegal conspiracy
at common law had been silenced by the passing of the Trade
Union Ordinance a mere four days later. For the next month
discussion centred round the technicality of the Union's
position, since it was not yet registered under the Ordinance.
The threat to the Union's newly won position came,
not from doubts as to its legal status, but from the deliberate
policy of some employers not to recognise it as a bargaining
body. The trouble began on July 1st when the manager of
the Demerara Foundry dismissed one of the engineering workers
for "wasting a lot of time by holding meetings to organise
strikes." His fellow-unionists immediately came out on
1. B.G. Ordinance No. 17 of 1921.
2. See Daily Chronicle, 7th July, 1920.
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strike, and work was resumed only after a Union official had
turned up and had him reinstated.* Early in July the Union
presented claims for skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled
workers in the employ of the Demerara Electric Company, which
operated the city's electricity and tramway services, and of
the Sprostons and Demerara Foundries. All three managements
refused to negotiate with their men 'through a third party',
and objected to the Union's interference in relations between
2
firms and employees. On July 5th Georgetown was paralyzed
by a general strike as all the men concerned came out while
the dockers, in whom lay the Union's strength, stopped work
in sympathy to demand recognition of their Union. The
Houston Match Factory girls, who had been refused an increase
3
on their miserable wages , also walked out. The next day
the sawmill workers went on strike for a 50% wage increase and
an 8$-hour day.
Two issues were now involved - the settlement of
the strikers' demands for higher pay, and the right of the
1. ibid, 2nd July, 1920.
2« ibid. 6th July, 1920; 8th July, 1920.
3. They were employed at piece-rates which they claimed
allowed an average wage of 12/ a day. According to
retail prices current in mid-December of the same year,
a week's wages would suffice to buy either a pound of
butter, or 2 yards of cheap print cloth. Of the essen¬
tial commodities listed only sugar, rice, flour and onions
cost less than 12/ per lb., the cheapest of them being rice
at 6/ a pint. See Daily Chronicle. 15th December, 1920,
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Union to represent its members. All three managements were
willing to treat with their men if approached personally,
but strikers insisted on putting their case through the Union,
On the first issue the men were successful; eventually
increases averaging 1C% and an 8-hour working day were offered
by all three concerns. But the Union lost in its fight for
recognition. The tramway strike was broken in a week, after
public opinion went against the strikers for refusing the
Company's offer,'"' They had done so against the advice of
Critchlow who seems to have realised the danger of their
unwillingness to compromise. The sawmill workers had to
return to work with a mere promise that an increase would be
considered. The Sprostons Foundry had offered an increase
of 10% all round and an 8-hour day and issued an ultimatum
that the factory would shut for three months if the men did
not return to work within 2k hours;'"" the Demerara foundrymen
held out for weeks, then gave in, their management having
refused even to acknowledge the Union's letters. It was
on the waterfront, the scene of earlier triumphs, that the
Union suffered the worst setback* The men returned to 'work
on the l4th to find at work a gang of strike-breakers from
the Islands, led by a Barbadian immigrant named Trim who had
1, Daily Chronicle, 11th July, 1920,
2, ibid,
3# Daily Chronicle, 28th July, 1920,
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adopted the role of professional black-leg. The following
week two of the chief stevedores, Labour Union men, were dis¬
missed, and Trim and one of his cronies given their jobs.*
The defeat of the Union was complete.
If the employers were determined to refuse the
Union recognition, labourers showed every sign of realising
its value. Its success, and the high cost of living, had
attracted to it not only the Negro population but East Indians
on many of the sugar estates. There had been an influx of
these members in the first months of 1920. As one ivell-
2
wisher put it :
Hie East Indian has waited a year, has become
satisfied, and now is storming the doors of
the Union in hundreds.
Soon it became the practice for the East Indians, members of
the Union or not, when a dispute arose with the estate ssianage-
ment, to march into Georgetown and seek the aid of Critchlow,
(often joining the Union at the same time), in the sa.me way as
they had marched to see the Protector of Immigrants in the
years before the Union had come on the scene. On at least
one occasion, dissatisfied with the decision of the Protector
that they ware not being underpaid, they claimed that he was
in league with the manager and went off to get the Union's
1. Daily Chronicle, 22nd July, 1920.
2. Rev. H.W. Grant at 1st Anniversary, Buxton Branch BGLU,
Daily Chronicle, 2nd September, 1920.
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help.* Critchlow usually went to the estate himself and
tried to effect a settlement. There was some danger to
the Union in this state of affairs. Steeped in the fuel
of racial and social prejudice and personal grievances,
labour relations on estates tended to be highly inflammable
and required the most trivial spark to touch off an explos¬
ion. Passions were easily roused, men resorted to violence
as the only immediately satisfactory remedy for their griev¬
ances; in such a situation discipline was difficult to
maintain, and the Union could not hope to command obedience
of the quality which the dockers had displayed. At the same
time it appears that it was Union policy to canvass for mem¬
bers, especially on the East Bank and East Coast plantations
in Demerara, nearest to Georgetown.
Even before the 'general strike' in Georgetown the
Union had secured increases for workers on some sugar estates
- at Cane Grove the increase had amounted to 25% of the rate
2
previously paid." In August the attack on the Union was
taken up by the estates. Forty-four strikers at Diamond and
Providence who had joined the Union were given notice to quit
their barracks; at Diamond strikers claimed that the estate
3
authorities had cut their water supply. The Union had had
1. Daily Chronicle, 22nd August, 1920.
Daily Chronicle, 19th June, 1920.
3. Daily Chronicle, 10th August, 1920.
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no part in the strike, though its representative on the East
Bank had tried without success to see the estate Managers,
and Critchlow had been forced to rush to the scene to pre¬
vent a mass march into Georgetown. When some 2,000 angry
sugar workers, East Indian and Negro, staged a demonstration
in the city five days later, Critchlow found himself summoned
by the Governor to answer the planters' allegations, which
the strikers themselves denied, that he had incited the men
to strike. Me was excluded from the subsequent interview
at which the Governor heard the men's grievances.* This
loss of the Governor's goodwill, so essential in the absence
of any machinery for settling disputes, was a great blow to
the Union.
The effect of these setbacks can be seen in the
way the BGLU faced the next cricis. Reductions in wages
and in the numbers employed on sugar estates throughout the
country in the middle of 1921 were followed by the merchants'
decision to effect a 20% reduction in wages all round after
a week's notice# The fall in the world price of sugar was
the reason they gave. These reductions followed close upon
a general rise in house rents in Georgetown consequent upon
a slight increase in the municipal rates, which had been
seized upon by the landlords as an opportunity to exploit
1. Daily Chronicle, 13th August, 1920.
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the city's housing shortage.* The Union meeting to con-
eider how to face the situation, could take no positive
industrial action beyond warning employers against the
2
dangers of arbitrary reductions without pr.or consultation#
Its decision to resort to political agitation at this time
was as much a confession of weakness as a demonstration of
understanding that in f ee of economic crisis, some weapon
other than the strike was required.
The OGLU and Politics.
Political agitation was not a new technique for the
BGLU. One of its first public activities had been to press
{though without success) for a legal minimum wage for ail
classes of labour, and to this end it had combined a handbill
campaign to canvass public opinion with efforts by sympathetic
members in the Court of Policy.
The next issue on which the Union took a stand, the
Seditious Publications Bill in Septe ber, 1919. gave it the
support of the whole country (except, of course, the planter-
merchant clique). This bill, though framed in general terms
embracing all publications which might tend to create or arouse
"seditious" feelings among the population, was really an attempt
1. Daily Chronicle, l4th July, 1921.
2. Daily Chronicle, 21st June, 1921.
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to ban the importation of American Negro literature which had
soared in the post-war heyday of Garveyism; Garvey's own
"Negro World" and Or. 7.E. DuBois's Pan-African publication,
"The Crisis", were the main targets. At the second reading
of the Dill in the Court of Policy, the Governor, displaying
an issue of the "Negro World" which contained the headline
'BRITISH COLONIES MOST PREJUDICED BEASTS ON EARTH*1, aid:
this journal which ... employs forever
the language of battle and . tries to incul¬
cate doctrines of race and class hatred, is
not matter that can safely be put in the hands
of half-educated people ... It is in order to
prevent people from playing with fire that
this bill is introduced.
It was a tactless legislative effort, tactlessly introduced
2
by Mr. C. Clementi , acting for the Governor, whose patron¬
ising Oxford manner and contempt for local sentiment evoked
a dislike which was matched only by his own disapproval of
those institutions which allowed the Guianese to cling to
the shadowy myth of political freedom. He stressed the
necessity for the bill since the censorship imposed under
the Defence of the Colony Regulations during the war was no
1. Daily Chronicle, 24th September, 1919.
2* Mr. (later Sir) C, Clementi, Government Secretary of
British Guiana from 1913 to 1922, and author of the stand-
ard Constitutional History of British Guiana.
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longer possible. But the Government had other legislation
at its disposal, notably the Ordinance under which copies of
the "Negro World" were seised by the Post Office after the
bill was withdrawn.* Moreover, the "Negro tforld" had been
banned on June 2nd, 1919* as "prejudicial to the interests
of H.M. Government" under the Defence of the Colony Regu¬
lations* East Indian nationalist iiterature had been banned
, 3
long before 1914:.'
Opposition to the bill was motivated by different
fears. Liberals and electives regarded it as an attempt to
stifle criticism of the Government, and objected to the loose
framing of some of its clauses which provided no safeguard
against the administration's interpreting them to suit its own
4
purposes. The Union felt that it 'was wickedly framed to
put an end to the activities of the BGLU", and amplified this
5
in its official protest :
The working classes in this colony might ... be
deprived of certain publications from the United
Kingdom and the United States of America from
1. British Guiana Ordinance 21 of 1893*
2. Daily Argosy, 1st November, 1924.
3. Governor in Court of Policy, 23/9/1919. Reported in
Daily Chronicle, 24th September, 1919*
4. See, e.g., Daily Chronicle, 9th September, 1919,
Editorial "Muzzling the Press".
5. Daily Chronicle, 24th September, 1919.
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which they learn of the progress of labour there
and of the legitimate and constitutional means
adopted by fellow labourers for their own pro¬
gress and welfare. Alternative^', coloured
people here might thus not be able to gauge the
progress made by coloured folk in, say, the U.S.A.
Such a denial is calculated to imbue the people
with suspicion of the Government .....
In fact, much of the Union's inspiration, and many
of its ideas and ideals, its organising and propaganda
techniques were culled from these sources;* the directive
supplied by Labour's practical demands for better living and
working conditions probably had a greater effect on the 'half-
educnted' negro than the visionary prospect of a distant Africa
which, at best, served to re-create a racial self-respect which
slavery had destroyed. In the making of the incipient Labour
Movement in British Guiana the two forces /ere complementary.
Against the Seditious Publications Bill the BGL0 organised a
protest meeting of citizens at the Town Hall and a demon¬
stration outside the Public Buildings on the morning of its
first reading; the crowd, some 2,000 strong, dispersed upon
being given the assurance that Government had no intention to
2
take all stages of the Bill that day. Govex^nment *s subsequent
1. cf. Letter of J.S. Johnson in Daily Chronicle, 19th
September, 1 >19.
2. Daily Chronicle, 12th September, 1919» This demon¬
stration was regarded as the reason for the presence of a war¬
ship in port on the day the bill was read a second time; the
Governor's explanation that it was 'co-incidental* won little
credence, Daily Chronicle, 24th September, 1919.
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decision to abandon the bill was looked upon as a victory for
the Union*
Following upon the general reduction in wages in
June 1921, the BGLU conducted a city-wide campaign for a Pent-
Restriction Ordinance, which the Government was persuaded to
introduce some eight months later* Put controlled rents were
only one factor in the cost of living; casual employment was
a more serious grievance, A campaign against unemployment- was
begun, therefore, with the same technique of public meetings,
demonstrations and petitions as before* These petitions,
the result of resolutions passed at union meetings, were a
conglomeration of current grievances, remedies suggested for
their removal, and the old demands for social and industrial
legislation which the Government did not see fit to introduce*
Constantly recurring in these petitions were the need for fix¬
ing a minimum wage for all classes of labour by lav/, and sorae
sort of legislation to protect domestic servants who had to
work 12 - 16 hours a day for wages of £15 - £55 & year, paid
monthly;* the latter demand may have been a reflection of
the increased female membership of the Union. To relieve the
unemployment situation the Union petitioned for the inaugur¬
ation of extensive public works schemes, and foi* better trans¬
port facilities between Georgetown and the mining and lata
1 Daily Argosy, 15th August, 1922; Blue Books, 1920-23*
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districts of the interior which would allow greater mobility
of labour.* The demand for public works soon evolved into
a broader plan that Government should develop schemes to pro¬
vide employment for artisans, and establish its own workshops
2
to supply the requirements of government departments'" - an
indication perhaps of increasing unemployment of skilled
workmen in the 1920's. Most of these petitions bore little
fruit, and the situation deteriorated rapidly. To the Union
the Government replied that unemployment was "partly due to
people not being able and willing to go where labour is
required, or to accept the wages offered", and suggested that
3
workers would find jobs on the sugar estates. Then the East
Indian Association, for the estate workers, petitioned about
the current distress, only to find that the Immigration-Agent
General's figures for wages and foodstuffs showed such an
improvement in workers' conditions since 1913 that they must
have wondered how they had managed to exist at all in that
4
year. The Government might have had a more realistic view
of the situation had it not acquired the habit of basing its
reply to labour petitions on the opinions expressed on them
1. Daily Argosy, 15th August, 1922.
2. Daily Argosy, 20th February, 1924.
3. Daily Argosy, 22nd August, 1922.
4. See Government's replv to East Indian Association re
labour conditions, in Daily Argosy, 3rd July, 1923»
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by the Chamber of Commerce, to which they were forwarded for
comment•^ Political agitation, by itself, was obviously a
failure. By mid-1923 Critchlow had arrived at the conclus¬
ion that the only way to maintain living standards in face of
once more rising costs and increasing unemployment was "to
2
increase the earning capacity of the workers"."1 It was this
change from peaceful political agitation to industrial action
that led to the Ruimveldt tragedy of 192 " ; for politico-
racial factors were beginning to complicate the Guianese
scene.
By 1923 the effects of the post-war surge of Negro
consciousness were making themselves felt in Dritsh Guiana.
Three separate tread© may be distinguished: l) the economic
and cultural uplift movement, centred round the Negro Pro¬
gress Convention and such associations; 2) a religious move¬
ment, involving withdrawal from the worship of a 'white God',
exemplified by the growth of the 'Jordanite' sect; 3) an
extreme racialism which saw all issues in terms of colour and
preached aggressive assertion of ecsuality, confined mainly to
a few vocal individuals. None of these was new to Guianese
society, or the direct result of Garveyism, which merely pro¬
vided the focus for a revival; there was little relish for
1. See, e.g., Daily Argosy, 30th June, 1923 and 22nd
March, 1924#
2, Daily Argosy, 31st May, 1924#
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the 'Back to Africa' idea* Negro "Improvement",Associations
predated the NPC by at least 20 years* After a visit of
Sylvester Williams*, the British Guiana Afro Improvement
Association, a branch of the Pan-African Association, had been
formed in Georgetown in 1900 and a Negro Improvement Associ¬
ation in New Amsterdam in 190Afro-Christian cults had
persisted in the Caribbean throughout the post-slavery era
in spite of restrictive legislative and police action by an
uncomprehending and orthoc x officialdom* The 'Jordanites'
were so named after their founder 'Jordan', "an elderly black
man who wears a beard" who reached at street-corners "against
3
the Government, the white man, and organised religion. The
extremists were the products of conditions existing in society
and their protest took on a racial context because the oppress¬
ion of race by race was a feature of Guianese life; had they
lived in Britain, they would have stomped the Welsh coal¬
fields preaching socialism and damning the Tories. To the
European minds of merchant-planters and officials, thesj all
amounted to one unwelcome fact - the deliberate propagation of
4
race hatred. Open discussion of the race question was viewed
1. Above, p. 148.
2. Daily Chronicle. 23rd June, 1901 and 6th September,
1906.
3. Daily Argosy, 6th April, 1924. The Argosy, voice of
the planters, is an extremely biased source. The 'Jordan¬
ites ' still operate harmlessly in Georgetoivn.
4. The Daily Argosy, passim, lst-15th April, 1924.
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with alarm by the uneasy elite who remembered only too well
that there had been race-riots between Negroes and Portuguese
in 1859 and l885» and that in 1905 both sides had made alleg¬
ations of racial prejudice as responsible for the police shoot¬
ing and the mob looting which occurred.
The BGLU and NFC had much in common. Both aimed at
better living and working standards for the Negro labourer;
the Union's leadership and most of its membership were Negro,
its professional advisers were many of them members of the
NPC, and Critchlow himself had been a member of the Convention's
first Committee, though there is no record of his attending
after 1922, Fears that this association would lead to racial-
ism in the Union's policy had been voiced as early a® 1919»
It was inevitable that the Union would be strongly Negro-con¬
scious, and that economic justice for the labourer should be
allied ith social justice for the Negro. How easy was this
association of economic condition with race can be seen from
the following extract from one of 'Professor' Osborne's
speeches";
The hear has come, de .and your rights and see
that yoi get thesn. Worship the 'white god'
1. e«g., "The Union cannot, without a violent disregard
of its obligations, take up a racial attitude In the
ranks to-day are to be found members or races other than
Negro". 'Charity' to Editor, Daily Chronicle, 19th
November, 1919»
2, Daily Argosy, 2nd April, 1924.
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no longer but know yourselves; If Critchlow
is killed, thousands of Critchlows will be
born every hour. Don't accept starvation
wages — you have the right to live as ether
races live
Even the Daily Argosy, however, admitted that Critchloisr was
no racist and put his actions down to personal vanity.'"
Union leadership was aiso moving rapidly towards
Socialism, under the influence of its contacts with the
British Labour Move.tent, and of the literature emanating from
Britain which was considered less objectionable by Government
than Garvey's writings and came in without hindrance. In
September 1923* the 8GLU inquired about affiliation with
either the British Labour Party or the Labour and Socialist
2
International.™' After Critchlow paid his first visit to
Britain to attend the W.E.A. International Conference in
August, 1924, it became affiliated with the Union of Democratic
Control; George Lanabury was to be one of its *representatives *
•2
in Britain." Critchlow's visits (he attended the Commonwealth
Labour Conference of 1925 as well) were useful in that he
gained first-hand knowledge in the working and organisation of
trade unionism in Britain, and he returned 'with plans for
1. April, 1924, passim.
2. Daily Argosy, 15th January, 1924.
3. Daily Argosy, 8th October, 1924.
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improved social services and National Insurance scheme.^
Something of the revolutionary militancy of the British Lab¬
our Movement of the day must have communicated itself to
the BGLU. Religious services {the initial movement had
received active support from the native Mathodist clergy),
hyinns, the National Anthem and 'Rule Britannia', with which
Union meetings and demonstrations had begun and ended, in the
early years gave way after 1925 to 'Socialist hymns' and the
•Red Flag*. The Union's official language of this period,
too, betrays an aggression in tone and character which was
lacking in earlier years.
These were the influences which created the state
of tension surrounding the Ruimveldt riots of 1924. The
riots themselves were not so serious as in 1905. A light¬
ning strike by Union men, casual labourers on one of the
wharves, took place on March 31st; the men had made no formal
2
demands before striking, but they wanted a 20% increase."
The Union organised a general demonstration for an Arbit¬
ration Board the next day, but this got out of hand, the
crowd forcing a total stoppage of business, transport and
essential services; after strenuous efforts, Critchlow per¬
suaded the demonstrators to disperse and re-assemble in the
evening to hear the outcome of deliberations with the Governor
idem; 13th January, 1925*
Daily Argosy, 1st February, 1924.
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and employers. Critchlow deplored the resort to violence,
which he had never advocated, and it seems that extremists
like Osborne had been hard at work. At 3.00 p.m. martial
law had been declared, all liquor stores shut, and a warning
issued that force -would be employed to quell riotous assem¬
blies.
The trouble came, once again, from the East Bank
sugar estates tvhere the strike had spread. A crowd of East
Indians and Negroes, (estimated at 3»000)\ marching to
Georgetown to seek Critchlow's aid were stopped by armed
mounted police at the La Penitence Br dge, where the road
crosses a large 'trench1 which blocks any other approach to
the city* The next day the police compromised by agreeing
to allow 10 delegates from the now restless strikers to pro¬
ceed on their mission, but refused to let the croud await
their return without dispersing. The people refused t leave.
The Riot Act was read, the crowd became menacing, and once
more the police fired 'in self defence' on a 'hostile mob'
2
armed with sticks and cutlasses and 30 yards away. Twelve
of the crowd were killed and twenty-one wounded. The decis¬
ion of the crowd to march to Georgetown appears to have been
the result of canvassing for membership by both the BGLU and
the East Indian Association in the past, accompanied by prom¬
ises of assistance if disputes were brought to the notice of
1. The Daily Argosy, 4th April, 1924.
2, The Daily Argosy, 3th April, 1924.
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these bodies. The East Indians had been disturbed by the
report of a delegation from India which had criticised the
deplorable wages and conditions obtaining on estates, and
which had led the East Indian Association to renew its efforts
to represent estate labourers.*
Georgetown had re mined quiet after its day of dis¬
turbance, the Governor insisting on a return to work while a
conference was arranged between the shippers and both union
and non-union representatives of the employees. Nothing
came out of these talks except a promise of an increase for
the .."omen who supplied coal for ships in port} both sides
agreed that the real problem was the casual nature of port
employment, and that the cost of living would follow a rise
in wages in a never-ending spiral. Tc the Union's subsequent
request for arbitration the Governor replied by the appoint¬
ment of a seven-man Commission into the port labour situation,
with equal labour and merchant representation and two Govern-
2
merit officials under the presidency of Mr. Justice Douglas,
The sugar workers, it appears, received no satisfaction.
The Ruiiaveldt riots mark a decline in the fortunes
of the 8GLU; never afterwards did it attain the prestige and
1. Daily Argosy. 5th April, 1924.
2. Government Secretary to Critchlow, 5th April, 1924, in
Daily Argosy, 6th April, 1924.
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place in the public life of the country which it had enjoyed
in its first years of existence# It continued to press for
social and industrial legislation, though with little suc¬
cess except in the field of relief measures for the unemploy¬
ment which continued to sweep the country - free meals for
the unemployed and for school children, loan passages and
food for unemployed miners, a scheme to provide land, tools
and seed for the growing of cash crops by the city populace.*
Unfavourable economic conditions were an even more potent
deterrent to industrial action than the opposition of the
employing class, and the Union remained tranquil u til the
mid-1930's*
BGLU - Organisation.
As the only successful trade union in the British
Caribbean before the new policy of official encouragement in
the 1940's, the BGLU's internal administration is of some
interest. In this sphere, too, its path was that of the
pioneer who would travel into uncharted territory. Pract¬
ical difficulties had to be overcome without the sort of
guidance on which contemporary trade unions can depend. The
BGLU was well served by a number of professional men and
cleric , who acted as honorary advisers - notable among this
1. BGLU 31st Anniversary and Labour Conference. Report«
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band was P.N. Browne, a barrister-at-law who was elected to
the Court of Policy in 1921 with union support. But none
of them had more than an advisory voice in the Union's
executive affairs in this period; its leadership revolved
around Critchlow, who remained first and foremost a trade
unionist - he became a full-time paid union official within
a year of the Union's foundation at a salary which now
appears startlingly inadequate - and did not seek political
honours until 19^7. The contrast with the trade anions
which sprang up after 1938 is refreshing. The Union began
its activities, too, free from that propensity for constitu¬
tional form which is the bane of organisation in the British
Caribbean - the Labour Union scheme of 1906 had foundered on
this rock. This atmosphere of informality was soon to lead
to a minor revolt by the more orthodox-minded members; but
it permitted the building up of a strong personal following
for Critchlow, the one man who appears to ave had some idea
of what was wanted, combired with the drive, the courage,
the sincerity of purpose and the unswerving honesty essen¬
tial to its achievement. In spite of his popularity and
his virtual dominance of the Union's affairs, the charges
of converting the Union and its funds to his own purposes
which have been levelled against leaders in comparable sit¬
uations in the newer unions, and particularly against
Bustamante in Jamaica and Butler in Trinidad, could never
seriously or honestly be made against Critchlow.
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Frosn the start the 'amal 'abated* nature of the Union
was emphasisedThe branches were based on geographical
divisions; each had its own committee, and was "entitled to
all the rights and privileges and immunities enjoyed by the
2
Central Branch in Georgetown and of the Union." The George¬
town branch was sub-divided into occupational sections, each
with a committee. All funds collected were remitted to a
central fund, over Thich Critchlow as Secretary-Treasurer
had control; minor attempts at peculation by various local
officials forced the indefatigable Treasurer to exercise a
3
hawklike vigilance on his sub-Treasurers in the early stages.
The Union had both a General Committee and a smaller Executive
Committee which ran its day-to-day business; the Executive
Committee, 3 in number at first, Critchlow soon increased to
6 on his own initiative. It was against this Executive Com¬
mittee that the revolt broke out in January 1920, spearheaded
it seems by some members of the General Com ittee who felt
that they were being by-passed. Because of the difficulties
of communication, it was inevitable that the majority of mem¬
bers on the Committees would be from Georgetown. The three-
co-opted Executive members were from the country Branches, and
1. Critchlow at formation of Buxton Branch, in Daily
Chronicle, 18th June, 1919*
2. Resolution of confidence in Hubert Critchlow, in
Daily Chronicle, 4th January, 1920.
3* Daily Chronicle, 10th January, 1919»
4. Daily Chronicle, 29th January, 1920.
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Crltchlow's aim may have been to make the administration
reflect more accurately the composition of its membership.
The substance of the protest was for greater over¬
all control of policy decisions by the General Committee,
less autocracy on the part of the Secretary-Treasurer, proper
constitutional arrangements for the control and banking of
Union funds, and the appointment of trustees. It appears
that some consideration had been given to these matters, but
decisions had been postponed pending the result of the negoti¬
ations for •incorporation1, i#e«, trade union legislation,
in which the union was currently engaged. The alternative
was to make financial arrangements in keeping »ith the require¬
ments for Friendly Societies• * The district branches
remained loyal to Critchlow and averted a situation which
might well have deprived the Union of his vigorous and skilful
leadership, for some of the rebels had questioned his fitness
for the post and condemned the plurality of his office. A
compromise was reached by the appointment of trustees and the
dismissal of an assistant-secretary whom Critchlow had engaged
on his own initiative. After these initial growing pains,
the Union remained free from internal dissention. Later in
the year a demand for greater autonomy on the ground of diverg¬
ence of interests by the branches at Wakenaam and Auruca, on
1 Daily Chronicle. J>Oth January, lq2G,
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it •
the Essequibo coast, resulted in their dissolution#
The concern, for the Union's funds was engendered by
the healthy finances which it enjoyed; with an entrance fee
of 50# and a weekly contribution of 8#, the Union could cc .1-
2
ect #1,309#07 in June, 1920, in Georgetown alone, though the
friendly society benefits which encoura ;ed regular payment
of dues were in their turn a big drain on the finances; in
January 1920, for instance, they took up over #1,000 while in
1921, with the death levy at 2#, over #9,000 were paid out in
3
death benefits alone# The Union's purchase of its own hall,
and a car to facilitate official visits to country branches,
assisted both its organising activities and its cixances of
survival# Not all its financial ventures were successful,
however. The mortgage on the hall was foreclosed in 1923,
and only the intervention of a wealthy sympathiser saved the
4
property. Its effort at a newspaper, 'The Labourer *, was
5
a failure# And its most ambitious undertaking, the Negro
Industrial Trading Company, formed to promote trade between
peasant farmers and urban workers in an effort to reduce the
1* Daily Chronicle, 1st August, 1920#
2# Daily Chronicle# 27th June, 1920#
3# Daily Chronicle, 27th January, 1920; 26th January,
1922.
4. Daily Chronicle, 24th February, 1923; 27th March,
1923.
5# Daily Chronicle, 30th January, 1920#
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cost of local foodstuffs and to remedy the uncertain markets
form which the peasantry suffered, was a colossal loss.*"
In spite of the decline in its fortunes, the 3QLU
managed to survive and to hold the allegiance of a loyal,
though decreasing, number of members right down to the 1930f©»
No evidence of the actual numbers in the Union after 1920 has
so far been discovered.
2. THE TRINIDAD ".ifOiaaNGMBN«3 ASSOCIATION.
There seems to have been a certain amount of labour
unrest in Trinidad during World War I, but information about
it is scant, particularly since newspapers did not carry full
accounts owing to wartime restrictions. It is certain that
there was "a substantial increase in the rates of wages through-
2
out the Colony" in 1915-17, though reliable figures pertaining
to the increase have not been obtained. The most serious
disturbances took place among workers in the oil and asphalt
industries, who struck for higher wages in March 1917. Accord¬
ing to the official version, the real reason for their discon¬
tent was very obscure, and it was felt that wages were not the
3
entire cause of the stoppages :
1. Daily Chronicle. 21st August, 1919} 28th August, 1920}
26th June, 1921.
2. Trinidad Dispatch 306/1917•
3« Trinidad Oispatcl 123/1917*
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The men have no real grievance as they are
among the best paid labourers of their class
in the Colony, and in addition to that the
majority of them are provided with free
quarters.
It seems, however, that the effects of the war were beginning
to make themselves felt in the rising cost of living; it was
reported later in the year that while normally the average
working-class diet was not deficient in proteins, "it may be
so at the present time (August 1917) owing to the increased
cost of certain articles of food."'*' It is not unusual for
the better paid workers to take the lead in resisting any
decline in their standard of living.
The strikes took place between March 19th and 26th
in the Point Fortin oilfields and at Brighton where the
Asphalt Company had its refinery. The prompt dispatch of a
small number of armed policemen at the first sign of unrest
kept the oilworkers at Tabaquite quiet, while at Fyzabad
only 20 had the courage to go on strike. These were immedi¬
ately dismissed and evicted from the Company's property. It
was at Point Fortin that the men first came out, on the 19th,
and by striking jheld up the fuelling of an Admiralty Transport
ship. An attempt by the police to mediate had no success -
the strikers refused to work at current rates of pay, and the
1. Trinidad Dispatch 316/1917#
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Company said that an increase was impracticable; it does
not appear that the men made any specific demands about the
amount of the increase desired. The Company retaliated by
threatening to dismiss and evict from its property all those
who stayed out. Since nil the men at Point Fortin lived
either in free Company quarters or in houses of their own
on lands rented from the Company at a nominal price, this was
a potent threat, especially as some enterprising souls were
malting a profit out of the arrangement by letting the houses
which they had erected.* This threat, coupled with the
arrival of a skeleton labour force of 50 soldiers to replace
the strikers, and the prompt expulsion from the area of all
2
the leaders by the police," led to the sudden collapse of the
strike after five days. At Brighton the strike of asjihalt
workers which began on the 21st threatened to be more serious.
On the evening of the second day of the strike, two fires which
broke out on the premises "under circumstances which point
3
strongly to incendiarism" destroyed buildings, plant and
refined asphalt to the value of #100,000. Though the vreapon
of eviction which the U.B.O.T. Company had employed at Point
Fortin was available, the Asphalt Company's Manager preferred




to persuade rather than coerce his workers. By the 26th
about 5^0 men (the majority of those on strike) returned to
work, after having; given their names as willing to do so; it
was alleged that the strike was the work of a few malcontents
who had prevailed upon the majority by intimidation and
threats. 15 people were arrested as a result of these strikes,
on charges ranging from arson and causing disaffection among
the civilian population to impeding the transport of war
material. Among them were two Americans, one of whom had
assaulted an armed sentry, and a Seventh Day Adventist preacher
who was charged -with attempting "to cause dissatisfaction
among the civilian population at Brighton by putting up a
placard which read 'Awake ye Stevedores and be men* and then
proceeding to advise the Brighton stevedores to strike"."''
It is not recorded that any increases in wages -were secured
2
as a result of these strikes, but on the evidence cited above
there may have been some adjustment later in the year.
The Two TflA's.
The split in the Ti¥A was never healed, Richards at
g
first ignoring the rebel branch completely. His group con¬
tinued its lobbying and its caucus organisation, but its
1, idem,
2, p. l87•
3, Enclosure in Trinidad Dispatch 102/1917,
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contacts with the British Labour Party must have suffered
during the war, and it gradually became little more than the
voice of Richards who was active in municipal politics and
became Mayor of Port-of-Spain. After one T.VA petition in
1917 which Richards initiated, it was noted officially that
he could not claim to be speaking for anyone but himself**
As the rebel branch of the TWA became increasingly involved
in the unsavoury business of trade union activity, Richards
began to stress the fact that his was purely and simply a
political organisation and eventually a notice to that effect,
2
signed by the secretary, appeared in the press :
The Trinidad Workingmen's Association (Incor¬
porated), affiliated to the Parliamentary Lab¬
our Party, England ... is a political organis¬
ation for the furtherance of social reform*
It seeks the political and industrial eman¬
cipation of the workers through organisation
and representation of the elective of all and
every governing body (sic). Since 1900 it has
carried on its propaganda throughout the country.
The Workingmen's Association (inc) is a Political
body for all earnest SOCIAL REFORMERS. It is
not a Labour Union and not for gain.
Finally, in May 1920, Richards sought an injunction from the
Supreme Court to restrain the leaders of the rebel group,
David Ileadley, James Brathwaite, Aaron Fitzroy Brathwaite,
1* idem.
Arg°s, 24th November, 1919*
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Henry Cecil Bain, Mortimer Phillips, John Sydney de Bourg,
and William Howard Bishop, from "using the name of the associ¬
ation for any company in which they are interested, directly
or indirectly." There is no evidence of what decision the
Court arrived at; but Richards must have been unsuccessful,
because in the press report of an address of welcome to the
new Governor in 1922, the TWA with most of the people listed
above on the Committee, describes itself as an incorporated
body affiliated to the British Labour Party." Ho more is
heard of the Richards faction of the TWA after 1920*
The rebel branch of the TWA had pursued its policy
of attracting a large membership and was rapidly becoming
involved in trade union activity; by the end of 19J-9» it
3
could, claim a membership of nearly 10,000. Membership was
open to all classes of labour, including clerks as well as
4
"to capitalists who, however are made honorary members,"
In an address to the BGLU in Georgetown early in 1920, David
Headley, then President, stated that they had tried to form
a trade union but had desisted after the police had accused
thera of fomenting strikes and had threatened the leaders
5
with deportation. The deportation threat highlights the
most remarkable feature of the TWA at this time - the large
1. Trinidad Guardian, 21st May, 1920.
2. Port-of-Spain Gazette, 18th January, 1922.




number of its members, and particularly of its leaders, who
were immigrants from the smaller West Indian islands, and
especially from Barbados and Grenada. This followed from
the fact that most West Indian immigrants to Trinidad were
to be found then in industrial employment either in the oil¬
fields or in the town. Of the original secessionist leaders
only J. Sydney de Bourg, who was 1st Vice-President in 1920,
remained and late in the year he left for the United States
to become an official in Garvey's U.N,I,A.
The 1919 Strikes in Trinidad.
The men who run the Workingraen's Association
are of little importance either socially, com¬
mercially or financially; in fact they have
no weight or influence with any class of the
community.*
However true this may have been in 1917, it could not have
2
been said of the rebel branch of the TWA from 1919 omrards.
The campaign of active organisation on which its leaders
embarked in that year placed it dramatically in the spotlight
during the wave of strikes which sivept Trinidad in Hoveraber.
Reports of a meeting of the association held on October 31st,
1. Enclosure in Trinidad Dispatch 102/I91?»
2. After this the name TWA is used to refer only to this
rebel branch and to the organisation which it eventually
became under Cipriani1s leadership.
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which show incidentally the concern of the leaders for keep¬
ing their activities tvithin the bounds of law and order,
reveal the motive behind all this organisation. According
to the Trinidad Guardian"1'', the President proclaimed!
It was their intention to plant their tenets
in every corner of the island, and ivhen they
were thoroughly organised they could affili¬
ate themselves with the Union in Demerara and
the 13 other ffest Indian colonies. The
effect of this confederation of labour would
be that when a strike was declared and the
Government or anybody else wanted to send for
labour to St. Vincent, labour there would be
able to say, "We cannot come."
The response of the workers whom the Union was trying to
organise was enthusiastic, no less than 129 members being
enrolled at the inaugural meeting of a branch formed in San
2
Fernando early in November.
In March 1919» strikes on the waterfront brought
pay increases of from 25% to 40%, with higher overtime rates
and double time on Sundays and public holidays; this meant
a basic rate of #1.50 per 10-hour day for warehouse porters,
while stevedores, the highest paid grade of waterfront labour
received #2.00 for a 9-hour day. The lightersaen, who trans¬
ported the cargo between ship and shore and wore paid by
1. 51st October, 1919*
2. Trinidad Guardian, 7th November, 1919*
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piece-rate, also had their rates increased.* There is no
evidence that the T»¥A had any hand either in the strikes or
in the negotiations which terminated them. Public opinion
had been heavily weighted in favour of the strikers, and the
newspapers were sympathetic.
Between March and November, the T.¥A leaders appear
to have devoted their attention to organising the waterfront
workers. On November 13th, the shipping firms were con¬
fronted with a demand for further increases in wages, an
8-hour day, and increased overtime rates for stevedores,
bargemen, and porters, in a circular letter from the Associ-
2
ation. It was later claimed, both by the Acting Secretary
of the TMAt Aaron F. Braithwaite, and Mortimore Phillips, a
stevedore who represented the strikers on the Conciliation
Board, that the men had decided to strike of their own accord,
and without any prompting from the TWA which merely intervened
to approach the shippers on the men's behalf before the strike
3
actually took place. The immediate reaction of the shipping
firms to this demand was that as the men themselves had always
conducted their own negotiations in the past, they could not
recognise an association whose claim to represent the steve¬
dores might be without foundation; they regarded this as an
1. Trinidad Guardian, 16th November, 1919J 22nd November
1919.
2. Trinidad Guardian, 14th November, 1919.
3. Trinidad Guardian. 3rd December, 1919.
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1
attempt by trouble-makers to foment unrest on the waterfront.
As a result there was a i>artial stoppage on the docks on the
l4th, and on Saturday 15th about 800 stevedores assembled at
the offices of the Royal Mail Company, the largest of the
shipping firms, as a demonstration that the TWA did represent
them. This forced the Company to recognise the Association.
The Royal Mail authorities received the deput¬
ation well, and after some•discussion recog¬
nised the officers of the Association as having
2
the mandate of the working men.
Sut when the shippers insisted on the strike being called off
before any discussions about an increase were held, negoti¬
ations broke down. On the 21st the lightermen, who had
remained at work, demanded, through the TWA, wage increases
3
corresponding to the claims of the stevedores. Three days
later, women coal porters at one of the wharves went on strike
for a 25% increase on their wage of 80^ a day, and announced
4
their intention of joining the Association.
There was an atmosphere of unrest in Port-of-Spain.
Already before the dockers* strike the city had been breadless
for two days because of a strike of the bakers for increased
1. Trinidad Guardian, 14th November, 1919.
2. Trinidad Guardian, l6th November, 1919.
3. Trinidad Guardian. 22nd November, 1919.
4. Trinidad Guardian, 25th November, 1919.
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wages, which they obtained. On the 21st sixteen labourers
in the employ of the town council demanded a 50% increase on
the 80/f a day which they had been awarded only a fortnight
before. News arrived that estate labourers at Macqueripe,
only a few miles away, had struck work, at the very moment
when housewives were faced with a fuel shortage as East
Indian charcoal vendors refused to sell coal in protest
against the Goverircmt-fixed price which they regarded as too
low.* The situation on the docks became more tense on the
24th, when it was made clear that the shipping firms were
determined to make alternative arrangements for providing .lab¬
our. The Santelle arrived from Barbados with 'a consider¬
able number* of labourers on board to unload its cargo in
Trinidad, and the following day the Royal Mail Company recruited
Venezuelan workers from various parts of Port-of-Spain to load
2
and unload its ships. Previous efforts by the shippers to
•1
recruit labour from the country districts had been foiled by
TWA officials who toured likely areas dissuading people from
accepting labour on the docks, while those who did accept were
either whisked off the docks and persuaded to join the TWA and







idem; 26th November, 1919»
Trinidad Guardian, 23rd November, 1919*
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At this point the strikers called upon the Govern¬
ment to intervene* Juines Qraithwaite, secretary of the TlVA,
was refused an interview by the Governor, Sir John Chancellor,
who would not accept him as a representative of the strikers
and who insisted upon a deputation drenm entirely from among
the stevedores."'" After consultations with both sides, the
Governor made his position clear! while he desired a settle¬
ment satisfactory to both sides, the Government could not inter¬
vene in a labour dispute except it became disorderly; should
strikebreakers be molested, police protection would be given
to them. 3}y this time the manager of the Royal Mail Company ,
who acted as spokesman for the merchants, had had second
thoughts about recognising the Association v/hose leaders, he
claimed, were merely misleading the stevedores by demanding
increases when they "had no knowledge of conditions affecting
2
the shipping interest."
Up to that time, the strikers had been very orderly,
a fact which says a great deal both for the intentions of the
WA leaders and for their control over the men. That things
got cut of hand on December 1st, as the dock strike was enter¬
ing its third week, is not surprising. Paced with the shipping
firms* withdrawal of recognition from the Association, and with
the Governor's refusal to intervene, it must have appeared to
1. Trinidad Guardian, 26th November, 1919»
2. Trinidad Guardian, 28th November, 1919»
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the stevedores, if not to the TWA officials, that active
measures were required if they were to ensure that blackleg
labour were not employed indefinitely. On that Monday morn¬
ing strikers attacked recruits who arrived at the docks from
the country districts to replace boatmen on one cf the coastal
steamers who had gone on strike on the previous Saturday,
The trouble soon spread. After lunch, a large crowd, which
included numbers of women, chased strikebreakers off the water¬
front, attacked some of the shipping agents, and resisted
the efforts of mounted policemen to disperse it. The mob
soon made its way into the city, bringing business to a stand¬
still in sortie streets in the shopping district, and demanding
the closure of the offices of the Trinidad Guardian, which had
been hostile to the strike,* Police closed all liquor stores
in Port-of-Spain - some of the rioters had penetrated as far
as the suburbs - but otherwise took no offensive action. The
disorder continued on the morning of Dece iber 2nd,
This display of exasperation on the part of the
strikers had the desired effect, Aaron Braithwaite, for the
TWA, and 5 representatives of the stevedores from different
shipping firms asked the Inspector General of Police to approach
the firms on their behalf, and proposed that an Arbitration Com-
nittee of four dockers1 and four merchants * representatives be
2
set up. Meanwhile a number of prominent citizens had sent
1. Trinidad Guardian, 2nd December, 1919*
2, Trinidad Guardian, 3rd December, 1919,
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one of their number, Dr. S.M. Lawrence, to confer with the
Governor about the situation. He agreed to the appointment
of a Conciliation Board of six - two to be nominated by the
shippers, two by the strikers (one of these to be himself a
stevedore), and two appointed by the Government.* The Board
met on the afternoon of the 2nd, in private session, and it
was agreed that the shipping companies should be asked to
reconsider the claims for wage increases which they had
received. The workers' representatives, on their part,
undertook to persuade the demonstrators to go home quietly.
On the following day, it was announced that the shipping
authorities had given written agreement to a 25% increase
2
in wages and a 9-hour day for all grades of dock labour."
Formal recognition was given to the TWA as the bargaining
body for labour on the waterfront. The stevedores made
the dismissal of all blacklegs a condition of their return-
3
xng to work - and won their point.
But the unrest was not yet over. The TWA pre¬
sented the Port-of-Spain City Council with claims for wage
increases and shorter hours on behalf of carterrnen and others
in its employ. The city scavengers, who received little
more than agricultural labourers, went on strike for a 50%
1. idem.
2. Trinidad Guardian, 4th December, 1919*
3« Trinidad Guardian, 5th December, 1919•
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increase and better conditions. All grades of \?orkers
employed at the Water and Sewerage Works petitioned for an
increase in war bonus.1 In the country, estate labourers
went on strike in various parts of the sugar belt, from
Cunupia to Chaguanas, and outbreaks of violence were reported.
At Woodford Lodge Estate, the manager and deputy manager were
arrested after one of the crowd of men who were exhorting the
2
estate labourers to go on strike had been shot dead. Skilled
and unskilled labourers employed by the Trinidad Central Oil¬
fields Company at Tabaquite went on strike for a 25% increase
after refusing the company's offer of 20%. News of strikes
in other isolated country districts poiared in to the city,
though it was reported that on some estates workers had won
increases. Policemen and bluejackets from HMS Calcutta,
all armed, were dispatched to the sugar districts. Reports
of serious disturbances in the island ward of Tobago, where
3
1 man was killed and ^ injured when police fired on a crowd
which had forced banks and shops in Scarborough to close
down after labourers of the Public Works Department declared
themselves on strike, contributed to the atmosphere of crisis
and of impending revolution. Armed sentries had been guarding
1. idem.
2. Trinidad Guardian, 7th December, 1919.
3. Trinidad Guardian, 10th December, 1919* Early reports
of casualties were grossly exaggerated.
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key buildings in the city since the first day of the Fort-of-
Spain riots; the Governor now called up the reservesT and
issued a proclamation that violence would be put down "by
force if necessary,"*
There was no evidence that the TvVA had any hand in
the unrest which was sweeping the agricultural areas. Its
leaders, however, were blamed and accused publicly, though
names were not mentioned. During the dock strike, both the
Press and the merchants had portrayed theta as agitators, "men
whose only guiding motive in life seeras to be to stir up strife
and bring about an industrial unrest which nothing can justify
•. • who dreara of a Utopia on Soviet lines which is impossible
2
in these days of practical materialism." The Chamber of
Commerce, meeting on December 6th, made it clear that its mem¬
bers had brought pressure to bear on the Governor to deal
firmly with the situation, and that they had even threatened
to cable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, so critical
were they of the measures taken to deal with the strikes, and
of the tolerant attitude of Government officials towards the
3
strikers and tho Association. The most vociferous and
reactionary member of the Chamber, Edgar Tripp, seconding a
1. Trinidad Guardian, 7th December, 1919.
2* Argos, 2.1st November, 1919«
3. Trinidad Guardian, 7th December, 1919*
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motion to this effect, called for the deportation of "the
agitators at the back of all the trouble «.. scum of the
wharves of the West Indies ... hooligans ... whose mission
appeared to be the taking of Trinidad back to Hayti
and who ought to be taught "... that Trinidad was conquered
by the British and would remain the property of the British#"*
The wave of strikes ceased with the appointment of
a Wages Committee by the Governor to go into the question of
wages and the cost-of-living in the colony. The Committee
reported that the cost-of-living had increased by 126% in
Port-of-Spain and lh5% in rural Trinidad over the 191% cost-
of-living, - though the basis on which it arrived at these
figures is not very satisfactory - and recommended minimum
rates of pay with a sliding scale to accommodate changes in
2
the cost-of-living. Allegations in the Chamber of Commerce
that the police had not been employed to quell the disturbances
in Port-of-Spain because the officers could not rely ipon the
loyalty of their men led to the appointment of a Commission
into the Conduct of the Constabulary, which in its report com¬
pletely exonerated the police, and concluded that "The riot
seems to have been brought about primarily by the failure of
an influential group of employers to remedy the genuine econ-
3
oraic grievances of their employees."
1. Report in idem.
2. Wages Committee, Trinidad, 1920.
3. Trinidad Council Paper No. 121 of 1921.
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lie Postpone 'cnt of Trade Unionise.
The TWA had won recognition as the bargaining body
for workers on the waterfront, and in some other fields of
employment where it had put forward claims for its members,
these claims had not been rejected out of hand. It was to
be expected that the Association would now consolidate its
position as a trade union and proceed with its avowed intent-
ion of organising workers throughout the island. Indeed, at
the end of December 1919 it presented claims to the New
Trinidad Asphalt Lake Company at Brighton on behalf of all
grades of labour employed by the company.* The Company
refused to consider any change in the rates of wages paid to
its employees pending the report of the Wages Committee , and
took up the position that it did not recognise the Association,
2
having always bargained directly with the men. When the TWA
pointed out that the purpose of the Wages Committee was merely
to find a basis for fixing a minimum wage, and that the Associ¬
ation was representing at their own request employees who
belonged to it, the Company declined to enter into any further
3
correspondence.
The failure of the TWA to take advantage of its
1. Acting Secretary, TWA to Manager, N.T.L.A.Co., in
Trinidad Guardian, 6th January, 1920.
2. Manager, N.T.L.A.Co. to Secretary, TWA, idem.
3. Trinidad Guardian, 8th & 9th January, 1920.
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newly-v/on recognition in accepting this snub from the Asphalt
Company, and its subsequent retirement from the trade union
field may be attributed to a number of factors* It has
already been pointed out that the Association was particularly
vulnerable to suppressive action by Government, since most of
its leaders were not natives of Trinidad. Two of them, Bruce
McConney and Mortimore Phillips (the stevedores* representative
on the Conciliation Board) were convicted of rioting and, on
appeal, had the sentences doubled. James Braithwaite, the
Secretary, who had been fined £25 for rioting and assault on
evidence which, as reported in the press, was not very con¬
vincing, was refused leave to withdraw his ajjpeal and received
the harsher sentence of three months* imprisonment.^ The fact
that the magistrate who imposed the original, and more lenient,
sentences was a local French Creole, while the justices of the
Supreme Court were Englishmen, helped to strengthen the con¬
viction that the Government intended to suppress the TWA whose
2
members marched 3,CG0 strong in protest against the sentences.
McConney, on his release from prison, was deported in tears to
3
Barbados , while the Rev. £• Sellxer Salmon, who succeeded
James Braithwaite as Secretary, was put on board a ship bound
1, Trinidad Guardian, 21st January, 1920.
2. Trinidad Guardian, 22nd January, 1920.
5* Trinidad Guardian, 2Gth March, 1920.
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for his native British Honduras at the end of March, 1920.
It is clear that deportation cr imprisonment was likely to
be the lot of any TfA leader who did not 'behave* at that time*
David Ileadley, the President, at a meeting of the BGLU which
2
he addressed in Georgetown in January, 1920, complained that
"the last thing the Government did was to write us (the TWA)
a letter threatening to deport any of us who authorised a
strike*"
In face of such obstacles, trade union activity
would have to be shelved, at least for a while. The next
attack upon the TWA came, as it did in the case of the 3GLU
in British Guiana, in the form of an Ordinance to ban Sedit¬
ious Publications, which was introduced in the Legislative
3
Council in March 1920. A memorandum of protest by the TWA ,
and public criticism and protest meetings in which a number
of prominent citiaens, including the Deputy Mayor of Port-of-
Spain, took part, resulted in a startling allegation by the
k/
Trinidad Guardian of a revolutionary■plot to overthrow the
Governtaent. Under the front-page headline "Why The Seditious
Bill Is Necessary" it disclosed the alleged plans of a "secret
organisation" with "six ringleaders, not one of whom is a
1. Trinidad Guardian, 28th March, 1920*
2. Daily Chronicle* 13th January, 1920.
3. Trinidad Guardian, 4th March, 1920.
4. 21st March, 1920.
Trinidadian," to destroy organised government and eliminate
the white populations evrery negro child was to be trained to
hate the white man, white merchants were to be boycotted, the
British were to be driven out and a Negro republic set up in
Trinidad; it claimed that men employed at the Government
quarry were being persuaded to steal dynamite for the con¬
spirators , who were also suborning the police# The import¬
ation of literature issued by the Garvey and DuBois movements
in the U#S.A« was cited as final proof of the existence of
this plot1:
The villainous doctrines of the irreconcilable
agitators in America were industriously circul¬
ated whenever opportunity offered, and emissar¬
ies were sent into the country districts to
arrange for the promotion of strikes and to
enrol local supporters of the seditious campaign#
The Government, according to the Guardian, had been aware of
this conspiracy for some eight months, and the Seditious Pub-
2
lications Ordinance was their way of preparing to deal with it#
This disclosure created an enormous sensation in the Island
and helped to heighten the tension which had existed since the
previous November# It is quite obvious that the TWA and its
leaders were the object of this allegation, which appears to
have been entirely without foundation# Certainly, had there
1# idem#
2. Trinidad Guardian# 28th March, 1920.
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been any truth in it, the attitude of the Government towards
the TWA which has been described above would have resulted, one
would expect, in wholesale arrests and imprisonments. The dis¬
closure served the purpose for which it was intended, however,
in spite of demands from a hastily-formed 'Citizens Committee'
that the Guardian either name the ringleaders and hand over its
evidence to the courts, or stand accused of stirring up "racial
hatred against the masses."* The Ordinance was passed, and
immediately the Governor banned the importation of the 'Negro
2
World', the 'Crusader', and the 'Messenger'. As late as
1929, in reply to a question by Cipriani who cited the example
of St. Lucia and Grenada, the Government stated in the Legis¬
lative Council that it had no intention of repealing the Ordin¬
ance, even though no prosecutions had been made under its pro-
3
visions.
From the infrequent mention of TWA activities in the
Presu aft r 1920, we can only surmise that the Association
suffered a serious decline during the next four years. It
continued to petition for various labour and social reforms -
an 8-hour day for all classes of labour, double time on
Sundays, Trade Union legislation, Workmen's Compensation - and
1. Trinidad Guardian, 25th March, 1920.
2. Trinidad Guardian, 8th May, 1920; 21st May, 1920.
3. Trinidad Hansard, 29th November, 1929•
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for purely political measures like the withdrawal of the
Seditious Publications Ordinance, the institution of com¬
petitive examinations for entry to the Civil Service, rep¬
resentative government, and West Indian Federation.* It
appears to have been organised at this time in occupational
2
sections, bakers, railwayman, dockers, etc." It does not
seem to have performed any trade union functions in this
period, and perhaps for this reason its membership figures
fell. i?hen Cipriani threw his lot in with the T./A in 1924
•T
it had no more than 40 members.
The WA Under Cipriani.
ii !■ .i ■ — ■ .in a ■mm ■■■». 1i Utti.i ill i—»
Perhaps the most important influence in turning the
TWA from trade union activity and converting it into a polit¬
ical party was its alliance with Captain Cipriani. It is
not clear exactly how or when this alliance began. Certainly
it must have been after the events of 1919-20 related above,
as there is no evidence of Cipriani's participation in the
affairs of the Association at that time. It is probable
that the identity of views on the question of constitutional
1. Port-of-Spain Gazette, 23rd March, 1921 j 24th January,
1922.
Port-of- Spain Gazette, 18th & 21st January, 1)22.
3. Port-of-Spain Gazette, 21st August, 1929•
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reform and representative government between Cipriani and
the TV/A leaders brought them together in 1921-22; Cipriani
had been from the very beginning one of the most outspoken
proponents of the case for a representative legislature.
The first occasion on which he appears on record in associ¬
ation with the TWA is the interview granted to that body by
Major Wood on his visit to Trinidad in 1922; Cipriani is
described at that time as an honourary member of the HA com¬
mittee.* At the end of July, 1922, the TWA petitioned the
Secretary of State that Cipriani be appointed a member of the
Constitution Reform Commission which had been set up to devise
a new form of constitution for the Colony. The Governor
advised rejecting the suggestion on the grounds that the T.VA
had no special claim to representation on the Commission,
which had been "carefully selected to represent different shades
of political opinion and ... (was) «... not intended to include
2
representatives of trades or professions." On the basis of
the evidence discovered up to now from references to the TWA
in the Press and elsewhere, we must conclude that it is incor¬
rect to hold that the TWA went out of existence in the years
before or during the war, and that its revival in 1919 was
1. Port-of-Spain Gazette, January, 1922, passim.
2. Trinidad Dispatch 483/1922.
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the work of Cipriani.*
Cipriani must have appeared to fieadley, Adams, the
Braithwaites and Bishop as the ideal person to lead the TWA
once it had incurred the displeasure of the Government. A
man of independent means, belonging to one of the most prom¬
inent families in the island (his brother was a nominated mem¬
ber of the Legislative Council at the time of the 1919 dis¬
turbances), with a record of loyalty to the British Empire,
and able to meet the merchant-planter group on their own
social level, he had been nevertheless an outspoken champion
of the working-class and a professed Socialist even before
he identified hitoself with the TWA. But for Cipriani the
patrician trade unionism must have held little appeal. With
the introduction of elected members into the legislature in
1925, Cipriani emerged as the representative of the working-
class in the island's politics. In the Report of the General
Secretary of the TWA for 1925 (the only one which we have dis¬
covered so far), the Association is called the "Local Labour
Party", and its affiliations are with the "Labour Party of
England, the Labour and Socialist International, and the League
of Nations at Geneva".
The subsequent activities of the Association leave
little room for doubt as to its political character. The
1. This is the impression contained in references to the
TWA in Craig, op. cit., pp. 68-9; Mitchell, op, cit.,
p. xxi; Labour in the West Indies; Parry & Sherlock,
op. cit., p. 280.
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section of the report entitled "The Industrial Side of Our
Work" describes the TtfA's concern for "the obtaining of com¬
pensation for injured workers, the seeking out of avenues of
employment for workers, and generally, so far as in our power
lies, to alleviate the conditions creative of the great and
growing unemployment in the Colony."* Instances are reported
in the Press of the period when the TWA intervened after lab¬
ourers had gone on strike, and negotiated with the employers
on their behalf. But in no instance did the Association call
a strike itself, or concern itself with bargaining for workers
as an alternative to strike action; its role was always that
of mediator and advocate, and it appears to have performed
these services irrespective of whether the men were members of
the Association or not.
In the 1925 Legislative Council elections, Cipriani
stood as the official candidate of the TWA, on a platform that
called for a Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, Trade Union
Legislation, an 8-hour day, the abolition of child labour,
compulsory education, competitive examinations for entry into
the Civil Service, Poor Law Relief, abolition of the Seditious
Publications Ordinance, a law to deal with habitual idlers,
and a Commission of enquiry into the cane-farming industry.
His election campaign was conducted with the aid of slogans
1. TWA Report, 1925» p.
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such as "Trinidad for the Trinidadians", and "Votes for sons
of the soil",''' which had tremendous appeal, but which could
be considered inconsistent coming from the representative of
an organisation many of whose members were not strictly speak¬
ing Trinidadiaas, a representative who, moreover, had been
quite satisfied with income and property qualifications in
the franchise that excluded a substantial number of his follow¬
ers* His declared aim was to bring Capital and Labour together,
"a fair day's work for a fair day's wages"# With no support
from the Press which felt that he was too 'red^ he won a
three-ooinered contest by a majority of 1,647, gaining nearly
three-quarters of the total poll in the Port-of-Spain constit¬
uency# He was re-elected to the Council in the 1928 elections
and again in 1933# Sarran Telucksingh, an East Indian who
sat as member for the sugar-growing constituency of Caroni from
1925 to 1946, joined the TWA in 1926 but left it after he dis-
3
agreed with Cipriani over the Divorce Bill in 1931 \ Cipriani
4
had supported one of his rivals in the 1925 election , and his
association with the TlvA may have been mainly a matter of con¬
venience. Timothy Roodal, another prosperous East Indian who
sat in the Council from 1928, also joined the TWA, became its
1# Port-of-Spain Gazette, 16th September, 1924.
2. Port-of-Spain Gazette, 2C>th January, 1925#
3# Craig, op# eit., p# 86.
4. Port-of-Spain Gazette, l6th September, 1924.
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Vice-President, and on Cipriani's death was elected President
of the Trinidad Labour Party into which the TWA had been
transformed* But neither Telucksin™h nor Roodal seems to
have exercised much influence in the TtfA at this time, and
their support was valuable largely because they represented
the East Indian community*
The activities of the TtfA between 1925 and 1933
centred mainly around Cipriani, who was President and Treasurer
from 1925 onwards* He soon found that, under the limited
constitution which the colony enjoyed, his advocacy of work¬
ing-class interests cast him constantly in the role of unofficial
opposition. The predominance of official and nominated members
in the Council made social reform measures unlikely to succeed
unless the Government introduced theraj the Trinidad Hansard
for the period is replete with Government replies to questions
on such measures by Cipriani that they were not considered
necessary, that conditions did not permit of tneir introduction,
that Government had no intention of introducing thesa at that
time. In such a situation, Cipriani exploited to the full any
opportunity to criticise, embarrass or expose the Government on
issues -which affected working-class interests. His contacts
with the British Labour Party enabled him to use the tactics
first employed by Alfred Richards of having questions asked in
the House of Commons} he could then raise the same point in
the Legislative Council. But for all this, he ivas achieving
no tangible benefits for Labour through legislation. It was
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obvious that mere representation was not enough - self-govern¬
ment must be the next objective#
In his demand for self-government Cipriani was speak¬
ing, not only for the working-class as organised in the TWA,
but for most of the rest of the country as well# The falling
prices for both cocoa and sugar were beginning to have their
effect on economic life; wages had been reduced after 1921
the recommendations of the 1920 Wages Committee with regard to
2
a minimum scale of wages had net been put into effect , the
need for additional revenue had led Government to increase
3
the customs duties on imported foodstuffs# As Cipriani's
campaign for self-government gathered momentum after 1928,
criticism of the Government's failure to deal with the worsen¬
ing economic situation was mounting. The editor of the Port-
4
of-Spain Gazette observed :
It is impossible for any person #•• to fail to
be struck by the absolute indifference shown
time after time alike to the best interests of
the people and to the wishes of the people as
expressed through the only media possible under
existing conditions *••••
1# Handbook of Trinidad and Tobago, 1924, p.
2. A Minimum Wage Ordinance was not passed until 1935*
and even then it remained a dead letter# Cmd# 5641#
(1938), P. 49*
3# Handbook of Trinidad and Tobago, 1924, p.
4# 23rd August, 1929#
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To Cipriani, self-government was "a clear labour
issue ... the answer to the present economic distress."J
At one of the mass meetings held for the purpose of sending a
petition to the Secretary of State on the issue, he gave his
reason for rejecting the idea of trade union activity - he
was not advising the workers to go on stri'ce, he said because
strikes might lead to disturbances, •slaughter*, and loss of
2
lives. The self-government campaign is conclusive prcoof
of Ciprianifs instinctive preference for politics, even when
political activity was producing few results, rather than
trade unionism. He obviously regarded the strike as a
revolutionary weapon, and was insistent on using constitutional
means to "overthrow the Government'*»
In spite of his distrust and dislike of trade union¬
ism, the demand for trade union legislation was one of the
most consistent planks in his, and the TWA*s, platform, and
he kept on asking questions in the house in the hope of coax¬
ing the Government into introducing a permissive law. This was
one of the measures which the TWA had advocated at least as
earls'- as January 1922, when Headley was still President, The
introduction „f a Trade Unions Bill, however, was the result




of instructions contained in a circular dispatch from Lord
Passfield, then Labour Secretary of State for the Colonics,
in September 1930.* Only five months earlier, on April 29th,
Government had stated in the Council, in reply to a question
put by Cipriani., that it did not consider any trade union
2
legislation necessary in Trinidad at the time. The Bill
introduced by the Government did not provide for eaceful
picketing by unions, nor did it give them immunity for actions
in tort. It was held that these two provisions, on which all
parties were not fully agreed in the United Kingdom, should
not be introduced into the Trinidad law, When the Government's
reluctance to introduce any trade union legislation at all is
remembered, its willingness to use this excuse to retain as
much control as possible over any trade unions which might
emerge is only too obvious. Immediately, and with the sub¬
sequent backing of the British T.U.C., Cipriani opposed the
oimaissioa of these provisions from the Bill, though from his
speech in the Council it appears that lie was more concerned
about securing the right to peaceful picketing than about
3
immunity for the unions. When the Bill was finally passed
without these provisions, he refused to take advantage of the
1, Cnid. 3641, p. 48.
2, Trinidad Hansard, 25th April, 1930.
3, Trinidad Hansard, 17th June, 1932.
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newly-acquired legality of trade union organisation and trans¬
formed the TWA into the Trinidad Labour Party* In fact, it
is difficult to imagine Cipriani in the role of trade union
leader* The transformation was merely a change of name, the
TWA having been concerned, since 1926, i?ith activity that was
mainly political*
Since his first election to that office in 1924,
Cipriani had remained President of the T?A, Because of this,
of his emergence as the outstanding leader of organised labour
at this time, and of the attention which his role as the polit¬
ical champion of the working-class focussed upon his speeches
and actions, the identification of the TWA with Cipriani the
man was easily achieved. This has made it impossible to recon¬
struct what we know of the history of the TWA in the per.iod
except as a chronicle of Cipriani'3 activities, for that is the
way in which the available surviving evidence is presented.
But its Secretary's Report for 1925*« does throw some light on
the organisation of the TWA at this time. It consisted in
that year of 16 branches, with a total membership of 16,526.
Most of these branches vere based on geographic divisions,
centr-ed on towns or villages; the Port-of-Spain Brar.ch was
tlio largest of these, as -was to be expected, with over 5»500
members. None of the others, which were scattered over the
1» PP* 5-6.
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Island, had as many as 400 members. There were also a number
of cane-farmers societies affiliated to the TWA, and their
7,230 members constituted nearly half the total membership.
The Port-of-Spain branch was sub-divided into occupational
sections - waterfront -workers, porters, engineers, domestic
servants, ironworkers, shipwrights, quarrymen and carpenters,
as well as a general womens* section. Railway workers all
over the island 'were organised into one branch, numbering
1,200 members. The branches outside of Port-of-Spain were
composed of all kinds of labourers in the same group.
This deliberate policy of grouping workers into
occupational sections, which is more in accord with trade
union organisation than with political activity, may have
been a legacy of the earlier post-1913 period of the TWA.
It is probably responsible for the impression gathered by the
members of the Foster Commission which investigated the 1937
disturbances that, while the HA was not its If a trade union,
"it had two branches, the Rail-way Union and the Stevedores'
1
Union, which appear to have operated as Trade Unions."
This impression is not supported by any evidence in the news¬
papers for the period.
As part of its self-government campaign the TWA
launched on a programme of island-wide recruitment for member¬
ship, in order that it could claim to be representative of
1. Cmd. 5641, p. 48,
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majority opinion in the colony; by 1930 its activities had
been extended to Tobago. It grew from 16 branches with
16,5^6 members in 1925 to 72 branches and nearly 65,000 mem¬
bers in August, 1929.* 3y the early 1930*s, it was claiming
2
a membership of 120,000.
Apart from securing the passage of a Workmen's
Compensation Ordinance which made no provision for agricult-
3
oral labourers, the political activity of the TWA in this
period under Cipriani's leadership achieved little tangible
improvement for the working-class. Its greater freedom in
the Port-of-Spain City Council, of which Cipriani was a mem¬
ber continuously after 1926 (he was eight times Mayor during
the years 1926-44), enabled it to achieve various reforms
such as slum clearance and holidays for municipal labourers
in the city; but even here the control exercised by the
Colony Government over the city's finances appears to have
4
been a handicap.
As econo lie conditions in Trinidad grew worse in
the 193C's, it was inevitable that the workers would turn
from the TWA, and from political agitation, to more direct
industrial action. In the v/orking-class revolution of 1934-
37, the TWA was to be bypassed completely#
1. Port-of-Spain Gazette, 21st August, 1929#
2. Lewis, op. cit.«
3. No. 8 of 1926; cf, C-id. 564-1. pp. 49-30.
See, e.g., Trinidad Guardian, 24th January, 1930.
* 221 *
C-thcr Associations.
Though the BGiU and the TJA were the only permanent
labour organisations of importance to emerge before 1933»
there were a number of other associations formed in the
period*
In June* 1920, in the midst of the general distress
which preceded the widespread strikes in British Guiana, kO
city artisans - carpenters, boat-builders, blacksmiths, shoe¬
makers , tailors and others - formed the British Guiana Amal¬
gamated Trades Union, with aims similar to those of the BGLU,
1
and a demand for a living wage. The motivation behind this
anion was the feeling that a body composed mainly of unskilled
labourers should not be allowed to represent skilled workmen
2
- the IXJLU had presenter demands for the carpenters in 1919•
A feature of the Union's progr :ime was the sponsoring of can¬
didates to represent tradesmen in the Courts of Government,
From the absence of any farther mention of this association
in the Press, it must be concluded that this move to establish
an aristocracy of labour was unsuccessful.
In Trinidad, a Bakers' Association was formed during
the two-day bakers' strike which preceded the dock strike in
Port-of-Spain in November, J-919» but it was dissolved two days
later once the strikers had won the increase which they
1. Daily Chronicle, 12th June, 1920,
2, Daily Chronicle, 21st September, 1919»
- 222 -
demanded•* There is also mention of a shop Clerks* Associ-
2
ation in 1921 , but no further evidence that it was ever act¬
ive has been discovered.
In Jamaica, although no permanent organisation
emerged in this period, there were a number of minor associ¬
ations which came briefly into existence at this time. A
wave of strikes similar to those already described in British
Guiana and Trinidad swept the island in 1918; it began among
labourers at the West Indies Chemical Works in Spanish Town
3
early in January. In April workers employed by the Kingston
-St. Andrew Corporation in the Fire Brigade and Sanitary
Departments went on strike, after waiting for weeks for an
increase to which the Corporation had agreed in principle, but
for which it needed the approval of a reluctant Government;
4
this strike was broken by employing new men. In mid-June,
strikes for wage increases took place among all classes of
labour on the Kingston docks; a conference of the shipping
agents agreed upon an increase in the rate for dockers from
3d to 4d an hour. The refusal of the United Fruit Company
to abide by this agreement led to minor incidents on the
U.F. Co*s wharf on the l8th, when a crowd of 600 men, women
1* Trinidad Guardian, 12th-l4th November, 1919.
2. Port-of-Spain Gazette, 8th February, 1921.
3. Gleaner, 5th January, 1918; 9th & 15th January, 1918.
Gleaner. 6th April, 1918; 9th April, 1918.
5. Gleaner, 18th June, 1918; 19th June, 1918.
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and beys set upon men ivho had accepted work from the Company
at the old rates. The strike spread to other fields of
employment in Kingston, railway workers, banana carriers and
general labourers all making demands. By July, the strike
fever had spread to the country districts, labourers on
sugar and banana estates and the Public Works Department going
on strike in the various parishes, often with incidents of
violence."'' The situation appears never to have acquired the
serious character which marked the strikes of 1919 in Trinidad.
For this credit is due to the employers, many of
whom acceded to demands for wage increases readily, and to the
sympathetic attitude of the new Governor, Sir Leslie Probyn.
As in the other territories, the war had led to a substantial
increase in the cost-of-living, estimated by the Gleaner to
1
be double in 1918 what it was in I9l3»~ The effects of this
rise were to be seen in the rags, hunger and obvious poverty
3
which were becoming familiar sights in Kingston. It appears
that in some instances employers had raised wages voluntarily
A
during I9I0 ; but the Government * s refusal to agree to an
increase for the municipal workers -was part of its general
1. Gleaner, passim, June & July I9l8.
2. Gleaner, 20th June, 1918.
3. idem.
he, Olivier to Editor, Gleaner, I3th September, 1916.
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policy towards wages. A motion by F.R, Evans in the Legis¬
lature calling on Government to increase the wages of labour¬
ers in its employ was withdrawn after opposition from the
official element in the Council, during which the Director
of Public Works claimed that the rates paid in Jamaica (1/10
- 2/9 per day) were higher than in Canada. After the strike
of municipal workers mentioned above, a Bill was introduced
to forbid strikes in the fire or health departments of the
2
Parochial or Municipal services. With the arrival of Sir
Leslie Probyn in June, Government adopted a more realistic
attitude towards wage demands. In fact, the Governor's
opening speech, it was rumoured in many parts of the country,
had advocated a wage of 'a dollar a day' for labour, this
%
being the rate currently paid in Central America.
Three trade unions appear on the scene at this time.
The Longshoremen's Union No. 1 of the Jamaica Federation of
Labour was formed in January 1918 by A. Bain-Alves, its first
President, "who had been active in making representations on
behalf of th* Machado Tobacco Company employees" previous to
4
its formation. It would seem, from the name of this Union,
1. Gleaner, 7th March, 1918.
2. Gleaner. 20th April, 1918.
3« cf. Gleaner. 21st June, 1918.
4. Hart, op. eit.« p. 25.
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that Alves* intention was to organise various groups of lab¬
our in the Island into some kind of Federation# Addressing
a meeting of banana carriers and coal heavers during the
strikes, after he had led a delegation to the United Fruit
Company on their behalf, he exhorted them to organise them¬
selves in a "Banana Carriers and Coal Heavers Union" and to
federate with the Longshoremen.* At that same meeting he
announced the existence of a Cigar Makers1 Union, which was
probably the outcome of his association with the employees of
the Tobacco Company; but no other reference to this union has
been found. The Longshoremen's Union continued in existence
for two or three years, and Hart claims that it "exerted con-
2
siderable influence spreading to several outports."
In existence in 1913 too was the Montego Bay Labour¬
ers* Benevolent Union, which was sufficiently well established
in January 1918 to have a branch functioning in Port Jforia and
putting forward a programme of social, economic, agrarian and
3
fiscal reform as a remedy for the social ills of the island.
The flontego Bay section held some 80 members, half of them art-
4
isans, the others agricultural labourers and boatmen. In
February the Union, in a circular sent to employers of labour
1. Gleaner. 27th June, 1918.
2. Hart, idem.
3» Gleaner, l6th January, 1918.
4. Gleaner, 17th April, 1918.
'M
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in the districtf made demands for increases on the rate of
1/6 per day paid to labourers; the circular invited employ¬
ers to consider whether 1/6 was a fair wage, and whether it
ought not to be increased in view of the abnormally high
cost of living.1 A meeting held by the employers at the
Montego Bay Court House on April 12th, and attended by a num¬
ber of artisans, ended abruptly when the workers expressed
2
dissatisfaction with the employers' attitude to their claims.
In June it was announced that the Montego Bay employers had
agreed to increase the rate of wages, and this instance of
peaceful negotiation between workers and employers was held
3
up by the Press as an example to be emulated#
In September 1919 workers on the Jamaica Government
Railv/ay formed the Workmen's Co-operative Association after
a successful four-week strike during which they had won con-
4
siderable public support• The union failed to attract work¬
ers in other fields of employment. "Within a year the Govern¬
ment had transferred some of the leaders to outstations and
squeezed others out of the service, and the Union was for all
5
practical purposes destroyed." The railway workers con¬
tinued to show dissatisfaction, however, and in 1923 they won
1. Gleaner. l6th April, 19lS«
2. idem#
3# Gleaner, 11th & 20th June, 1918#
4. Gleaner, l8th Sept., 1919; Hart, op# cit., pp. 25-6#
5• Hart t idem#
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increases and improved conditions after another strike which
lasted three weeks. In 1919 a second waterfront union, the
Longshoremen's Union No. 2 of the Jamaica Federation of Labour
came into existence, but it seems to have been shortlived#*
The Garvey movement does not appear to liave had the same
impact on labour organisation in Jamaica as it had in British
Guiana and Trinidad. This may be due to the fact that Garvey-
isia did not reach its peak in Jamaica until 1929} the close
association of Garvey himself with the movement in Jamaica
was probably responsible as well, since Garvey was not part¬
icularly concerned with trade union activity.
As economic conditions grew worse in the late 1920's
and the effects of the Great Depression began to be felt, new
associations began to arise for the purpose of organising lab¬
our. These were the fore-runners of the unions of the 1930's,
and they grew out of the same economic conditions as the later
unions. To this group belong the Trinidad and Tobago Trade
Union Centre and the Jamaica Trades and Laboar Union. Neither
of these survived for very long. The former was a general
union formed in 1929 which is said to have had some 2,000 nen-
2
bors in 1930." The latter.was organised in the same year with
1. idem; Trade Unionism in Jamaica. 1918-46.
,.y'- '■ 9' ' ' ' • ' ' • 5 ••
2. Trinidad Guardian, 17th January, 1930} Lewis, op. cit.
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encouragement from two American unions, and had branches in
several parts of Jamaica, especially in the banana-growing
areas| it ceased to function, however, after a fevr months.1
More political than economic was the motivation
behind the British Guiana Workers* League, which grew out
of two informal conferences called by A.A. Thorme, who had
dissociated himself from the BGLU in 1920. The occasion
of these conferences was the election of the second Labour
Government in Britain in 1929» the purpose, to formulate
some sort of planned Labour programme for British Guiana
for transmission to the BLP with which several people had
maintained contact since 1923» After the second of these
conferences the Workers* League was formed, though there
2
were few workers in the group. Its Council was a repre¬
sentative selection of radical Negro opinion - 2 doctors,
6 clergymen, a number of schoolmasters, and 3 ladies.
Critchlow seems to have been the only working-class member
of the Council. The League went through the usual formula
of holding public meetings to which all workers, 'professional
3
and unprofessional, skilled and unskilled* were invited.
It is not clear what specific plans the League had, or how
1. Hart, qp. cit., p. 26f Padmore, Life and Struggles of
Negro Toilers, p. 108.
2. Daily Argosy, 21st August, 1929.
3. Daily Argosy, 1st September, 1931*
close a relationship it established with the BLP. It was
conceived as a political organ, not in competition to the
BGLU. But by 1931 its aims had changed, and in that year




The disturbances which took place in the British
Caribbean territories in the years 1934-39 have been heralded
as the crucible out of which Labour MoveEaents in the area were
1
born. The evidence of widespread dissatisfaction which they
revealed, the concurrence of unrest in almost every territory
in the area, the publicity given to them in the United Kingdom,
the need for new lines of policy in the area to which they
drew attention and the outlining of these new policies in the
fioync and Foster Commissions and in the Orde-Brown Report on
Labour Conditions which were a direct consequence of these
disturbances, all these factors have helped to focus attention
on this narrow span of six years. The fact that official
acceptance of trade unionism and most of the unions themselves
date from these years, and that very little is known or remem¬
bered, even in Labour circles, of events which occurred before
1934 makes it all the more convenient to hold that the 1930's
gave birth to organised labour in the area.
Quibbling about the exact starting-point of social
movements is usually a pointless and unproductive exercise.
There are grounds, however, for regarding the entire period
1. See, e.g., Lewis, op. cit.; his pamphlet, which deals
with these years, is sub-titled "The Birth of a Workers'
Movement *"
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1913-39 as one of gestation in the history of organised lab¬
our in the three territories with which we are concerned.
Certainly the difference between the unrest of 1918-19 and
that of 1934-39 is one of extent rather than of character.
They steaded from essentially the same social aid economic
conditions, and manifestation® of discontent took the same
form - waves of strikes among unorganised or recently organ¬
ised -workers, most of whom struck first and made their demands
afterwards. The disturbances of 1934-39 were the result of
a process of reaction by workers to conditions in the area
which had been going on since World War I; they were not
the expression of a sudden awareness that all was not right
in the West Indian's world. The disturbances at the end of
V/orld War I had occurred during a period of boom in the econ¬
omy, when it was possible to grant wage increases. The fail¬
ure of the workers * associations which emerged at this favour¬
able moment to establish themselves securely may be ascribed
to a variety of causes. Of these, suppressive action by
Governments fearful of the revolutionary racial undertones of
existing organisations had already been mentioned in Chapter
IV. Of considerable importance too, is the absence of any
previous tradition of craft unionism, which meant that the
knowledge and example of workers organising to promote their
interests had to be imported. The predominantly agricultural
character of the working-class and the high incidence of
casual labour in industry are factors also to be considered
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in a period which, after the 1920-21 peak years, was one of
continuous slump that reached its nadir in the mid-1930's.
It is more than likely that the disturbances of
193*1-39 would have been less serio is had adequate and effect¬
ive constitutional machinery existed through which working-
class discontent could be given expression# It is import¬
ant to stress the word ''effective* because some sort of
machinery did exist. In theory, workers could voice their
discontent through representatives in the legislatures (pro¬
vided they could find a representative who satisfied the
property and income qualifications for membership); but the
experience of Cipriani in Trinidad shows how ineffective
political agitation was for improving the workers' lot.
They could also form trade unions, for by 1933 Trade Union
Laws, which recognised unions as legal, were in existence in
all three territories.
Jamaica was the first of the three territories to
legalise trade unionism, the lav/ being passed in 1919 on the
initiative of J.A.G. Smith who, as leading Negro lawyer and
a member of the Legislature, had negotiated on behalf of some
of the strikers in Kingston in the previous year.'- The
2
Ordinance did not protect unions from actions for damages,
nor did it recognise the legality of peaceful picketing; in
1. Gleaner, June-July, 1918, passim.
2, Law 37 of 1919.
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fact, the former provision was otaitted specifically from the
law at the instance of the Government* In British Guiana
the BGLU had been in existence for more than two years before
its position was safeguarded by legislation which legalised
2
trade unions. Here, too, the right of peaceful picketing
was not granted, though unions were to be immune from tortious
actions. Legal existence was not accorded to unions in
Trinidad until 1932, neither provision being included in the
3
Ordinance* In general, the laws were based on the United
Kingdom Trade Union Acts of 1871, 1876 and 1313, +he Trade
Disputes Act of 1906 and, in the ease of Trinidad, the Trade
Disputes and Trade Unions Acts of 1927*
The right of 'workers to combine in trade unions was,
in fact, insufficient without the-establishment of machinery
for the settlement of disputes between employer and employees.
v
In Trinidad one of the measures passed in the Legislature
4
after the unrest at the end of 1919 was an ordinance pro¬
viding for the establishment of a standing Industrial Court
"whose duty it shall be to settle any industrial dispute which
may be referred to it for settlement, and also to advise
1. cf, Cmd* 6607, p. 198.
2* See above p* 163*
3* See above p» 217*
4, No* 26 of 1920.
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the Governor on any industrial or economic question which he
may refer to it for advice." The court was to consist of
representatives of workers and employers and of independent
members under a President, all appointed by the Governor.
On this point the Porster Commission reports*!
We understand that shortly after the passing
of this Ordinance a President was in fact
appointed* No Court was ever established,
however; the appointed President never
functioned; and the Ordinance has remained
inoperative to the present day. It is
clear to us that at no time has the Indus¬
trial Court Ordinance been regarded as a
serious factor in the Colony's industrial
system.
No similar provision existed either in British Guiana or in
Jamaica. In the absence of any legal provision for the
settlement of disputes, labour relations were conducted on
the basis of whatever form of formal negotiation was agreed
upon by both sides in any particular dispute. As early as
1906 it had been suggested in British Guiana that an Arbitra¬
tion Board with power to bind both employers and workers to
2
agreements for a fixed period of time should be instituted.
Expedients adopted after 1918 included a 'Labourers' Indus¬
trial Board' of 3 employers' and 3 union representatives in
1. Cmd. 3641, p. 48.
2. Above, pp. 134-5#
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British Guiana*, a Conciliation Board of 2 workers* and 2
employers' representatives along with 2 nominees of the
2
Governor in Trinidad'-, and an Industrial Arbitration Tri¬
bunal (composition unspecified), to which workers could /'
3
bring their grievances in Jamaica « But these were all
called into existence after a dispute had arisen; no
attempt was made to provide machinery for the peaceful settle¬
ment of differences before they reached the point of an act¬
ual breach. And only in the case of the BGLU's agreement
with the merchants in 1919-20 was provision made for revision
after a certain period. In the absence of any established
machinery for the airing of grievances, it must have appeared
to unorganised labourers that going on strike was the safest
and most logical way of ensuring a hearing for their claims,
and this had the further advantage of protecting individual
spokesmen from the victimisation and dismissal which were
likely to be their lot if negotiations were begun before the
strike was called.
While, with the exception of the few instances dis¬
cussed in previous pages, organisations of workers did not
1, Above, p. 157*
2, Above, p, 200,
3, Gleaner, 26th & 27th June, 1918, It is not clear
that this Tribunal ever cane into existence; the
Governor's accouncement that he intended to set one up
is all that is recorded.
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exist and demands for wage increases or improved conditions
were largely the result of ad hoc combination by groups of
labourers, especially in the field of agricultural labour,
planters and merchants were well organised in all three
territories, both having trade associations with a long history
and a high degree of efficiency. The Moyne Commission came
to the conclusion that while no formal agreement existed among
planters for fixing the rate of vrages, informal consultation
achieved the same end.* In the case of the merchants, it
emerges quite clearly from their relations with the BGLU and
TNA that the Chamber of Commerce both in Georgetown and in
Port-of-Spain acted as an employers1 association; indeed the
settlement by arbitration of disputes arising in business
enterprises was one of the acknowledged objects of the Trinidad
2
Chamber. As a result, "collective bargaining in thi British
sense has been virtually an impossibility, and wage rates have
•5
followed standards laid down by employers alone," except in
those few fields of employment, such as dock labour, where
the "workers had succeeded in achieving some improvement of con¬
ditions through trade union action.
It is usual to lay all the blame for the lack of
1. Ctad. 6607, P» 197*
2. Handbook of Trinidad and Tobago, 1924, p. 177*
3. Cmd. 6607, ibid.
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communication between workers and employers on the planter-
merchant groups in the British Caribbean. To do this is to
ignore the fact that eacn Colony Government was one of the
largest, and in many cases the largest, single employer of
labour in its territory, and that no greater facilities
obtained for the expression of workers' grievances among man¬
ual employees of the Government than on sugar estates or on
\
the docks. Certainly the various Governments could have
(
given a lead to other employers by establishing, by legis¬
lation or in practice, recognisable machinery which would
encourage an atmosphere of friendly labour relations. "One
of the results of the exaggerated particularism of West Indian
administration is a lack of any common labour policy," wrote
Sir Samuel Hoare in 1921.* Had he said "any common positive
labour policy" we might agree with him. For the negative
policy of Governments in the area towards labour problems was,
in essence, a policy held in common. All governments made
it a practice not to interfere in labour disputes except to
preserve law and order. Outside of that, the degree and
nature of intervention depended upon individual Governors;
the disputes discussed in the previous pages of this study
make this clear. They make clear, too, the fact that in
numerous instances other employers were willing to follow the
1. "The Problem of Crown Colony Government in the Carib¬
bean", in The Nineteenth Century, April, 1921.
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Governor's lead or to accept his opinion, expressed or implied,
with regard to claims for wages. It is likely that the admin¬
istration, which found itself at one with planters and merchants
on so many social and political matters, never realised that it,
too, was in important employer of labour. An awareness of its
own position should surely have resulted in a more constructive
attitude to labour than the evidence of the period 1918-1935
reveals.
The Background of Discontent.
Indications of underlying unrest in the British
Caribbean can be observed long before i.934} even apart from
the big stoppages which took place in all three territories in
1917-20, and in 1924 (in British Guiana), countless minor strikes
in various fields of employment occurred throughout the 1920's
and the early 1930's. Many of these involved no more than a
handful of workers on an estate or in a local 'gang' employed
by the Public Works Departments. The frequency with which
reports of such strikes reached the newspapers - and we can
safely assume that not all of them were reported - precludes
their dismissal as merely trivial and insignificant incidents.
They form a pattern, indicative of general dissatisfaction with
social and economic conditions which were growing steadily
worse. That serious and violent outbursts occurred in 1934
and after is no surprise, when viewed in the perspective of
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time; rather, what is surprising is that the storm was
delayed for so long*
"Discontent has serious grounds in the unsound
basis of West Indian society," Macmillan warned in 193&.*
This view was echoed by the Forster Commission on the
2
Trinidad disturbances :
**» Our investigations have led us to the con¬
clusion that the true causes of the disturb¬
ances had such wide ramifications throughout
the social structure of the Colony as to make
it essential for us to treat our subject on a
comprehensive basis.
The Moyne Commission regarded the disturbances as "a symptom
of which the principal causes are low earnings and irregular
employment," and quoted with approval the admission made in
the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies
that "these feelings of unrest are a protest against the econ¬
omic distress of the Colonies themselves, a protest against
some of the consequences of that economic distress: uncertainty
of employment, low rates of wages, bad housing conditions in
3
many cases, and so on."
Economic distress was certainly the factor which ^
1. tf.M, Macmillan, Warning From The West Indies, (1936),
P. 59.
I P* 7.
Cmd. 6607, p. 197.
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triggered off the working-class revolution. The fall in the
2 1
price of sugar by r? between 1923 and 1929 was not the only
catastrophe which beset agriculture in the area; most other
crops were affected as well, bananas and cocoa being partic¬
ularly hard hit. The decreased demand for agricultural labour
which resulted affected the unemployment and underemployment
situation in country and city. In both it meant an increase
in the irregularity of employment - in many parts of the coun¬
try districts this was a deliberate expedient adopted to allevi¬
ate unemployment by reading the work available as widely as
possible; in the cities the already large casual labour force
was swollen by migrant labour from the agricultural areas in
search of opportunities for employment. At the low level of
wages then prevailing, workers could not suffer a reduction of
incomes, at a time when the purchasing power of money was
decreasing, wit' out serious repercussions.
In both British Guiana and Trinidad there had been
signs and reports of increasing unemployment since the late
1920's, but Jamaica was the worst hit territory. The size of
its working population was increased by young school-leavers
entering the labour market at an estimated rate of 20,000 a
2
year , and by migrants returning from Cuba and Central America.
1. See above, pp. 36-37*
2. Memo on .Medical and Housing Conditions, D.M.S., Jamaica,
(193<STI
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Before 1926, the number of recorded departures from the island
had usually exceeded the number of labourers returning; in
the period 1926-1939, however, only 24,492 labourers left
Jamaica while 57,746 returned, a net addition of 33*254 to the
labour force.* This meant more than just an increase in the
number of job-seekers in the island; it represented a serious
decline in the spending power of the work!ng~c1ass which had
been augmented handsomely by remittances from workers abroad.
A commission which investigated the unemployment situation in
193' found that out of a population of 90»*K)Q Kingston,
5,000 v/ere unemployed, two in every five of these being country-
2
men in search of work. Unemployment had increased consider¬
ably since 1930, the greatest hardship being felt by artisans
and "those educated and trained to become clerks, shop assist¬
ants, etc.," but the high incidence of casual labour, especially
among wharf labourers, made the position appear worse than it
3
actually was• That underemployment was itself a condition
of great distress, the Commissioners obviously did not appreciate.
Combined with the low rate of wages, it meant that in 1935 the
average income of 92% of the working population fell below 25/*
1. Based on figures in Proudfoot, op. cit., p. 404, which
are taken from L.G. Hopkins, Migration of Jamaican Labour,
1883 to 1944 (Unpublished MS).




a week, 71% receiving 14/- a week or less on the average*«
The average siae of the working-class family which enjoyed these
2
incomes was 5» there being wage earners to each family*
The conditions in which labourers lived and worked
were only in part due to the prevailing economic situation
however* Unemployment and underemployment were, as we have
seen, permanent features of the labour market in good times as
well as in bad, and were to some extent regarded as necessary
to ensure an adequate supply of estate labour in those few
months of the year when the crop was being harvested. Apart
from pious pronouncements, in British Guiana for example, that
the high incidence of casual labour in the city was the result
of workers* refusal to move to areas where labour was required,
nothing was done to facilitate this nobility which was felt to
be necessary, Jamaica's problem was obscured for long by the
facilities which existed for migration, and by its well-estab¬
lished peasantry. In Trinidad, whore internal communications
were good, the oil employers whose rates and conditions of lab¬
our were the best in the island, never suffered from a shortage
of labour, A situation of increasing unemployment was allowed
to develop from 1924 onwards without any attempts being made to
deal constructively with it - it was not until the 1950's that
any investigation into the employment situation was undertaken
1.
2.
Report of the Nutrition Committee, Jamaica, 1936-7, p. 4.
Memo on iiedical and Bousing Conditions, Jamaica,
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in any territory.. Low wages and long liours had always been
the rule throughout the area, whatever the economic climate; /
it was only when workers combined to demand increases or dis¬
orders occurred which had o?svious economic motives that any¬
thing was done about raising the rate of wages.
These were symptoms of an attitude to labour on the
part of employers which fitted in with the whole social pattern,
and to which may be ascribed particularly the acceptance of
housing conditions both on estates and in towns. This attitude,
in brief, conceded the worker's right to exist at his current
miserable level of living without admitting his claim to aspire
to an overall improvement of his lot# Hence demands for wage
increases could be granted, economic conditions permitting,
providing labourers co ild show that the cost of living had risen;
but likewise, when prices fell cuts must be imposed. No evid¬
ence has been discovered, for example, of any sugar employer
taking steps in the 1917-1921 period of prosperity to improve
the living conditions of resident labour by providing better
housing, water or sanitary facilities. In Trinidad, it was
noted in 1937 that while some employer© had shown concern for
the material well-being of their workers,^>
others, particularly some of those engaged in
the sugar industry, appear to have displayed
a lack of regard for the well-being of their
laoour which has clearly been such as to
1. Cmd. 5641, pp. 75-76.
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create an underlying current of resentment*
In no direction is this lack of regard more
apparent than in the deplorable conditions
in which a large number of the labourers
and their families are housed*
Housing indeed was the most obvious feature indic¬
ative of the generally low standard of living which prevailed.
The Moyne Commission reported"^' alter personal investigation
by its members| that "in both town and country the present
housing of tne large majority of the working people in the
West Indian Colonies leaves much to be desired; in many places
it is deplorable ..." Actual descriptions provided by the
biofiie Commission Report, by Grde Browne, by the Forster Com-
2
mission, and by non-official sources" all emphasise the inade¬
quacy of structure, the squalor, lack of sanitation, privacy
or comfort, and the overcrowding which were universal. The
tradition of housing workers in barracks or ranges which per¬
sisted through the indenture period from slave days was blamed
3
for the poor standard of agricultural housing, m towns, slum
tenements had grown up as the urban population grew, and many
of these reproduced the main features of estate ranges - a




Cmd. 6607« p* 174.
e.g. A* Calder-Marshall, Glory Bead. (1939), PP* 98-121.
Cmd* 3641, p. 36.
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common yard, with com -on outdoor toilet and water facilities*
Housing in towns, moreover, was effected by high rents and
unscrupulous landlords. But housing was no worse than other
social conditions: inadequate water supplies, the high incid¬
ence of diseases such as malaria, hookworm and tuberculosis,
diet deficiencies which affected the capacity to labour, poc>r
health and educational services. Nor did the working con-
ditions of the majority of the population give cause for any¬
thing but discontent, even apart from low wages and long hours.
Workers out of doors had to brave both the tropic rain and the
tropic sun; many estate labourers in British Guiana had to
work partly submerged in water. The litany of brad conditions
could be continued indefinitely. The inadequate attention
which most employers paid to these questions was emphasised by
the efforts of individual estates or of some non-agricultural
firms such as the bauxite company in British Guiana and the
asphalt company in Trinidad to improve working and living con-
l
ditions for labourers in their employ.
It was natural to blame the system of government, and
those who administered it, for economic and social misery, and
voices were not wanting to suggest that more power in the hands
of locally elected representatives was the best hope for allevi¬
ating economic distress. One of Cipriani's chief arguments
for self-government was the sterility of a system of government
1. Cnid. 6607« p. 176.
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which accorded to elected representatives of the people nothing
but nuisance value, and the potential development which., in
the hands of a government vsrith the people's interests at heart,
Trinidadferesources could provide.'' Gy 1935 the demand for
self-government, united with a desire for federation, was
being voiced, in major or minor keys, throughout the area, and
voiced by the only leaders who could claim to represent the
people. It is difficult to assess the degree of public sup¬
port which these demands could claim. As long ago as 1922,
Food had played down the popularity of the Representative
2
Government Movement then sweeping the area in these terms :
with an ignorant and uneducated population, it
is comparatively simple for good organisers to
arrange effective mass meetings to advance a
cause, with regard to which not one person in
twenty, if cross-examined as to wnat it was all
about, would be able to give an intelligent
'
reply.
The Forstcr Cora ission felt that it was labourers' working and
living conditions which underlay the unrest in Trinidad, and
that the question of self-government did not enter into the
3
situation. The same point of view was expressed in an
1. See e.g., Port-of-Spain Gazette, 1929, passim.
2. Crad. 1679. p. 6.
3# Cmd« 5641, p. 79»
article in The Times*:
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,,, the demand for constitutional reform is y
of no great importance* There is an adoles¬
cent quality about it. The young man wants
his latch-key and wants it so badly that he
does not think of the equipment of the house
to which it gives access. For this reason
the political claims of the educated classes
sure not endorsed by the bulk of the labouring
population*
This suggestion that the working-class discontent
had no political undertones is not borne out by other con¬
temporary accounts, nor by the keen political role which Lab-
2
our Movements have played since, Macmillan*' had found that
"even in Jamaica, on the surface a strikingly contented com¬
munity, the political opposition manifestly owes its strength
and persistence to an undercurrent of discontent among poor
wage-earners, both small-holders and landless," The Moyne
Commission found "a substantial body of public opinion" con¬
vinced of the need for greater participation by the people in
the business of government, and felt that claims for constitu¬
tional reform reflected "a genuine sentiment a groiving
political consciousness
1, "The Free West Indies - From Slavery to Riot," 25th
May, 1958.
2, up, c1t,1 p, 107,
3, Cmd, 6607, p. 373*
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The essential connection between working-class dis¬
content and the crown colony system has been expressed most
perceptively by an American writer on the Caribbean*:
dependence and backwardness are not synonymous,
but they frequently go hand in hand ... Blaming
•the government* for all kinds of difficulties
is by no means confined to the Caribbean colon¬
ies. What distinguishes the colonies from
independent countries is that 'the government'
is not their own, or at least not wholly their
own. The almost universal desire in the Carib¬
bean for greater autonomy ... is based on a
psychological need for respect, as urgent as
the economic needs •*«..
Labour dislike of the political system was reinforced
by the identification of the colonial administration with, the
employer interests which it facilitated* This identification
began on the level of race, colour, and social contacts, and
its extension into politics was logical enough. The expatri¬
ate character of the colonial official, the social system in
the area which made him automatically one of the white elite,
created a gulf between governors and governed and paved the
way for that "union between government and vested interests"
which made the administration "indistinguishable in outlook
2
from the local gentry." The instinctive opposition to
1, A.B. Fox, Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean, (1949),
pp« 5-10*
2, The '.Vest Indies Today, (193&)» pp. 34-5? cf Cmd. 6607,
p. 57#
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Government by elected representatives of the people, "vehement
and continual critics," which the Moyne Commission deplored*
had its roots in the social conditions which reserved the
plums of high office for a colour elite as much as in the
political system which preserved these criteria of privilege.
The record of successive administrations in dealing with lab¬
our questions and labour aspirations since the beginning of
the 20th Century had done little to erase the impression that
Governments were in general hostile to labourers* interests
and apathetic about their welfare.
The political content of the protests of the 1930*s
owed a great deal of their inspiration to the new pride in
their race and colour which the Garvey movement had imparted
2
to the Negro working-class. There was abundant evidence
that racial feeling was on the increase in the area, "'.'/here
people of one colour are predominant among employers and the
workers are found almost wholly from those of another colour,
it is perhaps inevitable in times of labour troubles that
racial and economic issues should be confused," says the Moyne
3
Report, But economic issues in the British Caribbean in the
1930*8 could not be separated from racial issues. They were
part of the same social pattern. Much of the justification
1, Cmd, 6607, pp. 5*5-57•
2, Eric Williams, The Me-ro in the Caribbean, (1942),
pp. . 57-53. " ' " "" ' ~
3, Cad, 6607. p. 59.
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for low wages and abominable conditions of labour was phrased
in terras of race and colour, not in terras of economic exped¬
iency. Planters, merchants and officials might not go so far
1
as to say with Sir William Coakor :
The negro is not a capable workman .... He is
mentally defective ... is still careless about
his residence. A hut or anything enclosed to
protect the inmates from the sun will suffice
for a home .....
But most of them would have agreed that the needs and deserts
of labourers in the area were low because of the fact that they
were Negro or East Indian workers, and so did not have the same
claims to a higher level of living which white workers would
have had. Instances of dissatisfaction due to racial quest-
i
ions - the employment of white South Africans in the Trinidad
2
oil industry , the feeling widespread in the area that the
Ethiopian War was another example of race prejudice in that
the League of Nations was unwilling to risk war over a black
state, criticism of appointments in the public services - are
numerous enough in the 1930's for us to conclude that race and
colour played their part in contributing to the general back¬
ground of discontent.
Because the disturbances of the 1930*s had their
origin, not only in economic grievances among the working-class,
but in the social and political conditions existing in the area
1. Sketches of Jamaica, (1928), pp. 2-25.
2. cf Crad. 5641. pp. 78-?9.
V
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at the time, they assumed the character not of raere disorderly
strikes, but of a widespread social revolution. The reforms
to which they gave rise justify this view.
Riots, Reactions and Reforms.
The series of disturbances which mark the working-
class revolution in the British Caribbean began in May 193^
and erupted intermittently until February 1939* The main
events in our three territories were as follo;?ss
May - July, 193^ Sugar workers strike in Trinidad.
February, 1935 Oil workers strike and hunger
march, Trinidad.
May, 1935 Wharf labourers strike, Falmouth,
Jamaica.
September - October,
1935 »••«•••••••••**•••• Sugar workers strike in British
Guiana.
June, 1937 Oil workers strike and general
disturbances, Trinidad.
May, 1938 * Sugar workers strike, Frome,
Jamaica.
May - June, 1938 Dock workers strike and general
disturbances, Jamaica.
February, 1939 ••••••••••• Sugar workers strike, Leonora,
British Guiana.
Besides, there were serious disturbances among sugar workers in
St. Kitts in 1935» coal haulers in St. Lucia in 1935 and sugar
workers in 1937» in St. Vincent in 1935 and in Barbados in 1937.
All but three of these were accompanied by disorders serious
enough to lead to the appointment of local commissioners of
enquiry; only one, the 1937 disturbances in Trinidad, led to
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a commission of investigation from the United Kingdom.* But
the cumulative effect of them all was enormous, and their
result was the West India Royal Commission of 1933-39 (the
Moyne Commission), "to investigate social and economic con-
ditions ... and matters connected thereivith, and to make
2
recommendations."
These disturbances followed the usual pattern which
we have seen for earlier years - an unorganised strike in one
spot soon spreading to other estates or to workers in other
fields of employment, and eventually getting out of hand.
This pattern is in itself indicative of the extent of the dis¬
content from which the riots stemmed* Not all of them began
with strike®, however. The St. Vincent riots of 1935 were
the result of the Government's insistence on legislating for
an increase in customs duties (which would raise the cost of
food and clothing) at a time of severe economic distress, in
3
the face of universal disapproval. The Barbados riots were
the result of Government's action in deporting to Trinidad
Clement Payne, who had been organising labourers in the island
since March 1937 (he had been associated with Uriah Butler in
Trinidad before then), and whose deportation could be justified
1. Cctd« 5341, (Forster Commission).
2. Cmd. 6607, p. xiii.
3. cf Lewis, op. cit; Press censorship made the exact
details of this disturbance difficult to obtain, as no
official report was published.
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only by a legal technicality.
It is possible to denote two distinct phases in
this series of disturbances, divided by the year 1936. The
earlier manifestations were inainly peaceful; only in the case
of the sugar strikes in 193^ in Trinidad was there any serious
disorder in our three territories. There was a more alarming
situation in the smaller territories in this phase, probably
because in every case the Government tried to deal with the sit¬
uation by 'gunboat diplomacy' - calling out the special police,
and cabling for warships to preserve order. With the exception
of the 1937 episode in Barbados which is to some extent linked
with events in Trinidad, it is in the three largest territories
that the serious outbreaks occurred after 1936. In British
Guiana, the Leonora disturbances took place after the Moyne
Com iission had been appointed, in the very month in which the
Cora .issioners visited the colony. The more serious character
of the later events appear to have been the result of increas¬
ing exasperation on the part of the people. In spite of
strict press censorship, too, reports of happenings in other
parts of the area, as v/ell as of the labour unrest in the U.S.A.
and in Europe must have had their effect in convincing workers
in each territory that theirs was not a lone protest.
In the course of maintaining law and order which the
Colonial Governments regarded as their first duty at this time,
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46 people were killed and more than 400 injured* An unesti-
mated number were arrested, prosecuted or imprisoned as a
result* The attitude of individual Governments varied,
depending to a large extent on the point of view of the Governor
and the balance of social forces in the territory* The earlier
strikes in the smaller islands, for example, were met by a show
of force which in many instances could be regarded as unwarr¬
anted. By contrast, the attitude of Government both in Trisddad
and in Jamaica appears to have been tolerant and, in the case of
Trinidad, extremely sympathetic to the strikers, until disorders
occurred* It is true, though, that tactless police action on
occasion may have precipitated violence in a dangerous sit¬
uation - for example, the attempt to arrest Uriah Butler in
Trinidad while he was actually addressing a crowded meeting,
2
which transformed the oilfield strike into a riot* It also
served to strengthen labour resolve, by making martyrs of indi¬
vidual leaders; this was the case both with Butler in Trinidad
and with Bustamante who was arrested during the dockers strike ^
3
in Jamaica.
The prevailing attitude of the officials, and of a
large proportion of the upper- and middle-classes to the riots
was one of disapproval* This disapproval was aimed, not only
1* Figures from Lewis, op* cit.
2* See Cmd* 5641, pp. 5^-62*
3* Cf. W.J. Makin, Caribbean Nights (1939)* P» 69.
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at the disorders, bat also at the working-class activity and
at the organisations which were springing up at this time.
Trade unionism in the area has had to overcome an extreme degree
of social prejudice, which is not altogether the result of econ¬
omic interest. The character of unrest which the absence of
conciliation machinery had forced upon working-class activity
made anything concerned with labour organisation 'not quite
respectable*• (This attitude, which was largely a middle-
class attitude, also applied to politics to a lesser extent.)
Middle-class people concerned with conformity and respectability
were perturbed by the police surveillance and the brand of
•agitator* which was the lot. of those concerned with organ¬
ising workers. Police reported what was said at public pol¬
itical meetings - even in the 1226 pre-election meetings in
Trinidad the police shorthand writer was a familiar figure -
informers, it was said, were widely used, workers* leaders
t?ere often arrested on trivial charges, or else tried for
"sedition" and "causing disaffection among the population".
The sort of police action to which working-class political act¬
ivity was subject at this time is illustrated by Calder-Marshall's
description of the prohibiting of a meeting held by the Negro
Welfare and Cultural Association in Trinidad in protest against
the Shop Hours' Bill in 1938,"'' There was in existence, too,
among some sections of the upper-class, the feeling best
1. op, cit», pp. 205-210.
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expressed by Makin's 'old white resident' of Jamaica who
likened the 1938 disturbances there to the Morant Bay rebell¬
ion*! "It's the only way to deal with these fellows. Shoot /
•em down." But some of this disapproval was offset by the
number of prominent citizens who, after the first moments of
shock at the thought that the disturbances should have occurred,
came forward to mediate, to advise the workers, and in some
cases even to head the new labour organisations which emerged
from the turmoil.
Apart from local attempts to provide palliatives
such as unemployment relief works and land settlement schemes,
the main reaction to the disturbances of 1954-38, and the
principal reforms which they brought about, lay in the appoint¬
ment and recommendations of the Moyne Commission. The idea
of a Commission was not universally welcomed. "The people
of the West Indies had asked for bread; they received a Royal
2 '
Commission," parodied Makin. The reason for the lack of
enthusiasm in many quarters was that the Commission was intended
to"'investigate' what had been 'investigated' at least a 3Core
of times before, during the past quarter of a century." As
the Man Power Citizen's Association, a trade union cum political
1. Makin, op. cit, p. 53; cf. Calder-Marshall, op« cit,
P. 55.
2. op. cit.t p. 89.
3. T.P. Achong, layer's Annual Report, 1942-3, (1944),
p. 64 n.
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party founded in British Guiana in 1936 observed in its offic¬
ial brochure*:
Hitherto our experiences with Commissions have
not been very happy ..... We found that their
labours were nearly in vain, their recommend¬
ations were pigeon-holed and ..... a waste of
time, energy and money.
The Commission was appointed in August 1938 and its members
visited every territory in the British Caribbean between
November 1938 and March l6th 1939* Its report , dated Decem¬
ber 21st 1939, was not published until 19^5? its recommendations,
however, were published in 1939*
The Commissioners recommended the setting-up of a
West Indian Welfare Fund under a Comptroller independent of the
Colonial Governments, "to finance schemes for the general improve¬
ment of education, the health services, housing and slum clear¬
ance, the creation of labour departnsents, the provision of
social welfare facilities, and land settlement, apart from the
3
cost of purchase of land." They made no concrete recommend¬
ations of economic policy; they drew attention to the need for
increasing "home production of essential foodstuffs on a basis
of mixed farming", in view of the rapidly increasing population,
1, MPCA, Foundation Souvenir. 1958-9, p. 3»
2» Cmd. 6607.
3* ibid, p. 428.
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and recommended increased preferential assistance for the
sugar industry and an increase in the basic export quota.
Local industries were to be fostered by "quantitative restrict¬
ion of imports coupled with safeguards for the consumer against
an undue increase of price.In land settlement, equal atten¬
tion should be paid to improving the husbandry of small-holders
2
and to providing additional lands for their sons. In the
field of politics and administration, federation was to be the
ultimate aim; in the meantime, universal adult suffrage, wider
representation of interest in the Executive Councils, and an
Advisory Committee System (a kind of first step to Ministerial
Government), should be considered; Governments should take
3
steps to explain their policies to the people.
Some of the recommendations of the Commissioners on
Labour and Trade Unions are of particular relevance to our
study. They were!
1) Legal protection for unions against actions in tort,
provision for peaceful picketing with access to workers both
at home and at their place of work, compulsory registration of
unions and audit of their funds;
ibid, pp. 440-444.
2. ibid, pp. 446-7•
3. ibid, pp. 449-453.
4. ibid, pp. 437-9*
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2) the establishment of Labour Departments*t and their
assistance in regulating wages and conditions of employment in
the formative period of trade unionism; to assist them Advis¬
ory Hoards of employers* and workers* representatives with
impartial chairmen should be set up;
3) the establishment of statutory Wages Boards in each
territory, and of an Industrial Court for the whole area;
4) the formation of Whitley Councils for civil services,
and an extension of this principle to subordinate staff and to
teachers, as an example to other employers by Governments,
There were other items relating to labour welfare provisions,
factory legislation, Workmen's Compensation, and the appoint¬
ment of Labour Advisers*
The reception which these recommendations received
was not over-enthusiastic, though few went as far as Achong
did in calling the report "the meet stupendous hoax ever launched
by the Colonial Office in the Caribbean area during this cent-
2
ury." The most detailed examination and criticism was made
by the People's National Party, which had emerged after the
1938 disturbances in Jamaica, and had formulated its own com¬
prehensive programme of reforms. While approving of most of
1• This recommendation had already been made by Orde-Browne
in his Report on Labour Conditions, and acted upon in some
cases.
2. T.P. Achong, op. cit., p. 65 n.
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the social welfare recommendations, it condemned the economic
policy section as "disappointing and in some respects mislead¬
ing", since no proposals had been made on the subject of indir¬
ect taxation, banking, industrial development, unemployment, or
income redistribution.* The criticism of the political section
2
of the Commission's recommendations was even more caustic
The Royal Commission were expected to say that the
problems of Jamaica and the West Indies were econ¬
omic rather than political. It was unlikely that
they would condemn, as it deserves to be condemned,
the whole system of Colonial Office administration
in the West Indies and it was certain that they
would fail to see or pretend not to see the connect¬
ion between the political decay that is apparent, the
administrative system and the failure to solve the
economic problems of the country ... the Recommend¬
ations on the political system ... are an evident
compromise resulting in a vague and somewhat meaning¬
less set of tentative and hesitant proposals ...
eloquent of the distrust and the indifference and the
subservience to concealed aims that is the real
reason for the denial of a policy for self-Government
to these Colonies.
There was, indeed, little to applaud either in the
general economic policy proposals or in 1he political recommend¬
ations of the Commissioners. The relation between the basic
economic distress of the area and social conditions was such
1. PNP Reoort of First Annual Conference, 1939, pp.
69-74, —
2. ibid, pp. 80-84.
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that social welfare measure® could be but palliative unless
accompanied by bold economic reforms. The conviction that
"the problem of the West Indies is essentially agrarian,"* and
that increased food production was essential in the face of a
rapidly expanding population, resulted in a strangely inade¬
quate approach to the economic question which was inconsistent
with the thorough attention given to welfare and labour. It
is difficult to see how the Commissioners, on the basis of
their recommendations, expected levels of living in the area
ever to be raised, except at the expense of permanent subsidis¬
ation through the Development and Welfare Fund, In their con¬
stitutional proposals the Commissioners opted for minor changes;
they apparently envisaged the possibility of the appointment of
Labour representatives to Executive Councils, but were not pre¬
pared to recommend measures which would result in the widespread
election of Labour Councillors tc the legislature, because of
the opposition to Government which was usual among popular
2
elected members. The financial assistance received from the
United Kingdom - which was to be stepped up in the form of the
Development and Welfare Fund - was the reason given for opposing
any transfer of authority from colonial officials to elected
representatives. These measures, and the reasons given for
proposing them, could not be expected to please that section of
1*
2.
Cmd, 6607, p, 422,
ibid, pp, 375-4.
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the population which had made the social revolution. In the
light of the Commissioners' conviction that the demand for
increased local control of public affairs was sufficiently
widespread to make the success of social reform measures doubt¬
ful unless they were accompanied by constitutional development,*
their hesitant constitutional proposals were inconsistent and
indicative of their inability to understand that political fact¬
ors made a basic contribution to working-class discontent#
The recommendations made by the Commissioners on
Trade Unionism were more satisfactory# Tie need for peaceful
picketing and immunity from actions for damages consequent upon
strikes was obvious, if trade unionism was to be encouraged.
Compulsory registration and tne audit of accounts were Gieasures
which could be used to restrain and guide trade unions in their
formative years. The provisions for Labour Departments, Labour
Advisory Boards and Wages Boards implied that a more positive
approach to labour questions on the part of Colonial Governments
in future was envisaged. The Commission suggested that the
Jamaica law of December, 193^, which established conciliation
and arbitration machinery for the settlement of labour disputes,
be copied in other territoriesUnless unemployment and under¬
employment were tackled, however, facilities for trade union act¬
ion and measures such as workmen's compensation would be merely
1* idem#
2. idem, p. 439#
■y
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temporary palliatives for working-class discontent. The only
attempt to deal with the unemployment situation, outside of
land settlement plans, was the suggestion that in the larger
territories the possibilities of unemployment insurance schemes
should be investigated#* In the conditions of the British
Caribbean this proposal was so Utopian as to reinforce the con¬
clusion that the Commissioners preferred to dodge the basic
issues at the root of all the trouble.
The Hoyne Commission Ileport marked a new departure in
West Indian policy in the fields of social and labour legislation
and welfare. In spite of its shortcomings, it must be regarded
as the most important official document relating to the area in
the 20th Century.
The Rise of Trade Unionism. 195^-59.
From the point of view of Labour Movements, one of
the main results of the disturbances of the 1930was the
impetus which they gave, to organising workers in the British
Caribbean. There had been signs of a revival in the years
1929-31* when a few trade unions came into existence, but it
was doomed to brief duration by the economic circumstances which
engendered it. The existing organisations such as the Trinidad
Labour Party and the J3GLU, had either failed to retain popular
support or, in the case of the TLP, continued with a policy
1. idem, p. 199 •
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which could achieve few positive benefits. Only the traumatic
events of 1937-39 could provide the renewal of enthusiasm which
was necessary for the emergence of permanent unionism. As it
was, under the influence of a few individuals of dynamic and
flamboyant personality, the movement to unionism swept the area
like a fever, acquiring in these months a raessianic character
which was lacking in earlier efforts. It was this semi-
religious fervour, born of desperation, which ensured that lab¬
our organisations would survive and grow, aided by the new atti¬
tude to trade union organisation among officials, employers and
middle-class, and by the wage concessions and improvement of con¬
ditions of which the unions could boast in these early years.
TRINIDAD.
It was in Trinidad that trade union development made
the greatest strides in this period. The continuing economic
depression after the conversion of the T.'/A into the TLP in 1932
had resulted in loss of popularity for Cipriani among some sect¬
ions of the workers, particularly in the oilfields area.*
Cipriani seemed unaware of the quickening tempo of laJsour dis¬
content, even though he was sufficiently convinced of the seri¬
ousness of the situation of increasing unemployment to sound
2
repeated warnings to the Government. Ills disavowal of the
1. cf. Lewis, op. cit; Ralph Mentor, Trade Unionism in
Trinidad. (19%67T
2. Trinidad Hansard, 1933-35» passim.
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Trade Unions Law continued in a refusal to sanction trade union
organisation -which was, in the end, fatal to the TLP. A sect¬
ion of the party catering for shop assistants and clerical work¬
ers was formed in 1933, (Lewis"*" calls it the Clerks' Union), but
it remained unregistered, even t ough its membership reached 5CO.
Ironically enough, it was the success of Cipriani in securing,
by constitutional action, a Minimum Wage Ordinance in 1935 that
led to the final discomfiture of the TLP, As long ago as 1920,
the Report of the Wages Committee had made recommendations for a
minimum wage, but no action had been taken on them. Cipriani
had continued to ask questions about the implementation of the
report in the Legislative Council from 1926 onwards, but no act¬
ion was taken in this regard until in 1935 a Board was set up
under the Ordinance to bring the Wages Committee Report up-to-
date. The Report of this Board, published in 1936, caused
widespread disillusion, as in many cases its recommendations
2
were lower than the current rates of wages. This is not sur¬
prising, as the earlier report was compiled in a boom period,
while in 1935 Trinidad was in the throes of depression. The
Minimum Wage fiasco made it clear that if workers were to find
relief from current distress, constitutional action in the Legis¬
lative Council was not enough.
There had been, in 193^, widespread strikes in the
1• Op. cit.
2. Mentor, op. cit; Trinidad Council Paper Ho. 88 of 1936.
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sugar district, and the following year a short strike in the
oilfields led to a hunger march of 120 men, who had become tem¬
porarily unemployed as a result of the strike, from Apex, in
the south of the island, to Port-of-Spain. The march, which
caused a sensation, was terminated aftox' intervention by
Cipriani, and trouble was averted.A At the head of this march
was Uriah Butler, who was to figure prominently in the Labour
Movement from then on. Butler was a Negro, native of Grenada,
who had arrived in the island in 1922 at the age of 30. He
2
has been described in the Forster Commission Report as "a
3
fanatical negro ... of extremist tendencies", while Dalley
regards him as "a curious phenomenon ... in his personality,
his phenomenal egocentricity, his wordly shrewdness and his
crude speeches and leaflets with their Biblical and religious
references ... more akin to a 17th Century 'Fifth Monarchy'
man than a 20th Century trade union leader." Much was made
of the history of mental derangement in his family. In fact,
Butler's role at this time was that of mouthpiece of the general
discontent. His obvious sincerity and bis willingness to run
the risks of leadership were more important than the unlettered
manner in which he expressed working-class sentiment.
1. cf. Mentor, op. cit; Cmd, 36%!, p. 58.
2. G.ad. 5641, PP» 37-3.
3. Col. No. 215, p. 14*.
The disenchantment of workers with the policies of
the TLP had led to the formation of two political groups with
more positive policies - the Negro Welfare and Cultural Assoc¬
iation in Port-of-Spain* and the Citizens' Welfare League in
San Fernando. liost of the members of the San Fernando group,
which was led by Adrian C. Rienzi, an Last Indian who had
studied law in England and had been associated with the social¬
ist movement taere, were ex-members of the TLP. Rienzi him¬
self had been chief organiser of the southern section of the
party, while Butler had been expelled from the TLP after the
1935 march. The aim of the CWL was to organise and educate
the people, and to secure the election to the Councils, both
Legislative ana Municipal, of representatives of workers in
1
South Trinidad. Butler was soon dissatisfied with a tact¬
ical policy as sterile as that of the TLP, and in 1936 he
formed the British Empire Workers' and Citizens* Home Rule
Party, to organise workers in the oilfields. By the next
year, he had attracted "100 paying members and 900 sympathis¬
ers ... (including) ... many who were prepared to adopt violent
2
methods.""' Sutler campaigned for support in his protest at
the rate of wages paid to oilworkers, and, receiving no reply
to his letters to the employers, advocated strike action. The
1. cf. for these developments, Calder-Marshall, op. cit.,
passim; Craig, op. cit.
2. Cad. 5641. p. 58.
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strike, which had been rumoured to begin on the 7th J;me, act¬
ually started on the lc_)th. The police had been preparing for
trouble - reinforcements had been posted in San Fernando and
at Fysabad oilfields - and a warrant was issued for the arrest
of Sutler on charges of "using violent language which might
lead to breach of the peace, and of counselling and inciting
the comsaission of breaches of the peace and acts of violence."
The strike had been orderly up to then.* It was only when the
attempt was made to arrest Butler as he was addressing a meet¬
ing of strikers that evening that the trouble bro out; the
crowd of some 200 put the police to flight. 3y the 21st the
disorder had spread to the Point Fortin oilfields and the Usine
Sainte Madeleine sugar estate; on the 2 hid it became general,
with outbreaks as far apart as Port-of-Spain and Rio Claro,
The immediate result of the oilfields strike was the
appointment of a Mediation Committee which secured a return to
work by strikers, and a promise from the oil companies to meet
workers* representatives. After prolonged deliberations, dur¬
ing which the employers* offers of an all round increase of one
peony an hour, a pension scheme, one week's holiday with pay,
and the rej-lacement of the identification card known as the
'Red Book*, which was regarded by labourers as an instrument of
2
victimisation, by a different system, were all rejected , the
1. C.md, 5641, pp. 57-74, for a description of the dis¬
turbances.
2. cf, Lewis, op. cit.
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oilworkers formed, on July 25th, the Oilfield Workers' Trade
Union, with Reinai as its first President. He had been act¬
ive during the disturbances as an intermediary between Butler,
who had gone into hiding, and the Mediation Committee, and had
been closely connected with the situation among the oilfield
workers•
It is obvious that the worker^ representatives must
have felt their lack of organisation a handicap in their delib¬
erations with the employers. The Butler party had had little
formal organisation, and was centred around the figure of its
leader. The decision to opt for orthodox trade union organ¬
isation was momentous in the fillip which it gave to the trade
union movement in Trinidad. On the announcement of the appoint¬
ment of the Forster Commission, the Union accepted provisionally
the offer of an increase of one penny an hour and suspended its
own claims - an increase of six cents an hour and 2 weeks holi¬
day with pay; the companies, on their part, abandoned the 'Red
Book' system.* The general expectation that the Forster Com¬
mission would make recommendations with regard to wages was not
fulfilled; the Commissioners felt that this was not only out¬
side their terms of reference, but was potentially harmful to
2
the development of collective bargaining in the colony. The
oil dispute was finally settled by an Arbitration Tribunal, the
rate being increased by four cents an hour.
1. idem.
2. Cad. 9641, p. 52.
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The connection between the June disturbances and the
growth of trade unionism is unmistabeable. Between August and
November, 1937» five unions were registered, three of them
industrial and two of them general. By the end of 1939 only
four more unions had been formed, not including the Civil Ser¬
vice Association and a general union formed in Tobago. Before
the disturbances, only one union had been registered.
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There was a close connection between several of these
unions, the result of the process of organisation from the top
which characterises trade unionism in the area at this period.
Rienzi and Macdonald Moses, who were the leading figures in
the (MTU, were also President and Vice-President of the sugar
workers' union, the ATSEFV/TU, which they organised at the
invitation of the sugar estate workers. The FWTU and the
ATTGtWTU were also formed as a result of active organisation
by Rienzi and Moses.* A second group was composed of the
SWWTU and the PWPSWTU, which were organised by the Negro Wel-
2
fare and Cultural Association, which Lewis calls "probably
the most radical (body) in the island ... with its more or
less raarxist philosophy and purely working class leadership."
In existence as a political group since at least 193^» It had
been active in organising meetings and demonstrations, and
calling attention to current labour distress. One of its
leaders, Jim Barratt, was imprisoned for sedition after the
1937 disturbances. The SWWTU and the PWPSWTU catered for the
two most important classes of workers in and around Port-of-
Spain, the waterfront workers and the unskilled Public 'Works
Department employees.
The reception which these new unions met with from
employers varied. The oilworkers* dispute had gone to arbit¬
ration only after the Industrial Adviser had intervened to
1. cf. Lewis, op. cit.
2. op. cit.
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prevent a recurrence of the strike begun in June. The ATSEFWTU,
after declaring a strike in April, 1938, after a conference with
the Sugar Manufactures* Association, 'which at first rejected its
claim for wage increases for field and factory workers, had
reached no solution, was forced to advise a return to work after
a fortnight. The failure of the Union was due, not to the
refusal ®f the workers to support the strike, but to the strat¬
agem adopted by the estates to persuade the canefarmers to work
as blacklegs rather than lose their crop. T'tis setback was a
serious blow to the organising activity of the ATSEFWTU, which
was already only poorly organised among the fieldhands who form
the majority of sugar workers.1 By contrast, the SWWTU secured
recognition from the shipping firms at the start of 1938, and
in December of that year concluded an agreement regarding wages
and hours which remained in force until 1946. The PIPS »TU,
also secured wage increases for Public Works employees after
3
negotiation with Government in its character as employer.
It has not proved possible to secure any accurate
figures for the membership of these unions before 1939. Lewis
claims that the PWPSWTU had a membership of 800 in 1939, while
„ 4
about 8,000 oilworkers, more than ^ of all those employed in
the industry, belonged to the OWTU.
1* idem.
Col. No. 215, p. 8.
3. Levyis, op. cit.
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JAMAICA.
The wave of unrest reached Jamaica last of the three
territories in this study. Before the disturbances actually
occurred, a number of unions came into being, and at least one
old union was revived. The old union was the Longshoremen's
Union No. 1 of the Jamaica Federation of Labour, which had been
established in 1919 (though it did not register as a trade union
until February 1922). It is possible that some of the dockers
who had belonged to the union in the 192C's were active in its
revival. In January, 1935* the revived union changed its
name to the People's Progressive Union No. 1, Jamaica Federation
of Labour.* There is nothing to show that it ever functioned.
In 1935 the Jamaica Workers1 and Tradesmen's Union was formed
under the presidency of A.Q.S. Coombs; a general union which
had some support among agricultural workers as well as among
dock labourers in Montego Bay, it claimed a membership of 5*000
, 2
in 193b* The Kingston branch of the JWTU launched out on its
own in that year as the Builders and Allied Trades Union. In
1937 the Jamaica United Clerks Association was formed among
shop assistants in Kingston at a meeting held on November 26th;
n.
by the end of 1938 it claimed 1,500 members. A Hotel Employ¬
ees Association was formed in that year as well, and Hart
1. Files of Registrar of Trade Unions, Jamaica.
2. Lewis, op. cit, Hart, op, cit, p. 27.
3. Clerks Union Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1938.
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records a Motor Cnmibus and Taxi Drivers Association which
seems to have ceased to function before it could be registered.
An interesting titbit about some of these unions is the length
of time which elapsed between their formation and registration.
The failure of the BATU is ascribed in the official
police report to the Kingston workers* lack of confidence in
the sponsors of the union, lack of funds, dissension among the
leaders, their inexperience and ignorance of trade unionism.
In the police view, "the tradesmen and agitators forming it
were almost without exception low-class scamps with a gift for
talking and little else", who would willingly have used trade
unionism as a means to gain a livelihood.1 The activities
of the BATU were regarded as having contributed to discontent
among the Kingston workers, and a demonstration by unemployed
ex-servicemen in August 1937 was broken up by the police riot
squad. A series of minor strikes throughout 1937 resulted in
increases for banana labourers, but unrest continued, and one
stoppage at the Serge Island sugar estate in St. Thomas was
2
particularly serious.
Considerable attention was being attracted at this
time by the series of public meetings conducted in and around
Kingston by Alexander Bustamante, a remarkable figure even in
an area of flamboyant personalities. A "tall, lean-faced
1. Police Report on Recent Labour Riots and Disorders,
Jamaica, 1938.
2. Report of Jamaica Disturbances Commission, May-June. 1938.
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individual, with the high cheek-bones, flashing eyes and wild,
unruly mop of hair . *. as paradoxical a figure in the events
which were to follow as he was a paradox even in himself .
Busta was to become the most widely known labour leader in the
Caribbean, the first Chief Minister of Jamaica, and a knight.
He is described as an 'educated and clever ••• agitator .
(who) elected to espouse the cause of labour and quickly ousted
2
all other labour agitators from the position of leadership."
A wonderful orator with a likeable personality and a flair for
the dramatic, he first appears on the Jamaican scene as a money-
3
leader in 1934. Early accounts of his career vary; but they
all agree that he was adopted as a child by a Spanish couple
whose name he took (he was born Clarke) and had a story-book
career of adventures and occupations in the Spanish Moroccan
campaign, in Latin America and in the United States. Origin¬
ally a member of the JifTU which he must have left at the same
time as the other BATU organisers, he preached a campaign of
labour organisation which reached its height in the weeks
4
before the Kingston riots.
These disturbances had been preceded by a strike
among construction workers at the West Indies Sugar Company's
1. Makin, op. cit., p. 44.
2. Police Report, Jamaica*
3« idem; Makin, op. cit., p. 45* ! *
4. Police Report; Makin, op, cit., p. 6l.
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new factory at Frome in Westmoreland. This incident, which
was complicated by various local grievances and by the presence
of a large number of job-seekers who could not be employed,
resulted in four deaths, and was brought under control only
after the despatch of most of the police reserves from Kingston.1
The tension in Jamaica at the time is conveyed by the fantastic
2
rumours which Makin says were current after the Frame disturb¬
ance on May 2nd*
There were to be simultaneous outbreaks all over
the island, Kingston was to be denuded of armed
police, and then, Kingston itself would revolt ..
News of the disturbances in Trinidad and Barbados, which had
been fully reported in the Jamaica press, contributed to the
tension. It is held too, that the belief of many people in
country districts that on August 1st 1938, the centenary of
the abolition of slavery, would be fulfilled a Royal promise to
give the land to the Negroes which had been made before Eman-
3
cipation » helped to foment the widespread feeling of unrest.
The first minor strikes on the waterfront in Kingston
between May iith and 20th which mark the start of the general
disturbances were quickly settled. On the 21st, there was
!• Westmoreland Disturbances Commission, Report, 1938.
2* op. cit., p. 58,
3, Police Report, Jamaica. This view was advanced by
Frank Hill, who had been active in the Labour Movement in
the 1930's, as late as 1956.
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a complete stoppage on the docks, the result of claims for
higher wages. A strike of strecfc-eleanere on the morning of
Monday 23rd soon became a riot, as people on the way to work
threw their lot in with the strikers. The next day transport
workers struck, and Bustamant^ who had been prevented from
holding public meetings, was arrested along with his chief
lieutenant, St. William Grant, when they tried to induce the
Fire Brigade to come out on strike. It was a day of ugly
incidents and shooting in the city. On the 28th "the wharf
labourers refused to consider any settlement of their dispute
with their employers until Bustamante and Grant were released."'''
Bustamante was released; Norman Manley, the leading barrister
in the island came forward to act as taediator and to speak for
the strikers, who were eventually granted an increase of 2d.
an hour, double time on Sunday, and overtime." The disorders
had spread to the country districts meantime, strikes on sugar
and banana estates in various parts of the island and among
wharf labourers at Montego Bay and Port Morant being accom¬
panied by rioting and violence. The situation did not become
normal again until the middle of June, by which time 8 people
had been killed, 32 wounded by gunshot and 139 injured other-
•2
wise; 7%3 prosecutions resulted from these disturbances.
1. Police Report, Jamaica.
2. idem.
3. Jamaica Disturbances Commission, Report.
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The formation of the Bustamante Industrial Trade
Union was the most important sequel to these disorders. The
martyr*® halo which his arrest had won him swept enthusiastic
workers into the union from July onwards, and by 1939 he could
claim over 50,000 union members.1 From the start, and by the
very nature of its formation, the union was obliged to adopt
a 'blanket* character. It had a central executive, and work¬
ers divided into industrial sections, seven in number, for
Transport, General, Maritime, Municipal, and Factory Workers,
Artisans, and Clerks. Each section was presided over by a
Vice-President; these, together with the General Secretary
and the President, formed the Executive Council. In addition,
2
the union had branches organised on the basis of locality.
The constitution endowed the President with office for life
3
and executive authority of an almost despotic nature.
The extensive membership of the union soon began to
pose problems with which its embryonic organisation could not
deal effectively. The wave of minor strikes continued into
1939 and the Union was faced with unauthorised stoppages one
after another, particularly among the agricultural workers.
As union discipline was virtually unknown, and the island's
system of internal communications made for rural isolation,
1* Lewis, op. cit.
2, See Memo of W.A. Bustasaante on B1TU, 23/11/^5. CLC Papers*
3. Rules of the BITTU.
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the unauthorised stoppage took on the character of a fait
accompli which the union had to acknowledge to maintain its
popularity, and which could often be resolved only by the per¬
sonal intervention of the leader himself*
Four other trade unions were registered in Jamaica
in the 1938-39 period, though none of them acquired any import¬
ance. The formation of the Trades Union Advisory Council in
1939 and the subsequent split in the trade union movement in
Jamaica are discussed in Chapter VI along with other develop¬
ments in trade unionism. The immediate result of the working-
class revolution in Jamaica was the emergence of one gigantic
organisation which bid fair to be the nucleus of a unified
national labour movement.
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JHEA 1. 12. 37 Hotel Workers
JUCA 7. 4. 38 Shop Assistants
BATU 12# 7. 38 General Union
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In some ways British Guiana had had its revolution
before the 1930,s, and the general disturbances which occurred
in Jamaica and Trinidad had no parallel there# The city
workers had been highly organised in the 8GLU, and even though
its membership had fallen off, the union continued to exist
and was a potential vehicle for the expression of labour griev¬
ances# The union's success in obtaining various minor relief
measures such as garden lots for city workers helped to soften
the effects of the slump in Georgetown. It was among the
East Indian labourers in the country that serious disturbances
occurred, in February, 1939#
The major advance in labour organisation in British
Guiana in the 1930's was the formation in 193& of the Man Power
Citizen^* Association, to organise the East Indian Sugar Work¬
ers. By 1939 the MPCA could claim 10,000 members, 9<3% of
these employed on sugar estates, with 41 district secretaries;
it had penetrated to every estate and village in the territory.*
The officials of the union were most of them professional men,
the committee of 12 including two jeivellers, a doctor, a journ¬
alist, a Hindu Priest, a merchant, and an ex-planter. This
was inevitable in view of the low standards of literacy among
East Indian sugar estate workers in the country; Its middle-
class officialdom, too, was responsible for the largely political
1. MPCA, Foundation Souvenir, 1936-9*
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character of the association, as contained in its programme.
It did not focus its attention primarily on winning wage
increases for its members, like the more militant unions in
Jamaica and Trinidad, Its concern ranged from labour legis¬
lation to constitutional and economic reform. It was critical
of the impartiality of the Labour Commissioner and of the
Police.*
The MPCA was registered under the trade union ordin¬
ance in 1937» however. After the spontaneous disturbances at
Leonora in February, 1939» in which 20 estate workers were
killed, the MPCA signed an agreement with the sugar employers
which accorded it recognition as the bargaining agent for
estate workers, and gave it the right to hold meetings on the
2
estates. This was a significant gain for the Association
which had complained previously that "many of the members and
District Secretaries have been victimised, penalised, oppressed
3
and evicted." lis success led to fears among the Negro work¬
ers that its racial character might eventually lead to trouble;
but it was the Associations policy to welcome Negroes, who
were useful because of their generally better education which
enabled them to assist with union administration. The Presi-
J.





cf. Lewis, op. cit.
MPCA, Foundation Souvenir, 1936-9*
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1940*8 was J.L. Griffiths who had helped Critehlovir to form
the BGLU in the 1920*s.
A number of smaller unions emerged, almost exclus¬
ively among Negro workers, in the years 1937-39* The strength
of organisation among government employees was partly an indi¬
cation of the benevolent attitude to labour of the admini¬
stration of the day, and also the result of Government's being
the most important employer of non-agricultural labour. Lewis
mentions one union, the B.G. Miners* Association, which does
not appear on the register.
Table XIV.
Registered Trade Unions, British Guiana
1933 - 1939
Abbreviated Name Registration Date Character
MPCA 5. 11. 37 General
BGSU 16, 2. 38 Seamen
wu 23. 3. 58 Transport
BGPOWU 30. 6. 38 Post Office
SMEU to CO • 9. 58 Medical Employees
BGCGW 4. 10. 38 General
SGEA 6. 10, 58 Gov't Employees
BGCA 1. 8, 39 Clerks
MMU 4. 9. 39 Moulders
BGSU (2) 28. 11. 39 rfood Sawyers




LABOUR MOVEMENTS SINCE 1939.
The developr.ent of Labour flovesuents in the British
Caribbean since 1939 is remarkable for the rapidity and com¬
pleteness with which organised labour has been accepted in
all spheres of social, economic and political life. Trade
unionism is now no longer regarded as disreputable - it is,
on the contrary, considered to be a valuable stabilizing
influence in the community* Leadership of a trade union
has become a vehicle for social and political advancement.
In politics, not only is leadership anxious to win and retain
working-class support, but the Labour or Socialist party has
been for many years the form of political organization most
likely to win electoral success. Labour leaders, instead of
being ostracized, prosecuted and treated as agitators, now
find themselves on co mittees, delegates at conferences,
persons of importance who must be consulted about decisive
events in the affairs of the territory, and welcome guests
at official functions.
This new situation is the logical outcome of the
social revolution of the 1930*s and of the reforms which
resulted from it. The acceptance of organised labour was
not automatic, however, either among employers or among the
middle class. It was made possible by the official attitude
of encourage sent to trade unionism, by the decision of a
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number of respected men, most of them professionals, to
participate in the movement, by the identification of organised
labour with nationalism and the demand for self-government,
and by the constitutional reforms which, from the end of
World far II on?/ards, put political power effectively in the
hands of the working class voter through the medium of adult
suffrage. Although in practice Governments have not always
conformed to the spirit of encouragement in their dealings
with trade unions, and in spite of opposition from employers
which has led to a number of serious and prolonged strikes,
trade unionism has grown steadily.
a It is in the field of politics that organised labour
in the British Caribbean has made the greatest advances by
comparison with the pre-1934 scene. Only in Trinidad had
there been anything like organised labour politics, in the
form of the activities of the TwA.1 The BGLU in British
Guiana had made political demands, but its interests had
been mainly industrial. In the first rus s of organising
enthusiast,i which had followed the working class revolution,
little attention was paid to political organisation, This
was understandable. The revolution had been triggered off
by immediate economic grievances, and its spontaneous
1. above, pp. 209-220.
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character gave any organisations which emerged the role of
organs of social protest that were not exclusively economic
or political or social, but a combination of all three.
Trade unionism was not only the most effective form or organi-
s tion for securing immediate economic relief; it was also a
.tore active and dynamic kind of association than a olitical
arty, and so, more suited to the needs of the moment. Under
the constitutions which were in existence, political activity
must needs be slow and unrewarding and as the examples of the
Cipriani and self-government movements s ow, likely to prove
futile.
In the troubled years which receded the riots,
some political groups had emerged - the Negro Welfare and
1 2
Cultural Association and the Citizens' Welf;*re League" in
Trinidad, and a number of Citizens' Associations in Jamaica.
Some of the people who took the lead in these groups held
socialist beliefs. There are also references which indicate
3
the existence of a Left Book Club in Jamaica, though our
ef forts to discover more about its activities at the time
have so far been unsuccessful. But in Trinidad the leaders
of these as ociations turned their attention to trade union
organisation in the first he. t of the disturbances, and
political activity was further hindered by the kind of police
1. above, p. 2?1
2. above, p. 267.
3* Daily Gleaner, 1936-39• passim.
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intervention described by Calder-Marshall.* No political
association appe rs to have been formed in British Guiana
at this time, although the MICA had a distinctive political
com lexion. It was only in Jamaica that a Socialist Party
sprang up within a few months of the riots.
The advent of World War II in 1939 meant a tem¬
porary slowing up in the pace of developments in organised
labour. Many labour leaders were imprisoned - Bustamante
and Butler among them - as precautionary measures, while
special Defence Regulations were enforced which limited the
right to strike in essential services and imposed other
restrictions upon labour activity. Some labour leaders, too,
relinquished their demands of their own accord for the
duration - the People's National Party in Jamaica, for
example, meeting on September 3rd, 1939, declared its
support for the United Kingdom and announced that it would
abstain from agitating for constitutional reform during the
2
course of the war. Wartime conditions affected the employ¬
ment situation and the cost of living} the building of U.S.
bsc-s, the acceptance of West Indians for war service, the
rice controls and rationing which were introduced, created
an artificial economic situation -which, allied to emotional
and other factors, took much of the impetus out of the
surging labour movements.
1. op. cit. pp. 205-210
2. PNP, Report of 1st Annual Conference, p. 12.
» 237 -
A brief survey of the main trends of development
in each territory from 1933 to 1955 follows.
Developments in Jamaica after 1953
After the formation of the BITU, the most impor¬
tant development in the emerreat Labour Movement in Jamaica
was the founding on August 28th, 1938 of the People's
National Party. It arose out of a conference, called on
the initiative of Norman W. Manley, of delegates from every
parish in the island, and from the Kingston and St. Andrew
Federation of Citizens' Associations, the National Reform
Association, the Jamaica Progressive League and the Jamaica
Union of Teachersit was in essence, therefore, a middle
class party at its formation, and this is reflected in the
composition of its Steering Committee, which consisted of a
number of distinguished professional men, among them being
Manley himself, H.P. Jacobs, N.N. Nethersole, C.T. Fairclough
and V.G. McFarlane. Its objects were, among others, to
develop the political life of the island, to organise it
into a cou try of small settlers, farmers and workers, and
"ultimately to earn and achieve political self-determination
2
and responsibility as a National Unit"; it was to be organ¬
ised on the basis of geographical party groups, with delegates
from these groups meeting in parochial (regional) conferences
to select candidates for elections, and in party conference
1. PNP, Report of the It Annual Conference, 1939, p.4.
2. PNP, Constitution
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to elect annually the General Council.* The PNP drew much
of its inspiration fro : the British Labour Party, on which
its organisation was modelled; at the public meeting to
launch the party which met with enthusiastic reception, the
chief speaker was Sir Stafford Cripps.
Since the PKP had been born cut of the worki g-
class revolution and supported 'the develc.ment of Organised
Labour' in its official policy - Manley had proclaimed him¬
self to be an avowed and genuine believer in the Trade Union
2
movement in Jamaica - some rapprochement with the BITU was
inevitable. Accordingly, "the Chairman was authorised to
open discussions withthe Bustamante Unions for the purpose
of defining their relations with the Party". It is prob¬
able that what was envisaged was the sort of relations ip
which exists between the British Labour Party and the Trade
Unions. No formal agreement was reached, but Bustamante
.joined the PNi in January, and "for some months to come the
3
Party and the Unions worked in open but unofficial alliance". *~
Busta.iante appears to have consider d trade unio activity
more important than politics at this time. In an address
at the 1st General Conference of the BITU on January 7th, 1939,
1. ibid.
2. Manley to Governor in Gleaner. 21st February, 1939.
3. PNP, Report of 1st Annual Conference, p.5«
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he gave his view:^
I thin the most important job now is
to organise labour thoroughly, and
when that has been accomplished I
can thin £ about going up for the
(Legislative) Council*
The alliance between the SITU and the PNP led
to the formation in February 1939 of the Trade Unions
Advisory Council. As a result of the threat of a general
strike called by the MTU in support of its demands for
waterfront workers, Emergency Regulations had been put
into force, and armed guards were protecting strikebreaker s
on the docks. In this situation it appeared that many of
Labour's hard-won gains would be lost, and the decision to
call out sugar workers in sympathy to coerce the Shipping
Companies was criticised. Trade unionism, not yet really
welcomed by all sections of the community, was beginning
to assume a mantle of irresponsibility which the dramatic
boasts of Busta mnte served only to make more alarming.
The Tra e Unions Advisory Council was formed at
a meeting convened by Manley under these circumstances,
for the purpose of strengthening and unifying the trade
union movement; it was to include all existing trade unions.
The composition of the Council, again, reveals a large
1. Gleaner, 9th January, 1939.
2. Minutes of Inaugural rieeting in CLC Papers.
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element of professional men. It was admitted that very-
few of them knew much about trade unionism, and that one of
their first tasks was to educate themselves. At this meeting,
which elected a Committee with Nethersole as chairman and
A. Richard Hart as Secretary, the dispute between Bustamante
and A.O.S. Coombs, which had existed ever since Bustamante
left the JWTU, was patched up. The Council aimed at organ¬
ising workers into occupational unions, each to comprise
related groups of workers, with one union for each group of
occupations. There were to be nine such unions. Interloping
unions, or those which refused to fall into the occupational
framework, would be discouraged. The TUAC would audit union
accounts and advise about financial matters, and would keep
statistical records relating to Trade Unionism in the Island.*
A public reconciliation between Bustauante, Coombs and E.E.A,
Campbell, a barrister and Member of the Legislative Council
who was also president of the JUCA, signified the new spirit
of unity.
The newly found unity was not to last. In April,
Bustamante resigned from the Council in disagreement over
the constitution adopted by the TUAC at two meetings from
which he was absent; the provisional draft, however, had
been accepted by him and had not been substantially altered
for adoption. The causes of the disagreement were the
1. Draft Constitution in CLC Papers.
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decision to allow for representation of Unions on the
Council, but to limit any one union's representatives to
five, and the requirement that affiliated unions should be
organised and run democratically.^ The first provision
would operate to the disadvantage of the BITU, which was
more than five times as large as all the other unions put
together; the second would affect the position of Bustamante
hisisself and his control ove the BITU. With his resignation
the TUAC was dissolved, and the Labour Movement in Jamaica
split into two irreconcilable halves. The split, when
viewed in retrospect, was almost inevitable. The revolu¬
tionary character of the BITU, and the dominant personality
of Bustamante, could hardly have been harnessed to the
highly disciplined organisation which i anley, himself a
strong personality, was trying to build. The socialism
of the PNP, too, was an irritant - as early as February, 1939
Bustamante had been complaining about having to work on the
TUAC with Richard Hart, its secretary, who was later expelled
2
fro-;, the PNP for his communist views."
The PNP next set about developing a trade union
wing of its own. Ken Hill, Richard Hart, and Floriziel
Glasspole embarked on a programme of organising workers who
were not already involved with the BITU; they had their
main successes in and around Kingston among manual government
1. PNP, Report of 1st Annual Conference, pp.7-8
2. Gleaner, February-March, 1939
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employees, municipal and parish council workers, railway
and transport workers and employees in the catering trade.
Ken Hill had been a Vice-President of the B1T0 before the
split and was the most popular trade union figure in the
PNP camp at this time; he was one of the few leading trade
unionists who was not a professional or white-collar worker.
The TUAC was revived in the guise of the Trades Union Congress,
with Nethersole as chairman. Its rules stipulated that
affiliate unions must have written into their constitutions
provisions for regular elections of officers, safeguarding
of union funds, and no restrictions against members "on the
grounds of race, colour, religious or political beliefs or
affiliations." The extent of the PKP's success in organ¬
ising trade unions at this time is illustrated by the fact
that of 30 trade unions registered between 194c and 1944, 13
were later amalgamated (along with the JUCA) in July, 1949
when the TUC was transformed into one composite functioning
union.* Of the remaining 1?, only 3 were functioning when
the amalgamation took place.
The alignment of organised labour in Jamaica into
two hostile camps was completed with the granting of a new
,, 2
constitution to the island in 1944. Hitherto, the PNP
had had a clear field in politics as Bustamante confined his
attentions to trade union organisation. The party's decision
1. Files of Registrar of Trade Unions, Jamaica.
2, above, pp. 20-21.
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to forego agitation for self-government had not prevented
it from taking the lead in discussions for an advanced
form of constitution when it was decided to alter the
existing one. Bustamante, on the other hand, had not been
particularly concerned with political devel -aents. With
elections scheduled to take place at the end of 1944-, however,
he suddenly' formed, in opposition to the PNP, the Jamaica
Labour Party. The JLP was, in effect, merely a convenient
political name for the BITU; it had no organisation or mass
membership independent of the union. Its candidates were
adopted in the same ay as all candidates sponsored by
caususes in. the area - they were merely a number of prominent
men who accepted the label of the party for purposes of the
election. The success of the JLP, however, its association
with the BITU and with the governing of the island, and the
existence of an opposition in the PNP, helped to mould it
into a permanent association.
Labour Politics in Jamaica
The PNP and the JLP, between them, have dominated
the Jamaican political scene completely since 1944. This
]y into a battle
has turned politics in the island pare
between the two rival personalities, Parley and Bustamante,
and partly into a clash of rival political ideals. The PNP,
avowedly a socialist party, had as its initial policy a
comprehensive programme of social and economic reforms which
stressed the need for a planned economy, which included a
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large measure of nationalisation;^
The Industrial Programme of the Party involves
(a) The state ownershixj of all public utilities.
(b) The Public ownership of all Industries
which enjoy a complete monopoly.
(c) Public ownership or effective state control
of all Industries which enjoy or require
subsidies fron public funds.
By the 1950 elections, however, the PNP, defeated soundly
in 1944 and accused of communism by its opponents, had
modified its nationalisation programme to include two
public utilities - light and Power, and Telephone Services,
the cost of both of which was extremely high - and nothing
2
more. The difficulties of nationalisation as illustrated
by the experience of the British Labour Party in the inter¬
vening years niav have contributed to this departure from
jjrinciple.
The JLP, on the other hand, has made little use of
the ideological propaganda traditionally associated with
Labour Movements; on the contrary, it lias plumped for
free enterprise rather than socialism, has proclaimed its
belief in co-operation between Capital and Labour, and
opposed se1f-gover.jaent. One observer has described it
as "an organ of conservatism". The JLP made no pretence
1. Outline of the Policy and Programme of the PNP,
April, 1939.
2. Why you should join the PNP, (Election Pamphlet, 1949).
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at believing in a planned economy, bat placed e iphasis
on the material benefits to the individual worker to be
gained by returning the party to power. It has placed
gre t reliance on the frankly charismatic appeal of Busta-
niante, and on his record of service:1
WORKERS OF JAMAICA
WORKING MEN AND WOMEN
OF AL CLASSES...
Vote for the man who has worked
for you for twelve years, for the
man who has done more for the working
people of Jamaica than any other
person or group, who ha secured higher
pay and better condit ons for Jamaica's
workers.
VOTE LABOUR
Vote for Bustamante and the J.L.P.
The reaction of the PNP to the success of this
sort of campaign has been to free itself from the charges
of communism which have been levelled at it, and to emulate
the JLP by building Manley up into a father-figure, "Father
of the Nation". The party, from its inception, had to
2
rebut charges of communism in its ranks, and the official
1. JLP Election Pamphlet, 1949*
2. See, e.g., Gleaner, 6th March, 1939*
Jamaica Arise, 19^5* passim.
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party reply that all members of the party were bound to
observe its fundamental principles had been unconvincing
and evasive. The left wing of the PNP had been strengthened
by the internment of some of the party's organisers during
1
the war; three of its leading trade unionists, Ken Hill,
Richard Hart, and Frank Hill, were admitted communists. A
rift between left and right wings in the party in 19^9 had
been patched up because of the approach of the elections,
which the PMP lost. Whether the desire to make itself
acceptable to the electorate by expelling its known com¬
munist members was the main reason for the purge which the
party undertook in 1952 is not clear - there have been hints
of a struggle for power within the party between Glasspole
and Nethersole on the one hand^ and Hart and Ken Hill on
the other, which allege that the communist leanings of the
left were used merely as a convenient excuse.
The expulsion of its left wing, the fruits of its
policy of building up party groups in every district of the
island, the rising unemployment in Jamaica which had led to
large-scale migration to the United Kingdom since 1950, and
which was sure to affect the JLP vote, and the reputation
which the PNP had been fostering as a party for planned
progress and intelligent government, all contributed to
its success in the 1955 elections.
1. cf. T.S. Siraey - "Colonial Policy on Trial -









































Trade Unionise in Jamaica
Developments in trade unionism in Jamaica have
been dominated by the early ascendancy acquired by the BITU,
and by the policy of the PNP to build up a rival group of
democratically run trade unions. After the urge of the
PNP in 1952, the TUC, which was controlled by the group
which had been expelled from the party* severed its con¬
nection with the PNP, which then formed the National Workers'
Union as a replacement. Although active in the regional
trade union movement in the Caribbean, however, the NWU
has made little headway in Jamaica itself; it can claim
only approximately 6% of all trade union membership. The
close relationship between trade unions and rival political
groups in Jamaica ha meant not only rivalry but actual
hostility between competing unions. This factor, though
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deplorable froni the point of view of trade union unity, is
less detrimental than might be expected because of the
pattern of union membership. Although 96^ of all trade
union members were concentrated in 3 unions, while 8 others
had less than ¥/» between them, in 1955* the vast siae of the
BITU reduces the danger of this political rivalry, and of the
representational disputes which are its conseque ce, for the
working class as a whole. The figures for 1955 are not ex¬
ceptional, and reflect a pattern which obtains throughout the
period. Trade union membership has increased from 1500 before
the 1938 disturbances, and 13, 500 in March 1940 to 58,500
in 1946 and 93,370 in 1955.1
Table XVI
Size of Trade Unions, Jamaica, 1955
Name Non-Paying Aggregate % of Total
BITU 49,804 16,885 66,689 71.3
TUC 6,300 12,370 18,670 20.0
NWU 1,842 3,133 • 5,025 5.4
8 others 1.859 ,1,217 3,076 3.3
59,805 33,655 93,460 100.0
Source: Annual Report, 1955.
In spite of the larger organisations i . Jamaican trade
unionism, and perhaps because of them, there has bee 1 a high
rate of mortality among trade unions. This is a feature
common to the other territories in the area as well,
1. Trade Unionism in Jamaica, 1918-46; Annual Report, 1953.
- 299 -
but it is particularly noticeable in Jamaica because of the
greater willingness shown by the Registrar of Trade Unions
to declare moribund associations dissolved or cancel their
registration under powers given him by the Trade Unions Law.
Seven of the nine unions formed between 1937 and 1939 have
failed to survive, while only six of the 21 formed during the
next decade (excluding those amalgamated to form the TUG)
still existed in 1955* Only the BITU can claim an unbroken
history since the working class revolution. The tendency
4 t
to form new unions still continues, 8 of them having been
registered since 1950.
The most serious problem which the developing
trade union movement in Jamaica has had to face, once it
had outgrown an early tendency to brandish the strike weapon
rather in the manner of big stick diplosaacy, has been the
number of jurisdictional disputes between the big rival
unions over the right to bargain for various groups of
workers. This problem first became serious in the months
after the elections of December 19^9, when the TUC amal¬
gamation had increased the bargaining power of the Manley
group of unions. Hie TUC representatives blamed blanket
agreements, to which workers belonging to minority unions
objected, and agreements in which employers promised to give
preference to members of a particular union, for this state
of affairs, and rejected the idea of political causation.1
1. Board of Enquiry into Labour Disputes between Trade
Unions, 1950, Report.
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The Board found that "the causes of this type of political
unrest are ..... basically inherent in the existing union-
political set-up...", even though the genuine grievances of
ivorkers faced with a rising cost of living were of equal
1 m.
importance. line solution adopted for these disputes was
a secret ballot at the place of work to determine which
union should have bargaining rights, the union winning 31%
of the votes being recognised. Between 1950 and 195'*» 79
of these polls were taken; in one dispute in the sugar
industry in 1951, the BJ.TU, up till then recognised as the
bargaining agent, agreed to negoti te jointly with the TUC
2
and to have polls taken on those estates claimed by Congress•
This agreement between the BITU and the TUC
symbolises the increasing maturity of the Jamaican Trade
Union Movement, which is no doubt due, not only to greater
familiarity with collective bargaining procedure and the
increased respectability that comes from social acceptance,
but also to the emergence of trade nion leaders, such as
Hugh Shearer (BITU), Ken Stirling and Thomas Kelly (NV/U),
who are themselves workers, and first and foremost trade
unionists. This maturity is reflected in the fact that
while 97 strikes occured out of lk7 disputes in 19^5, only
in 18 of the 118 disputes which were reported in 1955 was
recourse had to strike action.
1. ibid.
2. Report on the Achievements of the Jamaica Labour
Department. 19'5-54.
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Developments in British Guiana
There was little political activity on the part
of organised labour during the war years, though the MPCA
had a political wing. Labour may have been silenced by the
fact that both Critchlow, who was still Secretary of the BGLU,
and Ayube M. Edun, President of the MPCA, had been invited by
t e Governor to sit as nominated members in the Legislative
Council*
Trade Unionism, however, was making great strides*
From 2 unions with 266 members at the start of 1937 the
movement had grown to 15 unions with 3»6ll financial members
in 19^1, and to 27 unions with 6,279 members by 1946.* As
was the ca.se in our other territories as well, the movement
was much larger if one considered non-paying members as well*
The MPCA, for instance, could claim a membership of approxi¬
mately 22,000 in 1941, only 1,310 of whom had paid their sub¬
scriptions. The tendency to a multiplicity of small unions
was already apparent in British Guiana in 1941; of the 15
unions then in existence, 5 had less than 50 members, 5
others had less than 100 members, three had between 100 and
2
250 members, and two had just over 1,000. These last two,
though, were general unions both catering for sugar workers
in particular - the MPCA and the BGSFL - and only one other
general ani> n, a art from the BGLU, had been set up*
1. Files of Registrar of Trade Unions, British Guiana.
2. ibid.
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Perhaps it was this tendency to fragmentation
that caused the failure of the Trade Union Council which was
set up in March, 1941; it could attract no more than the
three founder unions by the end of 1942, as a result of
disagreement among delegates over the rules to be adopted.*
By 1944, however, awareness of the need for the TUC prevailed,
13 of the 23 unions on the register were affiliated, including
the MPCA and 3GLU, and more than 80% of all trade unionists.
Among its objects were the furtherance of lawful political
2
objectives affecting labour, and the settlement of disputes.
The ideal of amalgamating some unions was advocated by a TUC
Committee, appointed in December, 1945 to consider the question
of trade union membership, but it was opposed by constituent
x
unions for practical and political reasons. The unions in¬
volved appear to have been the BGWL and the MPCA, the one led
by A.A. Thorne, a Negro, the other by Ayube Edun and particu¬
larly strong among East Indians. Both unions were concerned
with organising sugar workers, for iirhom the MPCA had been
k
recognised as the bargaining body as long ago as 1939# In
194.5 the Sugar Producers Association signed an agreement with
1. British Guiana Department of Labour, Renort, 1942.
2. BGTUC, Revised Rules, 1946.
3. British Guiana Department of Labour, Report, 1946.
4. See above, p# 281
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the BGvVL recognising its right to have representatives on
joint committees on 26 estates."'" ]Rrcm 1946 the MPCA became
disaffiliated from the TUC.
The political complexion of the issues affecting
trade unionism which began to arise at this time is confirmed
by a Report on the Trade Union and Political Situation in
2
British Guiana, written c. 1946;
Politically the East Indian politician® have
united the Indian masses behind them and it
is probably they would sweep a general
election on universal suffrage, as the
Indian masses would vote racial regard¬
less of the wealth of most Indian poli¬
ticians. This has given rise to an anti-
progressive stand on the part of some of
the Trade Union Council leaders (Negro)
like Thorne, the President, who oppose
universal suffrage.
The split in the trade union movement did not
acquire a clear-cut racial complexion, as can be seen from
the composition of the British Guiana Labour Party in the
1>47 elections. The BGLP was in reality a caucus of TUC
leaders and prominent people sympathetic to labour. It was
formed in October, 194? to contest the November elections,
with Critchlovr as President and Aston Chase, who was to be
1. Memo in CLC Papers.
2. In CLC Papers. It is undated, but its contents indicate
that it was written before the elections of November,
1947.
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Critchlow's successor as secretary of the 8GLU and a minister
in the PPP government of 1953» as secretary. There were four
East Indians on its executive committee, and five among its
fourteen candidates. The BGLP's policy is interesting in
view of later developments in British Guiana. In addition
to the objective of Responsible Self-Government for the
country within five years, and the usual platform of social
reforms, it advocated:*'
1) Immediate constitutional changes, a legislature
of twenty-four members, adult suffrage, the abolition of
property and income qualifications for members, and wholly
elected local authorities;
2) Full employment, a 4(>-hour week, a saving wage,
and development of secondary industries;
3) Nationalisation of "certain industries", and
public utilities, comjmlsory investment by Firms registered
outside of British Guiana of 40% of their net profits in
the country, a discriminatory tax on foreign-owned primary
producing industries, and a development plan for the interior;
4) Legal enforcement of the closed shop in Govern¬
ment services and essential industries.
In the elections, the BGLP won five seats to the
MPCAfs one - the MPCA had sponsored six candidates, only one
of whom, Dr. J.B. Singh, was successful; it is likely that
Dr. Singh, who was a prominent and popular personality in
BGU\ Policy Pamphlet. 1947.
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his own right, would have won even without the sponsorship
of the HFCA* Among the SGLP candidates elected were
Critehlow and Theophilus Lee, a Chinese, and President of
the Cosmopolitan Workers Union, who had been the only pro-
Labour elected member in the old Legislative Council. Of
the other candidates elected, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, who stood
as an Independent Labourite for Central Demerara on a plat¬
form described as "openly Communistic",* joined the 8GLP
immediately; his wife, Janet, was defeated in Central George¬
town by John Fernandes, an independent of "socialist aym-
pathies".1'*" Two of the other independents elected were
regarded as pro-socialist. The 'victory for the left*
which these elections seemed to herald was wasted, however.
The BGLP failed to agree on the reply to the Governor's
official statement of policy, and rapid disintegration
followed. The political organisation of Labour was to be
postponed until the formation of PPP two years later.
The PPP and the 1953 Crisis
The most important development in the history of
organised labour in British Guiana since 1939 was the coming
of the People's Progressive Party to power in 1953 and the
subsequent suspension of the constitution of the country,
which was followed by a split in the party's ranks. It is
not possible to do more than give a brief outline here of the
1. Deacon, 15th November, 194?.
2* Beacon, 29th November, 1947»
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b ckground to the crisis, and of the sequence of events since.
After the failure of the BGLP to survive in 19W,
the Jagans founded the Political Affairs Committee in order
to keep labour politics alive.* Out of this Committee the
PPP iras born in 1950. Multi-racial in character, it appears
from the start to have been composed of three elements: a
left wing, to which Jagan, Sydney King, Westmass and Martin
Carter belonged; a less doctrinaire section, whose members
were, none the less, fond of using the socialist terminology
popular in "progressive circles" at that time - Burnham was
one of this group; and a third group, composed of people
who were important for their appeal and influence with the
people, as Dr. Latchmansingh was among sugar workers, The
PPP received support and encouragement fromthe Caribbean
Labour Congress and its constituent parties; in 19^9,
arrangements were made for Burnham, then a law student in
London and Vice-President of the London branch of the CLC, to
visit Jamaica on his way home in order to study the organi-
2
nation of the PNP.
The success of the PPP was due to a number of
factors - its solution of the race issue by having both
Burnha® and Jagan as outstanding leaders, its organisation
and the devoted effort of many of its leading members, the
obvious sincerity of the movement, its demand for self-
1. cf. B.G. Constitutional Commission, 195'*, p. 23
2. Notes and Itinerary in CLC Papers.
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government and a platform not unlike that of the B'ILP which
1
had won support, and the poverty of organised opposition,
/
A'ith the exception of the MPCA, most of the major unions had
come to support the PPP by 1953, and its leadership was re¬
flected in their officers. On the sugar estates the Guiana
Industrial lorkers Union, with Latch;«ansingh as President, had
had its branch secretaries victimised and evicted by the estate
managements after a prolonged strike for recognition in 1952.
The support of the Party did not coiae, of course, frota the
upper class, and drew its strength from the "low standards
of living and the limited opportunities for personal advance¬
ment". The PPP, therefore, was the embodiment of the same
sort of protest as the working-class revolution, though its
3
appeal was to "all races and all classes" - except of course,
the European upper class.
The party's op osition to the safety devices built
into the 1953 Constitution stemmed from its demand for self-
government. It opposed the inclusion of a nominated State
Council in the constitution, the presence of officials in the
k
Legislative Assembly, and the veto powers of the Governor.
The overwhelming victory of the PPP in the elections of April
1953, when it won 1$ of the 24 seats on the Council, was the
first step towards a crisis. It 1® obviously difficult for
1. B.G. Constitutional Commission, 1994, pp. 23-4.
2. ibid., p. 35"
3. idem.
4. See Cheddi Jagan, Fight for Freedom - waddington
Constitution Exposed.
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a party which decries a constitution as inadequate to be
anxious to make that, constitution work. The character and
temper of the party's campaign, too, had obviously antagonised
the merchant-planter group arid caused at least apprehension
in the minds of the officials."* But it was in the actual
business of government that the crisis arose. Friction was
immediately generated by the Party's failure to make an immed¬
iate reply to the Queen's address, and by the tenor of Jagan's
reply which repeated Party criticisms of the constitution#
The refusal of the PPP Government to accept an invitation to
send delegates for the Queen's visit to Jamaica, the repeal
of the bill banning undesirable publications, the introduction
of a bill to repeal the wartime law restricting the freedom to
strike in essential services, and finally the Labour Relations
Bill, all contributed to build up an atmosphere of tension.
Except in the case of the visit to Jamaica, the PPP was
attempting to remedy a grievance against which had protested.
In fact, the last bill, which aimed at providing for a poll
in jurisdictional disputes between unions, could be regarded
as a constructive measure# Jagan had proposed it in the
2
Council in 1952. The question is, however, complicated by
the background of conflict and rivalry between MPCA and GIWU
in the latter's demand for recognition on the estates.
1. See B.G# Constitutional Coemission, 1954, pp# 41-5'*
for a reflection of these attitudes.
2. ibid, p# 58.
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Negotiations had been going on between the GIWU and the Sugar
Producers' Association on the question of recognition of the
union since August 13th, and on the 20th the SPA agreed to
recognise the GIWU conditionally, A meeting of the Union
called a strike next day, and Ashton Chase, as Minister,
announced his intention of introducing the labour relations
bill* Efforts to rush through all its stages in one day were
frustrated by the Speaker, but it was finally passed by the
House on October 8th. The provisionsof the bill, while
making polls compulsory, were inadequate."
The atmosphere of growing tension is evident from
the report of the Constituti nal Commission of 1954m though
it seems not to have affected ordinary members of the public.
A constitutional crisis was brewing over the Labour Relations
Bill, which was to go up to the State Council for deliberation;
the Party had made it clear that the Bill must go through at
all costs. It never did - the Constitution was suspended
before it could be discussed. The action taken in suspending
the constitution was defended in the official a/hite Paper
published afterwards, which listed charges ranging from minis¬
terial irresponsibility to undermining the loyalty of the
police against the PPP Ministers." Whatever the justice of
these accusations may be - and some of them appear to have
1. ibid, p.63*
2. British Guiana Suspension of Constitution White Pai^er,
1953.
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been based on very slender evidence - it is abundantly clear
that the PPP leaders were guilty of gross political misjudge¬
ment coupled with an irresponsibility! born of their overwhelm¬
ing success in the elections, which may well have been temporary.
The suspension of the constitution, when viewed at this dist¬
ance with as much objectivity as its contemporary character
allows, has the appearance of an official coup d'etat to fore¬
stall a constitutional crisis in a situation of rising tension,
rather than a necessary consequence of any of the events which
led up to it. A confession of weakness on the part of the
Governor in face of the strength and popularity of the PPP,
it indicated that the constitution could have been made to
work, had the pace of the PPP leaders* reforming zeal been
slower*
The arrival of troops in the territory appears to
have surprised most British Guianese, though it has been said
that PPP Ministers suspected some such action.* It gave to
most of the party's supporters an additional sense of grievance,
and had the immediate effect of hardening support behind it
in the country. In 1955, a split between Burnham and the Jagans
occurred. The cause of the breach has not been made clear,
but a genuine difference of opinion on the party's future
tactics, along with the rivalry for control of the party which
1. See, e.g., B.G. Constitutional Commission, 1954,




had always existed, seet to have been responsible. The split
destroyed the hope of Labour unity in British Guiana, and gave
to the territory's politics a racial complexion, the avoidance
of which had been one of the PPP's main assets.
Amid the turmoil of political developments after 19'*9*
trade unionism assumed secondary importance in the Labour Move¬
ment in British Guiana. During the years 19^7 - 1935» ^1 unions
were formed, and 18 dissolved. The tendency to fragmentation
has persisted in spite of a TUC plan in 19^8 to amalgamate
all its affiliate unions into one big union, with three sections
2
for sugar workers, government employees, and others. ' A list
compiled by the Labour Department for 1955 showed 37 functioning
unions with a total estimated membership of about 10,000. Two
of these unions, the MPCA and the TOU, had over 5*500 members
between them; 13 unions had less than 100 members, while none
of the others had more than 500 members. The alliance between
the PPP and the majority of the trade unions did not have the
effect of creating bigger and stronger unions.
Developments in Trinidad.
Developments in Trinidad have failed to produce
either the two large pro-Labour camps of the Jamaican Labour
Movement, or a Socialist Party with almost universal support
like the PPP in British Guiana. Both the political and the
1. See, e.g., The Great Betrayal, 1955* published by the
Jagan faction of the PPP.
2. Annual Report, 1948; Memo from TUC, 19^8 in CLC Papers.
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industrial sections of the Labour Movement in Trinidad re¬
veal a degree of individualism among leaders which has re¬
sulted in the diviaion of organised labour into a number of
independent groups. Trinidad had possessed an active Labour
Party before the disturbances, but the events set in motion
by the working class revolution had passed the TLP by. It
had virtually no support when Cipriani died in 19^5» and
though it continued to exist, its importance for tne Labour
Movement after 1939 is negligible.
The TLP was only one of a number of Labour or
Socialist Parties which appeared on the Trinidad scene with¬
out making any impression, in this period. In its longivity
it compares favourably with its rivals. Politics in Trinidad
has centred, until 195&» around personalities rather than
around parties, and in the era of adult suffrage and the
importance of trade unions, few candidates were to be found
who did not claim to be Labour candidates. This situation
makes discussion of political developments in the Labour
Movement in Trinidad more difficult than in the case of
Jamaica or British Guiana, as no distinct trends are apparent.
In s >ite of the failure of party politics to estab¬
lish itself in Trinidad, a number of parties emerged in the
period 19**0 to 1935» which were connected with the Labour
Movement• The first and nost important of these was the
West Indian National .Party, founded in 19**2, and inspired by
the example of the PNP in Jamaica.* Under the Presidency
1. Pitt to Manley, l8/7/19**5 in CLC Papers.
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of Dr. David Pitt, a Negro who has recently been adopted as
prospective Labour Party candidate for Hempstead in London,
its officers were ail Negro, ana included Roy Joseph and Dr.
Patrick Solomon, as well as Quentin O'Connor of the FJTU.
The uni-racial character of the membership obviously worried
its leaders, who claimed that they had done all that was
1
possible to encourage East Indians to join the party. As
its name implies, the Party meant to concern itself with the
entire .Vest Indian political scene; it had local branches in
Grenada and British Guiana from 1944. Its programme called
2
for, among other things:
1) Adult suffrage and an Executive responsible
to the Legislature; the abolition of property
and income qualifications for candidates to
the Legislative Council;
2) Re-distribution of land for land settlement;
3) Acquisition of the sugar estates for sale to
peasants; co-operative growing and refining
of sugar;
4) Eventual state ownership of sugar factories
and of the oil industry; nationalisation of
of public utilities;
5) Employment of local labour in 95^ of ail jobs
in the oil industry; increase of the profit
tax for use in a special fund to minimise
the economic efforts of eventual oil exhaustion;
6) A 44-hour week, and holidays with pay.
The Constitution of the WINP was unashamedly copied from the PNP.
1. idem.
2. iVINP, Statement of Policy; Programme and Constitution,
1945.
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The WINP failed to -ttract, not. only the East
Indians, but also the important trade unions which formed the
TUC - the (MTU, the ATSEFWTU and their tiny co-member, the
ATTGW7U. These unions had been founded by Rienzi who, after
being interned in the early years of the war, had accepted a
legal appointment in the Civil Service.1 Personal rivalries
and jealousy among union leaders had led to the secession of
the S J-W, and the dissolution of a number of smaller unions
had reduced the TUC to 3 units. The TUC leaders, Ralph
Kentor, Macdonald Hoses and John Rojas, had formed their own
Sociali t Party of Trinidad and Tobago, and contested the 1946
elections on a programme similar to the WINP. Pitt alleged
that TUC opposition to the WINP was the result of his refusal
to support Mentor's candidacy for Mayor of San Fernando in
1942;" Mentor accused the WINP, a body of "petti-bourgeois
(sie)... middle-class intellectuals" of copying the TUC
3
programme. The other labour organisation which the WINP
failed to attract was the TLP.
The approach of the 1946 elections witnessed the
formation of a United Labour Front, in which the WINP, Uriah
Butler, and the FfTU with Albert Gomes as President joined
with a number of prominent independents with labour sympathies.
Br. Solomon, a Vice-President of the WIMP, was Secretetry-
Treasurer of the Front. The Front was, in fact, little
1. See Report on Trinidad, c. January 1953# in CLC Papers.
2. Pitt to Maniey, 18/7/45 in CLC Papers.
3. Mentor, op, cit.
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more than an election coalition; its platform was substantially
the same as that outlined for the rfINF above - but there was
little difference between the programmes of the various
competing caucuses.*" Gomes had been expelled in 1944 from
the WINP for supporting T.A. ?4arryshow*s election campaign in
Grenada against a candidate put up by the Grenada branch of
the WIMP, but he had been re-admitted in 1945 and had won with
WINP support the Port-of Spain seat in the Legislative Council
2
which Cipriani's death left vacant." Butler, who had recently
been released from his wartime internment, obtained permission
from the Government to resume his trade union activity and
immediately broke with the Front, re-forming his British
Empire Citizens' and Workers' home Rule Party and starting
a union, the British Empire Workers', Peasants' and Ratepayers'
Union. In the elections, 3 of the 9 Front candidated were
returned, 2 of the 5 sponsored by Butler, 2 of the 5 Socialist
Party candidates, and 1, Koodal, associated with the TLP.
Gomes, sponsored by the Front, beat Butler in a straight fight
to x-etain his seat in North Port-of-Spain.
The elections were followed, not only by the dis¬
integration of the Front, but by the collapse of the WINP*
This was in no small way due to the alignment of elected
members in the Council. Gomes and Joseph, both WINP men,
had been nominated along with C. Abidh (Socialist) and Roodal
to the Executive Council; the other five elected members
1. Pitt to Maniey, 18/7/1943, CbC Papers•
2. Bee Trinidad Guardian, 26th April, 1946.
- 316 -
formed an opposition coalition bloc, which meant that Solomon
was now allied with Bryan (Socialist) against is old comrades.
The first sign of strained relationships was the decision of
the if INF to ask Joseph to resign his membership after he had
refused to implement a Party decision that he table a motion
J
for self-government in the Council, By the end of 1947»
the new alignments had^been cemented; Bryan, with the support
of the opposition bloc, beat Goraes decisively in the Port of
Spain Municipal elections. Gomes' defeat was regarded as
an indication of his growing unpopularity; his part in the
1946 waterfrcnt strikes had been critieed,'"' his acceptance of
nomination to the Executive Council had been a political
3
mistake," and his own politics appear to have been veering
steadily right.
Out of these new alignments the Caribbean Socialist
Party was born in 1948. The three Negro members of the
opposition bloc, Solomon, Bryan and A.P.T. James (who had
been elected on the Butler ticket) were its founders and
became President, 1st Vice-President, and 2nd Vice-President
respectively. The alliance between this bloc and the TUC,
which had seemed possible during the nsuracipal elections
4
campaign when Rojas and Mentor supported Bryan, did not
come about however. C.P. Alexander, President of the SWWU
Beacon, 7th December, 1946,
2. See Col. No. 213, 1947, pp. 8-13.
3. See Craig, op.cit., passim for popular attitudes in
Trinidad to nominated members. See also, tothurin
to Hart, 3/11/1947 in CLC Papers.
4. Mathurin to Hart, 3/11/1947 in CLC Papers.
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and of TUC's rival the Federation of Trade Unions, became
3rd Vice-President.
The CSP stood for much the sane things as the WIMP,
with the addition of one important demand for Federations*
1} immediate Responsible Government
2) Federation with Dominion Status, and internal
self-government for constituent units
3) a planned Socialist Economy on a Caribbean
regional basis
In spite of the party's obvious anxiety for Federation, which
had been discussed at the Montego Bay conference in the
previous year, it set as its "first and immediate" aim
internal self-Government for Trinidad - a development, it
was felt, which the Party's Socialist character made urgent
as "it is obviously impossible to have Socialism in a Crown
Colony".^
The CSP was not alone in the field, however. The
TLP was given a new surge of life in 1948 bv Raymond Hamel-
Smith and Edward Lai-Fook, two solicitors, the one white, the
other Chinese, and came out with a platform of self-Government
and Socialism. Bv the elections of 1950 under the new
constitution which the CSP opposed as not sufficiently
advanced, the four Labour parties - the CSP, the TLP, the TUC
3
party and the Butler group - had been joined by a more con¬
servative organisation, the Party of Political Progress Groups,
1. CSP, Constitution, Programme and Policy, 1948.
2. Extract from Vest Indian Crusader, 4/2/48 in CLC Papers.
3. It does not appear to have been called the "Socialist
Party" at this time.
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to which Gomes then belonged. In the elections the CSP won
only a seats, though it had contested the i all. The TLP
also won 2 seats among its 12 candidates, while Gomes held
his seat in North Port of Spain. It was the Butler group
which had most success, 6 of its 17 candidates being elected;
of these 6, Butler was the only non-East Indian. No TUC
candidate got in, though 6 independents did, among them Roy
Joseph, who had been forced to resign fromthe old WINP.
After its failure at the polls - Solomon, its
President, was defeated, thcugh Bryan and James had been
returned - the CSP collapsed. Politics after 195® took on
the same pattern as in the 19^6-50 period, with unorganised
combinations of members in the Council. Dissension soon
reigned in the Butler group, which had never been close-knit
anyway, and by 1935 it too was no more than a name. The TUC
had one last fling at political activity, joining with the
Workers' Freedom Movement, a group of young Marxists, which
included Jim Barrett of the old Negro Welfare and Cultural
Association, to form the West Indian Independence Party in
1952."'" Among its demands were nationalisation of oil, sugar
and asphalt, a %0-hour week, and full employment or unemploy-
2
ment relief. The concern of the Trinidad Government over
the association of the TUC leaders with the WIJP "which it is
alleged, not without evidence, is communist inspired and to a
1. Report on Trinidad c. January 1953, in CI-C Papers.
2. WIIP, Fundamenta1 Programme, 1952.
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large extent directed""1 ie mentioned by Dalley, who appears to
have persuaded cluentin O'Connor of the FWTU to resign his
2
post as treasurer of the party." fith the resignation of
Ttojas cf the O.vTU soon afterwards, the WIIP became little
more than a name.
Organised labour had failed to evolve by 1955 any
form of political p rty in Trinidad more lasting than the
caucus which is usually associated with middle-class politics
based on a property francliise.
Trade Unionism in Trinidad after 193^
The trade union situation in Trinidad after 1939
has been less chaotic than the political movement. There
was little union activity during the war years; only three
workers* unions were formed between 1940 and 1.945, and none
of them was still functioning by 1946. Existing unions had
secured agreements with employers, the SSTWU and the 0 VTU
'5
being notable examples. Developments in trade unionism
in Trinidad after 1946 show many of the same trends evident
in British Guiana ad Jamaica - conflicts and rivalry
between unions and the influence of political affiliations;
a strong tendency to a large number of small unions is
noticeable in Trinidad as in BG.
1. F.J/. Dal ley, General Industrial Conditions and Labour
Relations in Trinidad, (l95'•. P« 39•
2. ibid, p. 31,
3. cf. F.J. Dalley, Trade Union Organisation and Industrial
Relations in Trinidad, 191P/) passim.
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The end of the war was marked by a number of
strikes, and in the oilfields, by disturbances again associated
with Butler's activities. Me had been interned for most of
the war, alter he had lost the appointment of GWTO organiser
given Mini by Rienzi in 193:> after his successful appeal
against the sentence of imprisonment for his part in the 1937
disturbances* On being allowed to start organising a union
again at the end of 1945» he returned to the oil area. In
November 1946, he threatened a strike in the oil industry
which he called finally in mid-December. When the oilworkers,
well-disciplined members of the GwTU which had an agreement
to honour, refused to stay out, intimidation and violence
followed and ultimately led to police intervention."^
Butler's influence was also held to be responsible for a
2
strike on the sugar estates in May 194?* Reactions to the
strikes of 1996-4?, ana the intervention of members of the
Legislative Council, illustrated the close connection between
the trade unions and politics in spite of the absence of
organised political parties. This was inevitable, as most
of the elected members of the Council were officials of at
least one trade union*
The slr.^tes 1946 also illustratedthe problem of
general unions competing for the allegiance of workers in
the same plant. This was a problem which had been raised
1.
2.
of. Dalley, i>4? Report, App, 3, p. 4l.
ibid., pp. 19-22.
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before by the Industrial Adviser,"^ and efforts were made to
rejuvenate the TUC and to lake it really representative of
organised labour. This period of trade .mion unity was
brief* In 1951 the TUC t/as split once more, this time on
the question of its international affiliation; it had been
affiliated with the WFTU in 19^5. Cn the formation of the
ICFTU, the old TUC leaders, Rojas and O'Connor, refused to
disaffiliate, and the Northern Unions, headed by C»P*
Alexander of the SWWU formed the Federation of Trade Unions
2
in its stead. This division in the trade union movement
persisted up to 1955» the TUC being- comprised of the (MTU
and the F.'«TU only.
The official encouragement given to the ICFTU group
of unions soon developed into Government hostility to the
constituent unions of the TUC, whose leaders were regarded
3
as communist. In 1954* Government withdrew recognition
U
from the F;'/TU as the bargaining body for some of its workers*
There is little doubt that pressure was being put upon the
TUC unions to break their communist connection - they were
associated with the WIXP at this time - and that this
3
pressure achieved its purpose.
I, e.g. in his Report for 194-9.
rA, Dailey, 195** Report, p.56*
3* cf* Report on Trinidad, c. January, 1953 in CLC Papers.
4. Annual Report, 1954.
5. Dalley, 1954 Report, pp.36-40.
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It is difficult to make any evaluation of the
growth of trade unionism in Trinidad because of the- in¬
adequacy of information about trade union membership.
From 1? registered unions in 1945 it has grown to 2? unions
with an estimateu memoership of 2u,OOo in 194b, anu to 52
1 3
unions with approximately 4o,000 members in i955» of
this membership in 1953 was concentrated in 5 unions, one
of them, the Oft'TU, having % of ail unionists in its ranks*
14 unions had less tuan 100 members, 14 others less than
300. ? unions were defunct. Personal observation confirms
the acceptance of trade unionism in industrial life, and the
exist&nce of a number of sound trade union leaders who
impart to the movement a maturity which it lacked in
earlier days.
Report of Industrial Adviser. 1945; Commissioner of




It is not the intention to formulate any set of
conclusions about the character of Labour Movements in the
British Caribbean* A number of features have become obvious,
however, in the course of this historical survey, mention of
which may prove to be of interest at this point* They are set
out briefly and precisely without any attempt at illustration
by an abundance of examples; they are, however, based upon
the development of Labour Movements in the three territories
as outlined in previous chapters.
1. These Labour .Movements must be regarded as movements
of social protest in the broadest sense, with interwoven
implications of economic and social class and of racial and
political relationships. Not only is this characteristic
the result of conditions in British Caribbean society which
gave rise to Labour Movements; it also gives to organised
labour a form and direction which makes separation of the
trade union ant political wings of these movements unlikely,
(we might almost say impossible), and which is likely to
have a racial content, not always apparent at first sight,
as long as a noticeable correlation between race, class
and ownership remains.
2. Labour leaders in the area have been overwhelmingly
middle-class in occupation and outlook. This is partly a
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consequence of the need for intelligent leadership (as is
emphasized by the example of the Butler movement) which has
had to be gleaned from outside the ranks of the working class
for the most part. Middle class leadership has been facilitated
by the degree of social mobility which education makes possible,
so that a lawyer labour leader, for instance, may well be the
son of sugar estate workers. It lias been made possible, too,
by the identity of interests between the coloured, Negro and
East Indian middle class and the Negro and East Indian working
class in the face of white economic and political dominance,
and by the values current in the area, which encourage the
absorbtion of working class leaders into a class with higher
social status. Working class leaders, like Butler, who have
remained working class are not generally accepted.
V
3. A great deal of the leadership of Labour Movements
in the three territories is cliarisaiatic in character, and
depends on personality rather than on the prospect of solid
achievement. This is not only conducive to irresponsible
leadership, but may also pose problems of discipline and
loyalty vrhen the first glamour of improved material condit¬
ions has faded, or when economic circumstances make some
sort of distress unavoidable.
4. The emphasis on self-government in the political
Labour Movement follows from the political and economic
circumstances of the three territories, and is strengthened
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by the predominance of middle class leadership. Paradoxically,
Nationalism has not been accompanied by a desire to sever the
British connection; only the extreme left-wing of the Labour
Movement in any territory has been seriously accused of being
anti-British. Butler's "British I&npire" associations are only
blatant examples of an attachment that appears to be instinctive.
5. Most Labour manifestoes have shown a desire for
agrarian reform irreconcilable with their socialist platform;
proposals for state ownership of sugar estates often co-incide
with plans to redistribute estate lands at low cost to a
settled peasantry* This may be a reflection of the two
complimentary strands in these Labour Movements hich blend
essentially middle class ideals with more practical working
class demands. It may also be a reflection of the essentially
nationalist character of the Labour Movement which often
unites cane farming peasants and sugar workers in the same
union.
6, Socialist demands, and many Labour demands for
social reform, have often left the impression of borrowed
tools, the adaptation of which to focal conditions has not
been attempted. Demands for the nationalisation of factors
of production, for example, have been made almost in the same
breath as proposals to attract foreign capital investors.
The difference between the socialist platform of the WIIP,
for example, and that of the PPP appears to lie in the
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degree of intellectual conviction with which these platforms
are advanced.
7. There have existed in the trade union movement
concurrent trends towards huge general unions and towards a
multiplicity of small industrial or occupational unions. The
small size of industrial employment units is probafely respons¬
ible for the latter trend.
8. All three labour Movements have been split on
ideological, racial or personality differences, or on a
combination of these. This appears to indicate the absence
of any deep underlying philosophy which might have a
unifying effect.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT.
Generalt
CLC — Caribbean Labour Congress
ICFTU - International Confederation of Free
Trade Onions
ISA - International Sugar Agreement
WFTU - World Federation of Trade Unions
British Guiana:
BGCA - British Guiana Clerks' Association
BGCGW - British Guiana Congress of General Workers
BGLP - British Guiana Labour Party
BGLU « British Guiana Labour Union
BGWL • British Guiana Workers' League
BGPOWU - British Guiana Post Office Workers' Union
BGSU - British Guiana Seamen's Union
BGSU (2) - British Guiana Sawyers' Union
GIWU - Guiana Industrial Workers' Union
MMU - Moulders' and Mechanics' Union
MPCA - Man-Power Citizens' Association
PPP - People's Progressive Party
SGEA - Subordinate Government Employees'
Association
SMEU - Subordinate Medical Employees' Association
SPA - Sugar Producers' Association
TWU - Transport Workers' Union
Jajaical
BATU - Builders' and Allied Trades' Union
BITU - Bustamante Industrial Trade Union
•JAFU - Jamaica Artisans' Federated Union
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JDA - Jamaica Drivers' Association
JESTLU - Jamaica Ex-Servicemen's Trades and
Labour Union
JHEA - Jamaica Hotel Employees* Association
JLP - Jamaica Labour Party
JUCA - Jamaica United Clerks' Association
JWTU - Jamaica Workers' and Tradesmen's Union
NWU • National Workers' Union
PNP « People's National Party
PWLA - Printers' Welfare League Association
TUAC • Trades Union Advisory Council
TUC • Trades Union Congress
Trinidad:
ABWU - Amalgamated Building Workers' Union
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i) Files of the Registrar of Trade Unions in British
Guiana, Jamaica and Trinidad.
ii) Trinidad Dispatches, 1966 - 19^6. (These were made
available by the curtesy of the Trinidad Government, though
of course only the open dispatches could be used.)
iii) Director of Medical Services, Jamaica | Memo on
Medical and Housing Conditions, 1936. (Colonial Office
Library)
iv) Police Report on Recent Labour Riots and Disorders
in Jamaica. 1938. 20th June, 1938. (Colonial Office
Library).
2. Labour Sources:
i) Caribbean Labour Congress Papers. (These are a
miscellaneous and uncatalogued collection of reports,
minutes of meetings, correspondence, pamphlets, party
manifestoes and constitutions, agreements and memoranda,
which cover the period 19^5 to 1951* They were loaned
by Mr. A. Richard Hart, who had been Secretary of the now
defunct CLC. As source material for the post World War 11
period they are invaluable.)
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